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APPROACHING THE PLANCK SCALE FROM A GENERALLY
RELATIVISTIC POINT OF VIEW: A PHILOSOPHICAL APPRAISAL OF
LOOP QUANTUM GRAVITY
Christian Wu¨thrich, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2006
My dissertation studies the foundations of loop quantum gravity (LQG), a candidate for
a quantum theory of gravity based on classical general relativity. At the outset, I discuss
two—and I claim separate—questions: first, do we need a quantum theory of gravity at
all; and second, if we do, does it follow that gravity should or even must be quantized?
My evaluation of different arguments either way suggests that while no argument can be
considered conclusive, there are strong indications that gravity should be quantized.
LQG attempts a canonical quantization of general relativity and thereby provokes a
foundational interest as it must take a stance on many technical issues tightly linked to the
interpretation of general relativity. Most importantly, it codifies general relativity’s main
innovation, the so-called background independence, in a formalism suitable for quantization.
This codification pulls asunder what has been joined together in general relativity: space and
time. It is thus a central issue whether or not general relativity’s four-dimensional structure
can be retrieved in the alternative formalism and how it fares through the quantization
process. I argue that the rightful four-dimensional spacetime structure can only be partially
retrieved at the classical level. What happens at the quantum level is an entirely open issue.
Known examples of classically singular behaviour which gets regularized by quantization
evoke an admittedly pious hope that the singularities which notoriously plague the classical
theory may be washed away by quantization. This work scrutinizes pronouncements claiming
that the initial singularity of classical cosmological models vanishes in quantum cosmology
based on LQG and concludes that these claims must be severely qualified. In particular, I
explicate why casting the quantum cosmological models in terms of a deterministic temporal
evolution fails to capture the concepts at work adequately. Finally, a scheme is developed
of how the re-emergence of the smooth spacetime from the underlying discrete quantum
structure could be understood.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Theoretical physics at the outset of the 21st century is confronted with a quandary strangely
reminiscent of the one Newton’s predecessors faced in the 17th century: two incompati-
ble theories quite successfully describe two different, but perhaps overlapping, domains of
physical phenomena. There was the sub-lunar domain of the terrestrial physics of projectile
motion to which Galileo so heavily contributed on the one hand, and the supra-lunar realm
of a Copernican solar system with heavenly bodies moving in Keplerian orbits on the other.
Galileo unsuccessfully attempted a (limited) unification of the two theoretical frameworks
by means of circular inertia, but it was only Newton who formulated a mechanical theory
capable of accounting for both celestial and terrestrial motion by using a consistent set of
just a few simple axioms.
Today, as repeatedly emphasized by Carlo Rovelli,1 physicists are faced with a similar
challenge. The laws of various quantum theories (QTs) govern the small-scale phenomena
of elementary particle physics, while the laws of general relativity (GTR) encode the large
scale structure of the universe. The string theorist Brian Greene analogized the situation
to a city with two different sets of traffic laws interfering with one another.2 But since the
fundamental forces responsible for the relevant effects studied by the two separate frameworks
exhibit vastly different ranges and thus operate at very different scales, they seem to co-exist
relatively peacefully. In Greene’s loose talk, it is as if the two kinds of traffic to which
the different sets of laws apply occur at very different levels such as to preclude (almost)
every conflict between the laws belonging to different sets. Like in a cyclists’ dream, it
is as if there is a set of traffic laws applying to cars and one set applying to bicycles,
with these two worlds rarely, if ever, clashing. But the impression of peace is deceptive.
Rather than a prosperous marriage, the situation resembles an ill-conceived truce which
could be broken anytime as new astrophysical data pours in. The 20th century revolution
in theoretical physics, which has brought QT and GTR and thus smashed the conceptual
coherence of classical physics, has so far failed to deliver a mathematically consisted and
1Most recently in Rovelli (2006).
2In the PBS show “The Elegant Universe” (part I) aired on 28 October 2003.
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conceptually unified successor framework. As Rovelli argues at the outset of his recently
published treatise on quantum gravity (Rovelli 2004), each of the two separate frameworks
assumes concepts contradicted by the other. In order to account for the evolution of quantum
states as encoded in the Schro¨dinger equation, QT requires a time parameter external to the
system at stake. In quantum field theory (QFT), the evolution of quantum fields similarly
presupposes a fixed spacetime background independent of the fields. In a stark contrast, GTR
dissolves these notions of external time and of a fixed background spacetime in favour of a
dynamical spacetime which encapsulates the gravitational field. This dynamical structure
co-evolves interdependently with the non-gravitational matter fields in accordance with the
Einstein field equations coupled to the dynamical equations governing the matter fields. In
return, however, in assuming a smooth, continuous metric field, GTR violates the dictum
of QT that all dynamical fields must be quantized. While GTR has revolutionized the
concepts of space and time, it has largely remained faithful to classical notions of matter
and causality. Conversely, QT adheres to pre-(generally-)relativistic concepts of space and
time, but completely reconceptualized matter, measurements, and causality.
The challenge of quantum gravity (QG) is the challenge of completing the 20th century
revolution in physics by fusing the two incommensurable frameworks and of re-establishing
a conceptual harmony at the fundamental level. Not only will a quantum theory of gravity
(QTG) resolve the incompatibilities between QT and GTR, but it will also be an essential,
and perhaps final, step to the theoretical unification of fundamental physics—or so it is
hoped.3 As a result, QG is viewed by many as the challenge for theoretical physics in the
21st century. Today more physicists than ever are busy formulating such a new synthesis of
quantum and relativistic physics. Their efforts have yielded a rich variety of approaches, as
will be briefly outlined in Section 1.1. They most prominently include loop quantum gravity
(LQG) and string theory (ST), along with, among others, non-commutative geometry, causal
sets, Euclidean gravity, topological quantum field theory (TQFT), and more idiosyncratic
approaches such as Regge calculus and Penrose’s twistor theory.
My thesis will concentrate on the conceptual foundations of canonical QG and of LQG.
But why LQG? Apart from ST, LQG is the most mature and worked out approach to QG,
having been initiated in 1988 by Jacobson, Smolin, and Rovelli based on Ashtekar’s connec-
tion formulation of GTR and has now grown into a respectable branch with an estimated
100 researchers worldwide. Contrary to ST, it starts out from the basic principles of GTR
by formulating a non-perturbative theory presupposing background-independence. As will
3QT and GTR are incompatible, but they may not be inconsistent—or it may not be decidable whether
they are inconsistent or not: it seems as if the mathematical frameworks of the two theories are too disparate
to allow the derivation of a contradiction, which is what would be necessary to speak of jointly inconsistent
theories in the proper sense of the term.
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be explored in Chapter 5, it has celebrated its first successes—the calculation of the spec-
trum of the area and volume operators, as well as the derivation of the Bekenstein-Hawking
black hole entropy—and is still actively developed. Its glowing lava, as it were, has not yet
solidified into a mantric dogma and is still very much in flux. In particular, the problems of
how the spin network states evolve and of the theory’s classical limit have not yet been re-
solved. Rovelli (2004) compares the task of solving the problem of QG with other seemingly
insurmountable obstacles in the development of physical theories whose removal had always
been guided by epistemological prejudices. He finds that for all cataclysmic resolutions of
momentous conceptual challenges in the history of physics such philosophical guidance and
nurture was essential. It is therefore an exciting prospect for me to probe the philosophical
and conceptual commitments of LQG and to study how they are instrumental in resolving
the tension between QT and GTR.
1.1 MAPPING QUANTUM GRAVITY
The quest for a quantum theory of gravity (QTG) starts at least as early as 19304 with
Rosenfeld (1930a,b) and has captured the imagination of physicists ever since. Rosenfeld’s
original proposal envisioned a quantum field theory of quantum fluctuations of the metric
on a Minkowski spacetime. Since then, many approaches have been developed. But I will
make no attempt at recounting the early (or later) history of quantum gravity.5 Rather, this
section is supposed to give some orientation in the field of QG.
Many different approaches to finding a quantum theory of gravity have been attempted.
So many indeed that Fotini Markopoulou has repeatedly felt compelled to compare the
situation in QG to the one in atomic theory a bit more than a century ago.6 Due to this
4The need for a QTG was, as far as I know, first expressed by Einstein in his 1916 remark that
“due to the inner-atomic movements of electrons, atoms would have to radiate not only
electromagnetic, but also gravitational energy, if only in a tiny amount. As this is hardly
true in nature, it seems as if quantum theory will have to modify not only Maxwellian
electrodynamics, but also the new theory of gravitation.” (Einstein 1916b, p. 696)
[“Gleichwohl mu¨ssten die Atome zufolge der inneratomischen Elektronenbewegung nicht nur elektromagneti-
sche, sondern auch Gravitationsenergie ausstrahlen, wenn auch in winzigem Betrage. Da dies in Wahrheit in
der Natur nicht zutreffen du¨rfte, so scheint es, dass die Quantentheorie nicht nur die Maxwellsche Elektro-
dynamik, sondern auch die neue Gravitationstheorie wird modifizieren mu¨ssen.”] He reiterated this stance
two years later (Einstein 1918, p. 164).
5For an account of the early history, see Stachel (1999). For a cursory overview of the (entire) history of
quantum gravity, see Rovelli (2002a). For some illuminating remarks, cf. also Ashtekar (2005).
6She cites Boltzmann’s assessment: “Every Tom, Dick and Harry, felt himself called upon to devise his
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excess of alternative approaches to QG, it will not be practicable to present all—or even
most—of them on the present occasion. Apart from LQG, I will restrict myself to a few brief
remarks on string theory in Section 1.2.7
This plethora of distinct approaches to QG reflects the state of a field in which there is no
consensus as to what constitutes even the relevant departure points. Not only are we faced
with the complete lack of a common axiomatic ground, but each camp views the others’
most important and most cherished vantage points as doubtful at best, and as irrelevant,
incoherent, or almost trivially false in other cases. Alternative approaches to QG only seem
to share the understanding that classical GTR and standard QFT should be reproduced from
a QTG in the appropriate low-energy limits. Despite this disconcerting disarray, some camps
live closer to one another than do others. Many authors of introductory texts to QG therefore
attempt to group together different camps which depart from similar vantage points. A
number of different classifications have been proposed in the literature, all from different
points of view, stressing different aspects and all with different merits. Without thoroughly
combing the entire range, let me briefly present two convincing proposals. For instance,
Chris Isham (1994b, 1995) distinguishes four broad types of approaches: (i) quantize GTR,
(ii) general-relativize QT, (iii) regard GTR as a low-energy limit of a QT constructed using
conventional ideas, without a quantization of the gravitational field, and finally (iv) consider
both GTR and QFT as low-energy limits of a radically new fundamental theory to be formed
ab initio. Let me say a few words about each family in turn.
(i) Schemes of this family start out from classical GTR and attempt to obtain a quantum
theory by applying so-called “quantization” techniques to the classical theory, i.e. they adopt
some mathematical procedure which turns classical fields into quantum fields. I will follow
Isham (1995, Sec. 2.2) in designating as quantization a diorthotic, i.e. corrective, scheme
which starts out from a classical system and subjects it to a procedure of well-defined and
justified steps in order to obtain a quantum system. For instance, the quantization of a
classical field will yield a corresponding quantum field, described by a QT. Isham contrasts
this procedure to formulating a QT without prior reference to a classical system, such as
seeking a representation of an algebra on a Hilbert space. Quantization techniques involve a
broad range of methods and have been successfully used to develop quantum electrodynamics
(QED), quantum flavour dynamics (QFD) or Glashow-Salam-Weinberg electroweak theory,
and quantum chromodynamics (QCD). Despite its success, it is believed by many to be
reversing Nature’s order: because the world is quantum at heart, it is in principle wrong-
own special combination of atoms and vortices and fancied in having done so that he had pried out the
ultimate secrets of the Creator.” Cf. e.g. Markopoulou (2003).
7For an extensive bibliographic review of approaches to understand the small scale structure of spacetime,
cf. Gibb (1995).
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headed to start from a theory of which we know it cannot be true in order to arrive at the
fundamental theory. I will briefly return to this issue in Chapter 2.
Family (i) approaches come in two distinct genera: the canonical and the covariant. The
latter tries to directly quantize the four-dimensional spacetime, but at the cost of splitting
the gravitational field into a fixed background metric and “gravity proper” as a perturbation
on this background. This genus has become nearly extinct since the realization that co-
variant quantizations of GTR are not perturbatively renormalizable in 1974.8 The canonical
scheme casts GTR as a constrained Hamiltonian system in preparation to apply the so-called
canonical quantization program and thus breaks GTR’s manifest general covariance by in-
troducing a foliation of spacetime. However, this approach does not necessitate a splitting
of the gravitational field, as we shall see in Chapters 3 and 4. My main focus will lie on this
genus as it contains the species of quantum geometrodynamics and LQG.
(ii) Members of family (ii) try to use a quantum (field) theory as vantage point and
then utilize some procedure performing a similar function as quantization did in family (i)
approaches in order to make the quantum theory generally relativistic. Approaches of this
family are sparse, Isham only mentions Fredenhagen and Haag (1987). More recent surveys
of the most important effort in this camp can be found in Brunetti, Fredenhagen, and Verch
(2003) and Brunetti and Fredenhagen (2006). The main idea of this main strand is to incor-
porate in a local sense general relativity’s principle of general covariance such as to obtain a
locally generally covariant algebraic QFT. Interestingly, this seems to necessitate the simul-
taneous treatment of all admissible spacetimes as background on which the quantum fields
live. Supposedly, gravitation is thought to enter the picture through the various background
spacetimes which represent the gravitational field.
(iii) The third family, like family (ii), takes a quantum theory as its vantage point. But
instead of “relativizing” the quantum theory, it attempts to extend the quantum theory
using methods as conventional as possible with the goal that GTR will drop out of the
extended theory as an appropriate low-energy limit. The most prominent species in this
family is string theory (ST), which is sufficiently important in QG to warrant a section even
in a dissertation on canonical approaches (see Section 1.2). Clearly, ST goes well beyond
conventional QFT, both methodologically and in terms of its ambition. Isham nevertheless
relates ST with family (iii) rather than (iv), presumably because it takes as its vantage
point, both historically and systematically, conventional QFT and does not attempt to build
a novel approach completely dissociated from “old” physics. Topological QFT (Atiyah 1989;
Lawrence 1996) is another genus of this family. In a topological QFT, the correlation func-
tions between quantum observables are calculated from topological invariants, i.e. they do
8Cf. ’t Hooft and Veltman (1974) and Deser and Nieuwenhuizen (1974a,b).
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not depend on the metric of the background spacetime. Topological QFTs known so far
come in two subgenera, one containing the species of BF theory9 and Chern-Simons theory10
and the other consisting of Witten’s more subtle way of formulating topological invariants.
Euclidean quantum gravity is another important genus in family (iii).11
(iv) Finally, the last Ishamian family of approaches to QG is most aptly characterized by
their iconoclastic attitude. No known physics serves as starting point for these approaches;
rather, they consider radically novel perspectives and try to formulate a QTG ab initio,
oftentimes axiomatically. All members of this family that I am aware of suggest only pro-
grammatic schemes and are rather remote from offering fully fledged theories of QG. The
attraction of this family lies in the apparent incompatibility of the guiding principles be-
hind GTR and any QT. The most prominent representatives of this family are the causal
sets approach (Bombelli et al. 1987; Brightwell et al. 2003) and non-commutative geometry
(Connes 2000; Schu¨cker 2001, 2005). ST does not belong to this last category because it
starts out from conventional QT and extends its methods and scope such as to include, in
some sense, gravity. Despite its radically novel understanding of fundamental physics, it is
not an attempt to formulate a QTG ab initio.
Naturally, one finds different—and inequivalent—classifications of the roads promising
to lead to a QTG in the literature. A somewhat more standard classificatory scheme is
found in Rovelli (2002a). He distinguishes three major families: (i) the sum-over-histories
approaches, (ii) the covariant school, and (iii) the family of approaches based on the canonical
quantization scheme. The third group is identical to Isham’s second genus of the first family.
Rovelli’s second family, however, comprises species from Isham’s first genus of the first family,
but also from his second and third families. The same holds for Rovelli’s first family, the sum-
over-histories line, which takes Feynman’s path integrals as the methodical vantage point and
quantizes GTR using his functional integrals. Both Hawking’s Euclidean quantum gravity
programme as well as the spinfoam models, to be discussed below, have grown out of this
idea.
Rovelli’s scheme does not really accommodate heterodox approaches such as causal sets
and non-commutative geometry. But it provides a valuable classification for understanding
the clash of the QG giants, ST and LQG. ST in all its versions has emerged from the
covariant approach, while LQG is the most promising theory on the canonical side. The
two sides reflect, to some extent, the divide between particle physicists trying to extend
9Interestingly, GTR can be formulated as a BF model with constraints. Thus, it might afford a close
relation to LQG via a perturbative expansion of BF-type spinfoam models. For a self-contained introduction
to spinfoams and BF theory and their relation, see Baez (1999).
10Originally published in Chern and Simons (1974).
11The canonical reference for Euclidean QG is Gibbons and Hawking (1993).
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the standard model to include gravity, and relativity theorists attempting to formulate a
quantum theory of gravity based on GTR.
1.2 STRING THEORY
The debate between the covariant and the canonical camps is sometimes fought with humour,
as Rovelli’s dialogue (Rovelli 2003a) between a string theorist and a student of LQG, emulat-
ing Galileo’s Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems of 1632, bears witness, and
sometimes with bile, as some private reactions to Rovelli’s dialogue testify.12 In any case, ST
has managed to garner much more resources than LQG.13 In this section, the reader shall
be briefed about the core ideas of ST. For an introduction to perturbative string theory, see
Piran and Weinberg (1988), or the classical, but outdated, textbook by Green, Schwarz, and
Witten (1987). A more recent textbook, which has quickly become the standard reference,
is Polchinksi (1998). For a popularization of ST including its non-perturbative aspects, see
Greene (1999) and Susskind’s contribution (Susskind 2003) to the special issue of Physics
World on QG. Zwiebach (2004) offers the most recent textbook on ST, which despite its
technical parts seems quite accessible. The text is sufficiently recent to include a detailed
chapter on how the black hole entropy is calculated in ST. See also the “official” string the-
ory website: www.superstringtheory.com. For an introduction to duality theories,M -theory,
F -theory, and other results in non-perturbative ST, see Sen (1999).
ST exists at two levels. At the perturbative level, on the one hand, ST consists of a set
of well-developed mathematical techniques which define the string perturbation expansion
over a given background metric. On the other hand, attempts at formulating the elusive
non-perturbative theory, supposed to be capable of generating the perturbation expansion,
have not succeeded so far. Such a theory, conventionally named M -theory, for “membrane,”
“matrix,” or “mystical” theory, consists of but incipient formulations using non-perturbative
compactifications of higher dimensional theories based on so-called duality symmetries, i.e.
symmetries relating strong coupling limits in one string theory to a weak coupling limit
in another (dual) string theory. Here, I will minimize my remarks on the technically con-
trived non-perturbative theory, and concentrate on giving a brief survey to the main ideas
of perturbative ST.
12Carlo Rovelli, personal communication, June 2004.
13Lee Smolin estimates the number of researchers in ST to reach a total of 1,000, as compared to LQG
which occupies roughly 100 researchers worldwide. The distribution of research funds, academic positions,
and attention from the popular science press is equally disproportionate.
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Perturbative ST (henceforth just ST) arose in the 1960s from attempts to describe the
strong nuclear force. Physicists realized that its mathematical machinery to describe strong
interactions dealt with extended objects called “strings,” rather than with the point-like
particles of traditional approaches. Elementary particles, in this picture, were constituted
by closed loops in different states of vibrations. But the initial enthusiasm died rather quickly
when attempts to understand the theory’s requirement of a ten-dimensional spacetime and its
stubborn prediction of a massless spin-2 particle failed. When it became clear that quantum
chromodynamics offered a highly successful theory of the strong interaction, ST was about
to sink into oblivion.
But the problems of ST can be turned into virtues, or at least to some degree, if it is no
longer considered to be merely a theory of hadrons, the carriers of the strong interaction,
but of all interactions. Specifically, the mysterious massless spin-2 particle is identified with
the graviton, the interaction particle of gravitation. The extra-dimensions are interpreted as
small, compact spatial dimensions resulting from the spacetime dynamics. No conflict with
observations exists as long as these extra-dimensions are sufficiently small. In this picture,
then, strings in different vibrational modes account for different families of particles, includ-
ing quarks, leptons, Higgs, photons, gravitons, gluons, W - and Z-bosons. Interactions occur
when strings break up or join together and thus, since all particles—including interaction
particles—can be formed with strings in particular vibrational modes, ST accommodates all
forces. The theory’s ambition of devising a grand unified theory is of course based on this
claim. But in order to incorporate fermions, ST requires certain supersymmetries to obtain,
now recognized as a generic feature of ST. Because at least some portion of supersymmetry
needs to be realized if ST is to be mathematically consistent, supersymmetry (its existence,
not the characteristic energy scale of its breaking) can be regarded as a prediction of ST quite
regardless of which compactification is chosen. So far, however, supersymmetry has not been
observed, despite numerous assurances from string theorists that it is “around the corner.”
According to one educated guess (Schwarz 2000), the lightest supersymmetric particle (the
“neutralino”), at a mass of at least 100GeV, might be detected by the Large Hadron Collider
at CERN, which is planned to go into operation in 2007.
Perturbative ST is free of ultraviolet divergences. The “world lines” of the point particles
as represented in Feynman diagrams of perturbative QFT become two-dimensional “world
sheets” of an extended one-dimensional string who lives in a higher-dimensional spacetime.
Analogously, the junctions of world lines in the Feynman diagrams used in the description
of interactions turn into string world sheets of various topologies essentially imitating the
Feynman sum-over-histories method. The n-th term of the ST perturbation expansion is
associated with a Riemann surface of genus n. Since ST does not require for interactions to
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be associated with world line junctions at given spacetime points, but only, it is claimed, with
smooth changes of the topology of the two-dimensional world sheets of strings, the interaction
amplitudes do not contain ultraviolet infinities. To repeat, strings are one-dimensional open
or closed objects. But in principle, there can be any p-dimensional analogues of strings
(called p-branes) sweeping out a (p + 1)-dimensional “world volume.” However, for p > 1,
non-renormalizable short-distance infinities arise.
Importantly, ST is not a background-independent theory. All strings, including those rep-
resenting gravitons, live in a higher-dimensional background spacetime. In a purely bosonic
ST, the dimensionality of the background spacetime is 26. If we add in fermions, and thus su-
persymmetry supplemented by constraints forming a so-called super-Virasoro algebra,14 only
the specific choice of d = 10 cures otherwise prevalent mathematical anomalies. So in an
apparent contradiction to any evidence, full supersymmetric ST requires a ten-dimensional
background spacetime. As mentioned above, the contradiction can be resolved by curling up
the six extra spatial dimensions to tiny scales inaccessible to experimentation. The geomet-
rical structure of these extra dimensions behaves according to the dynamical equations of the
theory and can, as a result of this, only assume the metric structure of so-called Calabi-Yau
spaces.15 The process of rolling up the extra dimensions into a compact space too small
to be observed is called compactification. Within the context of some STs, a Calabi-Yau
compactification can then lead to an effective theory describing four-dimensional physics
which resembles a supersymmetric extension of the standard model with gravity. Unfor-
tunately, however, there are (at least) tens of thousands of Calabi-Yau spaces which meet
the dynamical requirements and could therefore encode the metrical structure of the extra
dimensions.16 Only if one picks a “right” specimen of Calabi-Yau space, the standard model
is reproduced at low energies. Also, the topology of the Calabi-Yau space determines the
number of lepton and quark families. But while suitable choices seem to reproduce a lot of
the familiar four-dimensional physics, the number of these choices and the degree to which
they determine the effective theory leads to an unacceptable level of immunity of the theory
from empirical tests, enabling ST to absorb almost any experimental finding.
Only within the last ten years, during the so-called “second superstring revolution,”17
signs of a non-perturbative theory have emerged. So-called dualities relate the five per-
turbative superstring theories to one another, such that the five theories are but five dif-
14For a review of classical and quantum super-Virasoro algebras, cf. e.g. Mansour (2001).
15This was established, under some plausible conditions, in Candelas et al. (1985). The existence of these
spaces was first proved by Yau (1977).
16Estimates for the number of stable compactifications range in the order of 10500 (Carroll 2004). We are
not exaggerating, then, if we insist that the compactification of extra-dimensions is non-unique.
17The “first revolution” refers to the formulation of the five mathematically consistent, supersymmetric,
perturbative string theories in ten dimensions during the mid-eighties.
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ferent perturbative expansions about five different points, thus hinting at an underlying
non-perturbative theory. Higher-dimensional p-branes are no longer plagued with infinities,
as they were in the perturbative expansions. Three different kinds of dualities relate theories
of strong coupling to those of weak coupling, theories compactified on a space of (relatively)
large volume to those compactified on a space of small volume, and finally theories compact-
ified on a space of large (small) volume to those of strong (weak) coupling.
In his contribution to PSA 19, Sean Carroll (2004) has offered an intuitive explication
of how the gravitational force is supposed to be captured by ST. A transverse gravitational
wave will exert a small tidal force on circularly arranged test masses. These then start to
oscillate into ellipses along axes perpendicular to the direction of wave propagation. Because
this pattern strongly resembles the propagation of an oscillating string, strings with the
appropriate oscillation are believed to form gravitons, the interaction particles of gravity.
Apart from the inclusion of the graviton, ST claims to solve the problem of QG for another
reason. The world sheet theory must exhibit so-called Weyl invariance, a certain consistency
condition on the background spacetime, in order for the perturbation expansion to be mean-
ingful. This condition turns out to resemble the Einstein equations with source terms from
an anti-symmetric tensor field and the dilaton (Polchinksi 1998, Vol. I, pp. 111f). It is an
open question, however, whether the requirement of the Weyl invariance of the perturbation
expansion will emerge from the dynamical equations of the non-perturbative theory. If it
does not, it is unclear how the Einstein equations could emerge from ST in an appropriate
low-energy limit.
Perhaps the most remarkable (theoretical) success of ST is its derivation of the Beken-
stein-Hawking entropy of a black hole. Consider an amount of a hot gas that falls into a black
hole. Respecting the Second Law of thermodynamics, of course, the combined system “black
hole + gas” cannot decrease its total entropy in this process. Consequently, in absorbing
the hot gas, the black hole must increase its entropy by at least the amount of entropy the
gas had before its absorption. Along these lines, Bekenstein (1972, 1974) suggested that
there is an entropy associated with black holes and that it should be proportional to the
area of its horizon. Shortly thereafter, relying on calculations in QFT on curved spacetime
backgrounds, Hawking (1975) and Hartle and Hawking (1976) showed that a black hole emits
radiation, exactly at the temperature predicted by Bekenstein. Thus, a Schwarzschild black
hole has the entropy
S =
k
4G
A, (1.1)
in natural units (cf. Section A.1) where A is the surface area of the horizon of the black hole,
with k the Boltzmann constant and G the Newton constant. Although neither the Bekenstein
entropy nor the Hawking radiation have ever been observed, most physicists consider them
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as part of established physics. This confidence is based on the many independent ways in
which this result has since been derived from well-established theories.18
An entropy S is usually interpreted as the number of distinguishable states Ω, S = k lnΩ.
Classically, the entropy of the black hole can be imagined as each element of the horizon of
area `2Pl, where `Pl ≈ 10−33cm is the so-called Planck length, having one degree of freedom
with a finite number of possible states. In ST, one essentially tries to come up with a
function Ω based on some fundamental way of counting states corresponding to a black hole
geometry. For instance, a stationary Schwarzschild black hole is related to a highly excited
string without momentum. The entropy of the Schwarzschild black hole can then relatively
easily “deduced” from the entropy of the string (Zwiebach 2004, Sec. 16.6). The “deduction,”
however, for a case as general as the Schwarzschild solution remains rather loose. For the case
of so-called extremal black holes, i.e. for black holes withM2 = a2+Q2 whereM is the mass, a
the angular momentum, and Q the charge of the black hole, string theorists (Maldacena 1996;
Strominger and Vafa 1996) have been successful in deriving equation (1.1) more rigourously,
including the correct proportionality factor. This result has been extended to some degree
to higher-dimensional so-called near-extremal black holes (Horowitz and Strominger 1996).
Although extremal black holes almost certainly do not exist (Wu¨thrich 1999, Secs. 2.1 and
3.5), the successful derivation of their entropy points to interesting connections between ST,
QFT on curved spacetime and classical GTR.
Another recently claimed success of ST is that it apparently indicates that the de Sitter
spacetime, a spacetime of an accelerating universe similar to our own, can be understood
as a local minimum of vacuum energy Λ in the space of ST’s solutions (Kachru et al. 2003;
Quevedo 2003). It is unclear, however, whether this result constitutes an independent success
of the theory.
1.3 SYNOPSIS OF THE CHAPTERS
Chapter 2 starts out with discussing two questions which must be addressed prior to em-
barking upon an investigation into the foundations of quantum gravity: first, do we need a
quantum theory of gravity at all, and second, if we do, does it follow that gravity should or
18For a critical renegade, however, see Helfer (2003). In this review, Helfer argues that no compelling
theoretical case for (or against) Hawking radiation has been made so long as the two, in his view dubious,
assumptions that first, old physics may be applied to vacuum fluctuations at arbitrarily large energy scales
and that second, genuinely quantum-gravitational effects may be neglected, have not found a definite the-
oretical treatment. As an aside, the second issue, the so-called “trans-Planckian problem,” also appears in
inflationary cosmology where length scales smaller than the Planck length might play a role.
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even must be quantized? As I will argue in Chapter 2, these are two separate issues. The
answer to the second question is less straightforward than is commonly assumed, since QG is
a combination of two ancestor theories which both build on a continuous, four-dimensional,
differentiable manifold with a Lorentzian metric. Yet a quantization of GTR is expected
to dissolve the “classical” structure of spacetime. Despite this reservation, however, there
are good reasons to indeed quantize gravity. Most of the material in this chapter has been
published in Wu¨thrich (2005).
The following Chapters 3 and 4 prepare the stage for the quantization of GTR. This
preparation comprises the discussion of the requirement of background independence as the
towering feature of classical GTR, as well as the introduction of the postulate of general
covariance and its relation to background independence. Chapter 3 discusses these founda-
tional issues in GTR.
Once these essential physical ingredients have thus been cooked up, the mathematical
formalism will have to be outlined. For this, I will remind the reader how to cast GTR in
a Hamiltonian formalism and put together the recipe for the canonical quantization of a
diffeomorphism-invariant system with constraints. This is mostly done in Chapter 4, also
leading into Chapter 5. Chapter 4 will also address the motivation for and the legitimacy of
casting GTR as a constrained Hamiltonian system. The justification of this step crucially
depends on the interpretation of the invariance under active spacetime diffeomorphisms as a
gauge invariance of GTR. It will be a central issue in Chapter 4 whether or not GTR’s invari-
ance under active spacetime diffeomorphisms can be retrieved in the canonical formalism.
Chapter 5 investigates, among others, how general covariance fares through the quantization
process. I will argue that the full spacetime diffeomorphism invariance cannot be recovered
in the canonical formulation of the theory, at least not as it stands. The chapter also includes
a brief outline and discussion of the so-called problem of time and the related issue of finding
observables, i.e. the physically fundamental magnitudes.
In Chapter 5, a brief outline of LQG will be presented. I will not attempt to be compre-
hensive in this survey, but rather to explicate its guiding ideas and concepts, particularly as
they pertain to the issues at stake here. The presentation does not aspire to be mathemati-
cally rigorous. I shall sketch the main steps of choosing an algebra of canonical coordinates,
solving the Gauss constraint to obtain the SU(2)-invariant spin networks, solving the vector
constraints to obtain a basis of spin networks invariant under spatial diffeomorphisms, i.e.
the kinematical Hilbert space, and finally trying to solve the Hamiltonian constraint to arrive
at the physical Hilbert space of the theory.
Apart from following the canonical recipe of Wheeler and DeWitt, the evolution of the
basic spin network states can also be captured by formulating a covariant spinfoam model.
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After a discussion of the results to date in the canonical camp, I will briefly outline the
main ideas of the covariant approaches to find an appropriate dynamical regime. The co-
variant, Feynman-inspired sum-over-histories approach called spinfoams is motivated, to a
large extent, by the sheer mathematical difficulties in solving the Hamiltonian constraint
of the canonical theory. Unfortunately, its relation to the canonical quantization is unclear
and it is therefore still an open question how, if at all, the covariant spinfoam model relate
to canonical gravity. So far, the dynamical completion of the theory either by sticking to
canonical methods or by extending the theory by covariant methods and results has not been
achieved.
The last few years have also seen the arrival of what is usually referred to as “loop quan-
tum cosmology” (LQC), the study of highly symmetric cosmological models in the context
of LQG. One of the most intriguing features of these models is claimed to be the vanishing of
the initial singularity in a Friedmann-type evolution. In order to appraise this claim, I build
up my case over the course of three chapters. Chapter 6 describes the inevitability of the
initial singularity in cosmological models based on classical GTR, which are briefly treated
in Appendix C, and discusses cases where quantization has in fact washed away classical
singularities. These are typically examples of singular behaviour in the dynamics of simple
systems which are vanquished if these systems are properly quantized. These cases instill a
hope that perhaps cosmological models based on a quantization of GTR might also overcome
the big-bang singularity.
Chapter 7 then is dedicated to exposing LQC in some detail. LQC uses the same kine-
matical Hilbert space as does LQG, but freezes out all but one degree of freedom before
solving the difficult Hamiltonian constraint equation. This symmetry reduction to kine-
matical states which correspond to isotropic and homogeneous spatial universes drastically
simplifies the constraint equation and thus even allows to find solutions and to study the
physical Hilbert space, assuming that the matter Hamiltonian is not too complicated, how-
ever. The next chapter, Chapter 8 offers an analysis of whether or not the claims that
LQC vanquishes the initial singularity unavoidable in classical models withstand scrutiny.
The singularity, as it will turn out, does vanish in the sense that the unphysical dynamical
evolution so dear to loop quantum cosmologists effectively manages to penetrate back into
a mirror world of “before the big bang.” At the same time, however, the singularity is not
completely exterminated despite what is claimed. It survives in the sense that Laplacean
determinism still fails at the big bang, although the failure is milder than in classical models.
Chapter 8 also includes a discussion of some recent reactions to LQC.
One of the most important philosophical issue will be presented in Chapter 9. In partic-
ular, I shall treat the disappearance and the re-emergence of classical spacetime from QG.
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Chapter 5 will illustrate how the continuous spacetime structure of classical GTR is lost in
LQG—a circumstance which I will label as the “disappearance of spacetime.” A natural
question to pose then pertains to how this continuous structure re-emerges in the classical
limit. I will try to sketch what could be meant by the emergence of spacetime in the light of
the deplorable absence of a physical resolution of the problem and will argue that the prob-
lem of understanding how classicality can emerge from the underlying quantum structure
is very similar to the more familiar cases concerning ordinary QM. Essentially, selecting a
rather special class of kinematical quantum states seems to permit to approximate the clas-
sical world. Some exact classical values of geometrical quantities can thus explicitly regained
by a well-defined limiting procedure.
Finally, Chapter 10 presents some conclusions of my dissertation project.
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2.0 WHY MUST GRAVITY BE QUANTIZED?
All major approaches to quantum gravity endorse, implicitly or explicitly, the view that
gravity must be “quantized” in order to be amenable to a description at the fundamental
level. To be sure, different approaches propose to execute this task in radically different
manners. But they agree in that without a quantization of gravity no consistent quantum
theory of gravity will be forthcoming. What such a quantization involves will vary with the
approach taken. It may mean that the classical gravitational field is subjected to some defi-
nite quantization procedure which converts the classical field into a quantum field. Or it may
involve extending the standard model of particle physics such as to include a spin-2 particle
incorporating the gravitational interaction. I will also include among the “quantizers” those
approaches which start out from a quantum structure of spacetime or of a quantum field
of gravity ab initio. The reason for employing such a liberal notion of quantization is that
for the purposes of the present chapter, differences in how a quantum spacetime is to be
constructed are insignificant in determining whether the spacetime structure or the gravita-
tional field exhibit, or should exhibit, a quantum nature at all. But rather than analyzing
what is meant by “quantization” I shall focus on the intriguing foundational issues that arise
in the context of motivating and justifying such a quantization of gravity. Before addressing
the main question of the chapter, however, two brief remarks are in order.
First, one could oppose quantizing gravity, at least in a somewhat narrower sense of
“quantizing” than just outlined, on the grounds that in fundamental physics starting out
from a classical field in order to arrive at the quantum structure puts the cart before the
horse. This mentality, whose slogan could be something like “quantum without quantiza-
tion,” is expressed in the quote from Patton and Wheeler on the occasion of the 1975 Oxford
symposium on quantum gravity: “However workable [the] procedure of ‘quantization’ is in
practice [. . . ], we know that in principle it is an inversion of reality. The world at bottom is a
quantum world; and any system is ineradicably a quantum system. From that quantum sys-
tem the so-called ‘classical system’ is only obtained in the limit of large quantum numbers.”
(Patton and Wheeler 1975, p. 545) Some thus believe that proceeding by quantization is a
principled mistake. Deutsch, an unconditional advocate of a quantum world through and
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through, is equally adamant in his condemnation of quantization:
“in the [. . . ] important matter of formalism we still know of no other way of constructing
quantum theories than ‘quantization,’ a set of semi-explicit ad hoc rules for making a silk
purse (a quantum theory) out of a sow’s ear (the associated classical theory) [. . . ] I believe
that quantization will have to go before further progress is made at the foundations of
physics [. . . ] To base the theory of quantum fields ϕˆi on that of classical fields ϕi is like
basing chemistry on phlogiston or general relativity on Minkowski space-time: it can be
done, up to a point, but it is a mistake; not only because the procedure is ill defined and
the resulting theory of doubtful consistency, but because the world isn’t really like that.
No classical fields ϕi exist in nature.’ (Deutsch 1984, p. 421f)
To be sure, most physicists agree with this assessment. In answering the question asked at
the outset of this chapter, however, I shall not distinguish between the belief that gravity is
quantum and the method of constructing a quantum theory of gravity by proceeding via a
quantization of a classical field because I take the latter not to contradict the former. By
lack of something better, quantization can thus be viewed as a means to get a glimpse at a
complete and consistent quantum theory of gravity. For the purpose of this section, therefore,
I am not concerned whether an ansatz approaches the problem “top-down” by quantizing a
continuous gravitational field or “bottom-up” by postulating a quantum structure of gravity
or of spacetime ab initio. With respect to the question addressed here, both will be regarded
as giving the same answer, viz. that the gravitational field is, or even must be, quantum.
What all views must concur in, of course, is that any quantum theory of gravity, regardless
of how it might have been “discovered,” must produce the correct classical limits.
Second, one may be tempted to equate the quantization of spacetime with its discretiza-
tion. This temptation is fuelled by the expectation that quantum spacetime will no longer
exhibit the smoothness of the differentiable manifold of the classical level. It is important to
recognize, however, that the quantization of spacetime is neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for its discreteness. It is not a sufficient condition because quantization may lead
to a theory of QG where the relevant observables have purely continuous spectra. Once the
physical Hilbert space of the quantum theory is given, one can construct operators defined
on this Hilbert space which encode the geometry of spacetime. Whether these operators
turn out to have continuous or discrete spectra is an entirely contingent matter. Moreover,
quantization is not a necessary condition for the discreteness of spacetime either: there exist
approaches, most notably the causal sets approach, which postulate a discrete spacetime
structure but fail to give a full quantum theory of spacetime.1 So while in most approaches
1The causal sets approach is still regarded as a classical theory so far, as it fails to provide a proper
quantum dynamics. In a personal communication on 24 October 2003, causal sets theorist Fay Dowker has
acknowledged the need to replace the classical probabilities involved in the dynamical evolution according to
the causal sets theory with e.g. transition amplitudes in order to get a quantum theory. For more on causal
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to QG, quantum spacetime might exhibit some form of discreteness, this discreteness neither
implies nor is implied by the quantum nature of spacetime.
So why must gravity be quantized? Callender and Huggett (2001a,b) have sensibly sug-
gested to distinguish between the two separate issues of motivating the quest for a quantum
theory of gravity on the one hand and motivating the quantization of the gravitational field
on the other. The first problem can be expressed by asking “why do we need a quantum
theory of gravity at all?,” and the second, assuming that the first one was answered in the
affirmative, by inquiring “why do we have to quantize gravity for the purpose of finding
a quantum theory of gravity?.” It may seem that these two questions can hardly be kept
separate since quantum field theory requires that all matter fields be quantized and general
relativity teaches that those matter fields are the sources for the gravitational field. Whether
or not the two questions collapse into one depends on whether it will turn out to be possible
that quantum matter fields coexist with a classical, i.e. non-quantized, gravitational field.
Since at least some approaches to gravity, the so-called semi-classical theories, insist that
such coexistence is indeed possible, distinguishing the two questions will help to map the
debate. Let me address both of these two separate questions in the course of the present
chapter.
Notwithstanding some potential reservations regarding the empirical accessibility of the
Planck scale, the need for a theory merging quantum theory and general relativity is uni-
versally acknowledged among physicists. Opinions part, however, when the floor is opened
to discussions as to how the problem of constructing such a theory must be approached.
This thesis contends that there are powerful and important arguments which suggest that
gravity should indeed be quantized. Peres and Terno’s result (Peres and Terno 2001) in
particular, to be discussed in Section 2.2, provides such an argument, which, however, turns
out to be not entirely successful. The same section also deals with what is probably the most
common litany defending the necessity of a discrete spacetime structure. I analyze one of its
best expressions—the one due to Doplicher and collaborators—and conclude that it begs the
questions. Common to both Peres and Terno’s and Doplicher’s arguments is their attempt of
solely drawing on resources from physical theories and their mathematical apparatus rather
than relying on metaphysical or aesthetic principles to be discussed in Section 2.1. These
arguments favorable to quantization will be contrasted in Section 2.3 with two alternative
approaches to quantum gravity which do not involve quantization and by their mere exis-
tence establish the contingency of quantization in attempts at formulating a quantum theory
of gravity. Some conclusions for this chapter, which stands somewhat independently, follow
in Section 2.4.
sets, see Section 5.3.2.
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2.1 THE UNIFICATORY REFLEX IN FUNDAMENTAL PHYSICS AND
ITS DISUNITIST CHALLENGERS
So why do we need a quantum theory of gravity? Although general relativity and quantum
theory may be so disparate as to disallow the formal deduction of contradictions, they are
generally taken to be incommensurable (families of) theories. A quantum theory of gravity
is expected to remedy this theoretical schism and to bolster attempts at finding the Holy
Grail of physics, a unified framework of all interactions. The argument from unification—
unification for the sake of unification—does not, however, sway the sceptic. The “disunitist”
would certainly be free to respond that at the very least, it may just as well be the case
that the conceptual disunity of the two theories reflects a disunity in nature. In fact, she
could claim, gravity’s stubborn refusal to be subsumed under the otherwise all-encompassing
umbrella of the Standard Model may be interpreted as evidence for this disunity. Despite its
rare explicit articulation and its questionable metaphysical strength, however, the unificatory
impetus provides an extremely important motivation for attempts at quantizing gravity.
In this section I shall also discuss the supposed implications of principles of unity for the
second of Callender and Huggett’s question, i.e. whether the need of a QTG necessitates the
quantization of gravity, because these principles claim to bear upon both issues. At the end
of the section, I hope to have a clear conclusion what principles of unity can accomplish in
both respects.
So a strong, but often nebulous, desire to present a unified theoretical framework at the
level of fundamental physics populates the folklore of physicists and often fuels the search for
a quantum theory of gravity. Arguments to this effect, if made explicit at all, typically elicit
some principles of unity of nature, of theory, or of scientific method. An enquiry into these
metaphysical motivations for pursuing a quantum theory of gravity must therefore offer at
least some answers to the difficulty already encountered by Oppenheim and Putnam (1958):
despite its omnipresence, the precise meaning of the unity or unities at stake is rarely, if
ever, clear. The next few paragraphs are supposed to offer nothing more than a preliminary
alleviation of this difficulty; for a much more thorough investigation of the different senses
of unification operative in physics, see e.g. Cat (1998).
There can at least be three different kinds of unity, which all come in different shapes
and sizes: a unity of nature, one of scientific method, and one of theory. The first kind of
unity is surely expected to capture the idea that the “world” is a unified structure which does
not disintegrate into causally disconnected substructures. This unified whole, furthermore,
is expected to afford a systematic description at least of those aspects which are empirically
accessible to us. It may mean that there ultimately exists only one kind of fundamental
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entities, which stand in only one kind of relation to other fundamental entities, or that all
fundamental entities live on an equal footing with one another, or something else entirely.
But I will not pursue these ideas here, as I believe the other two notions of unity are more
adequate to capture the unitist spirit at work in the context of interest.
Let me thus turn to the unity of method, i.e. the belief that there exists a unique, privi-
leged scientific method capable of producing scientific knowledge. While the unity of theory
as discussed below often motivated the search for a QTG in the first place, methodological
unification has fuelled the idea that in such a QTG, gravity must be quantized. In the present
context, methodological unification means something to the effect that all dynamical fields
must be treated equally by being subjected to quantization. Methodological unification is
then in turn justified by invoking Ockham’s razor or some general idea of an “economy of
thought.” An example of such an attitude is expressed in Duff (1981, p. 81): “The idea
of not quantizing gravity seems to be the very antithesis of the economy of thought which
is surely the basis of theoretical physics.” A methodological unification strategy based on
an economy of thought, as Mattingly (2005) rightly points out, does not in itself imply the
necessity to quantize the gravitational field, as Ockham’s razor cannot decide between a full
QTG and semi-classical QTG which does not contain extra entities absent in full quantum
gravity. It is just that the gravitational field is not quantized. As Mattingly (2005, p. 336)
concludes, “[a] unification strategy based on parsimony of ontology [as a methodological
principle] thus affords no advantage to quantizing the Einstein tensor.”
In the wake of the failure of attempted reductionist strategies, many philosophers of
science have grown wary of such unconditional demands for methodological (and theoreti-
cal) unification. In fact, some philosophers have spearheaded a veritable witch hunt against
what they regard as imperialist tendencies of physics (and economics) to claim metaphysical
privilege among the sciences and to impose its method(s) upon other disciplines.2 For in-
stance, Cartwright (1999) argues that the nomological and conceptual diversity with which
we describe the natural world should make us cautious in accepting the canon of received
methodology according to which the laws of our fundamental physical theories command a
universal application. While many of their claims and their arguments have not gone unchal-
lenged,3 I take it that no one would seriously insist on a perfectly monolithic methodology
2See e.g. Dupre´ (1993); Cartwright (1995, 1999). Many of their objections to unification also apply to
the unity of theory, to be discussed below.
3See e.g. Hoefer (2003); Sklar (2003); and particularly Teller (2002) for a critical examination of
Cartwright (1999). While Teller is sympathetic to the larger outlines of Cartwright’s programme, he is
highly dissatisfied with her arguments in support of this programme. Sklar (2003) and Hoefer (2003) ac-
knowledge the theoretical fragmentation at the level of fundamental physics, but insist that this does not
imply that mathematical laws are not universal in their scope. Teller (2001, 2004), who agrees with Hoe-
fer and Sklar that foundational laws are universal in scope but also maintains a pluralist ontology, to be
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of science. It thus seems as if invoking these very general philosophical principles does no
work toward justifying the quantization of gravity, given that we need a QTG. Arguments
relying on the resources of physical theories appear more promising. These arguments will
be discussed in Section 2.2.
More pertinent to my enterprise is also the notion of unity of theory, which can be taken
to express the idea that scientific theories must be terminologically, ontologically, or nomo-
logically unified, either within or among special sciences. A terminological unification would
limit the scientific vocabulary to expressions which are definable in terms of the vocabulary
of the fundamental theory only. An ontological unification reduces the ontologies of all theo-
ries to the one monolithic ontology of what is considered to be the most fundamental theory.
In one of its more radical incarnations, ontological unification requires that all basic entities
are of one kind only. Even more radically, an ontological unitist could endorse a kind of
Eleatic ontology consisting of but one individual. Such an extreme ontological unification,
to be sure, would completely defy its own ambition if this one individual would be granted an
arbitrarily complex structure. At the very least, however, it is clear that there must be some
uniformity in the basic ontology, for otherwise, one might just regard the conjunction of the
ontologies of all theories as the fundamental ontology—a construction surely in discord with
unitist ambitions. Finally, a nomological unification is attained to the extent to which the
laws of theories, whatever they are, are implied by those of the most fundamental theory.
Again, a simple conjunction of propositions expressing the laws of the to-be-unified theories
cannot be adequately considered as the fundamental law, on pain of violating the substance
of unitist ideology.
Theories which are unified in some of these aspects need not be unified in others. For
instance, as Morrison (1995) argues, while the electroweak theory has “unified,” i.e. has
brought under the description of only one theoretical structure, both the electromagnetic
and the weak nuclear forces, it has retained a disunity among the particles which carry the
forces. Thus, it is well possible that a theory offers a nomological, but not an ontological
unification. Conversely, Sklar (2003) rejects a pluralist ontology while acknowledging that
even our fundamental theories are conceptually and explanatorily, and therefore arguably
nomologically, fractured.
It is not entirely clear whether Morrison’s argument insisting on an ontological disunity
in the case of electroweak theory is successful. She seems to base this claim on the distinction
between the force carriers of the respective forces: electromagnetic interaction is mediated
via photons, which are mass- and chargeless, while the weak nuclear force carriers, the W±
discussed in the next paragraph, occupies a somewhat intermediate position in the debate. Hacking (1996)
offers another pluralist view.
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and Z bosons, are massive and, in case of the W±, electrically charged. Mass and (electric)
charge, if anything, must surely be counted as essential properties of elementary particles.
Since the force carriers differ in their essential properties, she seems to argue, electroweak
theory does not entertain a unified ontology. However, these force carriers, at least with
these properties, only come into existence at energies below the unification energy. Above
the unification energy of the order of 10 GeV, i.e. before the symmetry breaking which
“generates” the masses of the W± and Z bosons, the ontology of the theory arguably only
consists of the gauge fieldsW aµ (where a = 1, 2, 3) and Bµ. These gauge fields, to be sure, also
differ in what could be argued are their essential properties: the W aµ gauge field carries the
weak isospin and the Bµ gauge field has weak hypercharge. I am no expert in field theoretic
formulations of the standard model and will therefore refrain from further remarks, but it
seems as if one lesson should be taken home: if electroweak theory can be charged with a
failure to offer a unified ontology at the most fundamental level, it seems as if the charge
should proceed along these lines and argue that and how the difference between carrying
weak isospin or weak hypercharge marks an ontological fracture at the level of fundamental
gauge fields, and not the difference between massive and massless “effective” constituents.
Let us assume that Morrison’s argument can be salvaged one way or another. An anal-
ogous stance, Mattingly (2005) proposes, could be taken as far as the second of Callender
and Huggett’s questions, i.e. the quantization of the gravitational field, is concerned: the
vision of a unified fundamental quantum theory prohibits the co-existence of classical and
quantum structures in a fundamental theory of gravity. But since the question of whether a
classical structure may be part of a QTG is precisely what is at issue, invoking a unificatory
principle seems insufficient. For if it were not, one could similarly argue that for a unified
ontology, any charged force carrier must be dismissed as disturbing ontological unity. Mat-
tingly admits that it may be objected that quantization is not just like other properties such
as charges and that this claim is correct. But, he insists, this claim “can hardly be taken as
a principled objection to its own denial.” (Mattingly 2005, p. 336) Crude principles of unity
may be sufficient to motivate the search for a QTG, but they seem to fall short to imply the
necessity of quantizing gravity in order to achieve this aim. From this and similar examples,
Mattingly concludes that unificatory principles must be sharpened in order to deliver the
work they are supposed to do here.
Without going further into the details of the debate over the unity or disunity of science,
these brief remarks manifestly show that while there is a stable majority of philosophers crit-
ical of a prescriptive unitary methodological dogma, there is no consensus in the community
as far as theoretical unification is concerned. A fortiori, philosophers cannot make unanimous
recommendations for practicing physicists. What is evident, though, is that the supporters
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of unification in QG fail to receive decisive philosophical support. Interestingly, however, this
does not stop practitioners of QG, themselves for professional reasons unabashed unitists, to
follow some of the allegedly implied prescriptions, albeit in a completely partisan manner!
Even though abstract principles of unity may, when scrutinized, offer little justification
for the search for quantum gravity, they seem to be even less powerful as arguments estab-
lishing the necessity to quantize gravity. Perhaps the proponents of the search for a QTG and
the quantizers of gravity must seek elsewhere. The next section, Section 2.2, will consider
arguments in favour of quantization of gravity drawn from the resources of physics alone,
rather than from metaphysical principles. These arguments, though still inconclusive, will
offer a much more substantial support for quantizers.
Equally, it may suffice to mobilize the resources of physics itself to find perfectly valid
objectives for pursuing quantum gravity. Extant theoretical physics strongly motivates the
search for a quantum theory of gravity by itself and thus dispenses with the need to invoke
metaphysical unitism. General relativity conceives of gravity as a dynamical field captur-
ing the gravitational dance of classical matter, while quantum theory maintains that all
dynamical fields must be quantized, i.e. that all matter is quantum. Although this tension
may be mostly dormant at the energies that are currently experimentally accessible, there
are situations where the interaction between the matter fields qua quantum fields and the
gravitational field becomes pertinent. In particular, it is believed that exotic but crucial
regimes such as the early universe or the (late) evolution of black holes require a QTG. In
other words, there seems to be a class of phenomena whose explanation we have good reason
to believe must include both generally relativistic effects as well as quantum effects. Against
this, one might argue that to this day, no observations or experiments have been performed
which directly probe energy levels at which generally relativistic and quantum effects become
inextricably combined. First, despite the fact that the energies required to access the Planck
scale directly continue to be out of reach, a growing number of research groups studies the
phenomenology of quantum gravity and it is possible that impending empirical input might
very soon substantiate the need for a quantum theory of gravity.
Second, there is a difference between observing phenomena which we believe must ulti-
mately be explained by a QTG on the one hand, and directly identifying observational or
experimental data as exhibiting a quantum-gravitational signature. For instance, it is one
thing to have strong reasons for believing that in order to understand the formation and
evaporation of black holes, one must have a grasp on their generally relativistic characteris-
tics as well as on their quantum aspects. But it is quite another thing to be able to present
an explicit catalogue of data for which we are certain can only account a QTG. Until we
have completely formulated a QTG, of course, we may not even know what a quantum-
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gravitational signature could look like. So it seems asking for way too much if we should be
able to produce a catalogue of quantum-gravitational effects to be accounted for by a yet to
be formulated QTG prior to even having started the first steps towards such a theory. But
it surely cannot be that the full catalogue of empirical consequences of a theory must be
offered as a justification to start its formulation. What can reasonably be asked for is a set of
phenomena which existing theories have trouble accommodating and some justification why
the resolution of these difficulties must be sought in a particular direction, and both of these
demands seem to be satisfied in the case at hand. But to be sure, although we may well
have strong reasons to believe that only a QTG will be able to offer a full understanding of
the formation and evaporation of black holes even in the absence of data with unambiguous
quantum-gravitational signature, it may turn out that we have been misled in this belief and
that in fact there is a pair of theories, one a classical theory of gravity and the other a quan-
tum theory not of gravity, but of something else, that can jointly account for everything we
see. In other words, it might just be the case that there are two separate phenomenological
domains which, despite deceiving appearances, have an empty intersection and that there
are two theories which perfectly manage to account for their respective domains. In this
case, the set of recalcitrant phenomena would neatly decompose into two (or more) domains
reigned by different theories.
However, although the situation in which most physicists believe a QTG is required are
phenomenologically exotic, and although many physicists and philosophers are highly critical
of particular approaches to finding a QTG, no one seems to seriously deny the cogency
and relevance of the enterprise of seeking a QTG. I will return to the unificatory rhetorics
prevalent in the physics literature and the disunitist reflex recently found in philosophy
pages, as well as to whether any morale can be drawn for this debate from quantum gravity
in Section 2.4. Now, I turn to physical motivations for quantizing gravity.
2.2 WHY QUANTIZE GRAVITY?
Assuming then that we need a quantum theory of gravity, does gravity necessarily have to
be quantized in such a theory? I concur with Callender and Huggett (2001a,b) and with
Mattingly (2005) that this question must be answered in the negative. The mere existence of
approaches to quantum gravity which do not involve the quantization of gravity implies that
quantization is a contingent matter. Semi-classical theories of quantum gravity, which supply
the wedge that Callender and Huggett drive between the two disparate questions of whether
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we need a quantum theory of gravity and of whether such a need implies the quantization of
gravity, constitute such approaches. Semi-classical quantum theories of gravity stipulate the
coupling of the classical gravitational field, and therefore of the classical spacetime geometry,
to the quantum fields of matter. The coupling of the gravitational field only occurs via the
“classical” quantum magnitude of the expectation value of the stress-energy tensor of the
quantum fields present in some quantum state of matter ψ. Thus, quantum matter can be
coupled to the classical spacetime geometry via the “classical” quantity 〈T̂µν〉 .= 〈ψ|T̂µν |ψ〉.
The dynamics of the coupled system is governed by the coupled semi-classical Einstein and
the quantum Schro¨dinger equations:
Gµν [gµν ] = 8piG〈T̂µν〉, (2.1)
Ĥ[ψ, gµν ]|ψ〉 = i ∂
∂t
|ψ〉, (2.2)
where the Gµν , the so-called Einstein tensor, characterize the spacetime geometry and
Ĥ[ψ, gµν ] is the quantum Hamiltonian operator in which the gravitational field appears
as external source. In (2.1), the classical Einstein equations are obviously modified by ex-
changing the classical energy-momentum density Tµν with its expectation value 〈T̂µν〉. Most
importantly, equations (2.1) govern the so-called quantum backreactions, i.e. quantum fluc-
tuations induced on the (classical) gravitational field by its coupling to the quantum fields of
matter. It will be the subject of some debate in the part of Section 2.3 which discusses Peres
and Terno’s no-go result whether this classical-quantum coupling, including the quantum
backreactions, can be properly implemented by consistently combining the two dynamical
sectors.
Typically, it is assumed that equations (2.1) offer a valid approximation to a full QTG
in cases the backreactions are sufficiently small, at least locally. Unfortunately, as Wald
(1994, p. 98) explains, the precise range of applicability of (2.1) is not known, no more than
it is for the analogous semiclassical Maxwell equations ∇µFµν = −4pi〈jν〉 in QED, where
Fµν
.
= ∂µAν−∂νAµ is the electromagnetic field tensor, with Aµ the covariant vector potential
of the electromagnetic field, and jµ is the four-current. Furthermore, as he continues, anyone
who wishes to calculate the quantum backreaction effects in this approach is confronted with
at least three serious difficulties: at least one of the fundamental parameters required to
define 〈T̂µν〉 must put in by hand (or by experiment), the semi-classical Einstein equations
(2.1) admit new solutions with “runaway” character, and the computation of 〈T̂µν〉 itself is
such a formidable task as to make it almost impossible.
Although these difficulties may very well turn out to be fatal for semi-classical theories
with quantum backreactions, these theories offer, at least in principle, an escape from quan-
tizing gravity. To be sure, only a few renegades actively pursue approaches in this camp, but
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the recent results reviewed by Brunetti and Fredenhagen (2006) have reinvigorated semi-
classical theories. But the justification for semi-classical theories is challenged by Peres and
Terno’s no-go result, to be discussed in Section 2.2.3. Even if their argument is unsuccess-
ful, however, semi-classical approaches have lost much of their appeal as a result of what
seem to be almost insurmountable difficulties, as mentioned. Quite apart from the fact that
quantization might offer an appealing escape from the dismal mood in the anti-quantizer
camp, the question then becomes whether physics itself might dictate the quantization of
gravity. After a brief glimpse at the prehistory of the current debate, the remainder of this
Section will review what I take to be the two most promising explicit arguments in favour
of quantization.
2.2.1 Early arguments pro quantization
So there is, overall, little doubt that in the final QTG gravity will be quantized, but the
question will ultimately have to be settled on empirical grounds, as Callender and Huggett
(2001a,b) remark. I concur with this assessment, although I want to resist giving the impres-
sion, at times created but ultimately dismissed by Callender and Huggett (2001a,b), that
this conclusion is implied by the failure of those theoretical arguments discussed in this sub-
section.4 The argument to this conclusion rests on the premises that in an empirical science,
such as physics, experiments and observations must decide between internally consistent,
inequivalent competitor theories,5 and that QG is no exception in this respect. I see no
reason to harbour principled doubts about both premises. The main conclusion of Callender
and Huggett stands.
However, their investigation is too narrow in that it is confined to Eppley and Hannah’s
classic, but somewhat obsolete argument. Eppley and Hannah (1977) have argued that
gravity must be quantized on the basis that the interaction of a classical gravitational field
with a quantum field leads to contradictions with trusted physical principles. The argument
has the form of a reductio proof which opens a dilemma and purports to show that both horns
of the dilemma lead to absurdity. The premise to be reduced to absurdity is, no surprise,
the assumption that the gravitational field is a purely classical field. Another premise of
their argument, which is not meant to be reduced to absurdity, however, is that quantum
4Note that I label Eppley and Hannah’s thought experiment as a theoretical, as opposed to experimental,
pace Mattingly (2006). Thought experiments, to my mind, are nothing but theoretical arguments; appealing
or persuasive at times, unconvincing at others, but never of the same kind of support as empirical confir-
mation. Consult Norton (2004) for a defence of this position. A proposed experiment with an anticipated
outcome remains a thought experiment until it is actually performed.
5Given the enormous differences between the different approaches to QG, the simultaneous emergence of
two empirically adequate and empirically equivalent theories seems vastly improbable.
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mechanics is to be interpreted standardly: the wave function of a quantum state collapses
immediately upon measurement into an eigenstate of the pertinent observable. For this
substantial and far from uncontroversially true premise alone, which does important work in
their argument, their thought experiment must be judged inconclusive. In a reductio proof,
it is always the conjunction of all premises and not just an individual premise alone which is
reduced to absurdity. Although thereby leaving the realm of logic, one may of course argue
that a particular premise be abandoned. But such an argument can only succeed if all other
candidate premises at stake can be shown to be uncontroversial.
Eppley and Hannah open the dilemma by presupposing what they take to be mutually
exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities: either interaction with the gravitational field
does or does not collapse the quantum state. If it does, Eppley and Hannah argue, then the
conservation of energy-momentum must be violated, if the theory respects the uncertainty
relation. On the other hand, if it does not, they allege to show, superluminal signalling
becomes possible. Because either of these consequences is undesirable, they conclude, gravity
cannot be classical.
Callender and Huggett (2001a,b) detect some significant loopholes in the argumentation
in both horns of the dilemma and consequently discount Eppley and Hannah’s argument as
incomplete. Mattingly (2006) complains that the device proposed by Eppley and Hannah in
order to measure the gravitation-quantum matter interaction would have to be so massive
as to be confined to within its own Schwarzschild radius. I acknowledge all these counter-
arguments. My main reservation against Eppley and Hannah, however, stems from their
argument’s dependence on the interpretation of quantum mechanics, as indicated above.
The very structure of their thought experiment, I maintain, is fatally flawed in that they
unjustly blame the absurdity on one particular among at least two disputed premises. Even
if there were no loopholes at all, and even if their measuring device would be constructible,
I urge, any argument based on one specific, highly controversial interpretation of quantum
mechanics—a collapse interpretation in this case—suffers by extension and cannot yield a
conclusive argument as to whether gravity must be quantized on physical grounds.
Before the Eppley and Hannah gedanken came to dominate the literature as the lead-
ing argument supposedly implying the quantization of gravity, an almost ancient argument
by Bohr and Rosenfeld (1933) and refined by DeWitt (1962) populated the imagination of
physicists.6 It questioned the adequateness of semi-classical theories mixing classical with
quantum fields and allegedly showed how any classical field that is coupled to a quantum
6And before then, Einstein (1916b, 1918) and Klein (1927) defended the view that GTR will ultimately
have to be modified in the sense that it must accommodate quantum aspects. For a discussion of the positions
concerning the need for quantizing gravity or GTR held in the interwar period, consult Stachel (1999).
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field must be quantized, as the uncertainty relations of the quantum field “infect” the clas-
sical field via “quantum disturbances.” Brown and Redhead (1981) have cast doubt on the
argument by attacking the disturbance view of the indeterminacy. In the view of Callender
and Huggett (2001a,b), this attack has been successful. However, in some sense at least,
the attack launched by Brown and Redhead (1981) was against a strawman: Rosenfeld
(1963) himself insisted in his reaction to DeWitt’s elaboration of what was generally taken
to be his, Rosenfeld’s, argument implying the necessity to quantize gravity that the argu-
ment was never meant to be conclusive. In fact, Rosenfeld wrote, not only will empirical
evidence eventually have to pronounce the verdict, but in the absence of such evidence, he
stalled overly enthusiastic quantizers, “this temptation should be resisted.” (Rosenfeld 1963,
p. 354) Callender and Huggett concur with him, and I tend to agree, in that not even the
most elegant and powerful formal apparatuses can yield conclusive recommendations con-
cerning the quantization of gravity without the necessary empirical input. Or, as Rosenfeld
(1963, p. 356) put it, “[e]ven the legendary Chicago machine cannot deliver the sausages if
it is not supplied with hogs.”
2.2.2 Non-commutative Spacetime Operators
There exists an important tradition, going back to Snyder (1947a,b) and in fact even to
von Neumann, which attempts the quantization of gravity by introducing non-commutative
operators for spacetime coordinates. As in LQG, these operators have a discrete spectrum of
eigenvalues and thus suggest a discrete interpretation of spacetime. In this case, but not in
general as indicated above, this discreteness encapsulates the quantum nature of spacetime
or, equivalently, of the gravitational field. Unlike in LQG, however, the discrete spectra
are not results of the quantization procedure, but rather act as desiderata around which a
quantum theory of spacetime must be constructed.
In a handwritten letter to Dirac dated 27 January 1934, von Neumann considers non-
commuting “space coordinate operators” X, Y , and Z with a discrete spectrum as well
as a time operator T with a continuous spectrum. Von Neumann starts out by stating
what the desired behaviour of these operators should be: the spatial operators need to have
discrete spectra; the temporal operator can have either discrete or continuous spectrum,
but a continuous spectrum would be highly preferable;7 and last but not least, they must
respect Lorentz symmetry. Note that the demand for Lorentz symmetry exonerates von
Neumann from a potential accusation that demanding discrete spectra for spatial and a
continuous spectrum for the temporal operator might introduce an inadmissible distinction
7“I would prefer a continuous spectrum for ‘time’.” (Cited from Re´dei (2006, p. 100))
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between space and time and a privileged observer. Motivated by the hope to exterminate
singularities in electrodynamics which arise in approaching a point-like charge to within
arbitrarily small distances, he was however soon discouraged by the lack of a proper physical
justification for assuming the discreteness of physical space, as well as by Dirac’s sceptical
response of 28 February 1934. Four years later, on 17 March 1938, he wrote to a Hungarian
physicist named Rudolf Ortvay that “I did not examine the model in deeper detail because
I considered it very artificial and arbitrary—and so I still think today.”8 A decade later,
Snyder (1947a,b) proposed a similar scheme, from similar motivations, this time including
the time operator among those with discrete spectrum.
The most popular argument for the non-commutativity of the spacetime coordinates and
for the discreteness of spacetime has found a famous expression in Doplicher, Fredenhagen,
and Roberts (1995). I think that it can be safely said that this article has now replaced Eppley
and Hannah (1977) as the standard argument for quantization. Doplicher and collaborators
have argued that the quantum uncertainty relations of the spacetime coordinates emerge
from the combination of Heisenberg’s principle with general relativity. The argument, as I
interpret it, should contain two main parts: the first shows that continuous spacetime loses
its operational meaning at small scales already at the semi-classical level; the second would
extend the argument to full quantum gravity by defending that this operational limit is due
to the truly (discrete) quantum nature of spacetime at Planck scale.
The first part of the argument encodes a rather common belief that the combination of the
uncertainty relations and classical general relativity imposes restrictions on the operational
meaning of classical spacetime. The reasoning runs along the following lines. If
(1) the greater the accuracy (or, equivalently, the smaller the uncertainty) in the measure-
ment of spatio-temporal coordinates, the stronger the gravitational field generated by
the measurement, and
(2) an increasing gravitational field eventually becomes strong enough as to collapse to a
black hole, creating a closed trapped surface, and thus prevents any signal from leaving
the region at stake, and
(3) an operational meaning can only be attached to a spacetime localization in case signals
can leave the region measured,
8Cited from Re´dei (2006, p. 195). I am greatly indebted to Miklo´s Re´dei for having pointed out this
correspondence to me and having communicated the details of the letters, their references, and transcriptions
(personal communications on 13 September 2005 and on 28 April 2006). The originals of the von Neumann-
Dirac correspondence are to be found in the Library of Congress [no signatures] and the original letter
to Ortvay is hosted by the Department of Manuscripts and Rare Books at the Library of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences [signature K 785/97]. Von Neumann’s letters are all transcribed and, in the case of the
letter to Ortvay, translated into English in Re´dei (2006). Neither Stachel (1999) nor Rovelli (2004, Appendix
B) seem to be aware of these pertinent von Neumann letters.
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then
(4) a localization measurement is operationally restricted to a certain maximum accuracy,
or minimum uncertainty.
The third premise is merely a definition of operational meaning and does not seem to be either
problematic or substantial. The first two premises, on the other hand, are those that procure
the mileage. The second premise epitomizes how gravity determines the causal structure of
spacetime. This is an immediate consequence of classical general relativity and deserves all
the credit that general relativity does. The first premise is a rather direct consequence of
combining Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle with the principles of general relativity, as Do-
plicher, Fredenhagen, and Roberts (1995) claim. According to the uncertainty principle, they
explain, measuring a spacetime coordinate with accuracy 1/E generates an uncertainty E in
the associated momentum. Thus, an uncontrollable energy of the order E is concentrated in
the spacetime region to be measured. According to general relativity, the energy-momentum
density Tµν associated with this energy deforms the geometry of the spacetime.
But what does it mean to “measure a spacetime coordinate”? Unfortunately, I have not
been able to find a explication of the measuring process anywhere in Doplicher, Fredenhagen,
and Roberts (1995), nor in von Neumann’s correspondence, where the same language is used.
It almost appears as if this tradition just posits the measurement of spacetime as a primitive
concept of the theory. But this should not content us. What then would be an adequate
explication of “measuring a spacetime coordinate” capturing its meaning? The terminology
suggests that there exists a physical system (“spacetime”) which can be in different states
(the eigenstates of the spatiotemporal operators). When we measure a particular spacetime
coordinate, then, this measurement would amount to an application of the corresponding
operator onto the state of the system and receive an eigenvalue in return. If the physical
system is a chunk of spacetime, then these measurements would inform us what the spa-
tiotemporal “size” of this chunk was. Clearly, such a metaphysically loaded concept of the
measurement of spacetime coordinates must be unacceptable to an operationalist. For her, it
should be preferable to conceive of spacetime measurements as measuring the spatiotemporal
extension of a physical object.
Returning to the structure of the argument explicated above, note that the first two
premises are implied by basic principles of well-trusted physical theories. While this certainly
does not make them unassailable, our reasons for rejecting them would have to be substantial
enough to challenge first principles of two of the most successful achievements of twentieth-
century physics: quantum mechanics and general relativity.
One may argue, however, that these first principles will naturally be challenged at the
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level of quantum gravity. The fact that attempts to combine quantum mechanics with
general relativity unveil their conceptual incommensurability can be taken to imply, or at
least strongly suggest, that some of their first principles must be violated in quantum gravity.
In a sense, then, quantum mechanics and general relativity when combined already contain
the seeds of their own destruction. Thus, one cannot expect that all principles that underpin
the above premises will still be valid in full quantum gravity. But if not all premises hold,
then the argument will of course collapse. Because the source energy associated with Tµν
is quantum and the argument as given is thus strictly semi-classical, the objection could
conclude, it may very well turn out that the discreteness emerges only as an artefact of
the manner in which quantum mechanics and general relativity were combined at the semi-
classical level. Therefore, the argument as given so far must be complemented by a second
part asserting that the operationally discrete spacetime at the semi-classical level results
from an underlying discreteness at the fundamental Planck level.
Unfortunately, Doplicher and his collaborators do not provide such an addition. But
neglecting to take this second leg seriously amounts to begging the question. It is undoubt-
edly true that if spacetime is discrete at the Planck level, it is reasonable to expect some
signatures of this discreteness to surface at the semi-classical level. But the converse is not
true, exactly because some or all of the premises made above may no longer obtain in full
quantum gravity. The argument as it stands will hence not make any converts. Despite its
appealing reliance on deeply entrenched physical principles, the argument thus falls short
of proving that spacetime must be discrete (or, similarly in this case, that gravity must be
quantized) from the resources of trusted physical theories alone.
But the question then becomes how any argument drawing solely on accepted physical
theories can possibly establish that gravity must be quantized. If a quantum theory of gravity
would be part of the established corpus of theories, the proof would be easy. But alas, it is
not! The failure of current physics to offer a straightforward and unique path to a quantum
theory of gravity strongly suggests that the formulation of such a theory will require new
physics. In this case, however, one cannot accept an argument from the resources of old
physics alone to the effect that gravity must be quantized.
2.2.3 Inconsistency of Quantum-Classical Dynamics
Despite this limitation of arguments relying on principles of accepted physics, some ways
of constructing a quantum theory of gravity without quantization, it is claimed, can still
be excluded. Peres and Terno (2001) and Terno (2006) have mounted an argument which
seems to preclude the possibility of a consistent semi-classical quantum theory of gravity
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which includes quantum backreactions. A somewhat peculiar idea underlies the enterprise:
assuming that not all quantum dynamical variables are observable and some principled
rules for distinguishing operators corresponding to observables from those associated with
“unobservables,” a classical system is introduced as a quantum system for which all operators
corresponding to observables commute. In general, there will be unobservables in the classical
system which do not commute. It turns out that a formalism introduced in Koopman (1931)
and refined in von Neumann (1932a,b) can suitably accommodate this idea. Consider, then, a
system consisting of two sectors, one governed by quantum field theory (the quantum sector),
and a classical sector described by so-called Koopmanian dynamics. Koopmanian dynamics
offers a generalized formalism that allows to cast a classical system in the mathematical
formalism of a quantum theory, i.e. as a Hamiltonian system living in a Hilbert space. The
conjugate variables of the classical sector will be represented by commuting multiplication
operators, as opposed to the non-commuting operators of the quantum sector. Furthermore,
assume that the hybrid dynamics of the combined classical-quantum system is described by
a unitary evolution on the joint Hilbert space H = Hq ⊗Hc.9
Borrowing from the exposition of the Koopmanian formalism in Mauro (2002a,b),10 let
me briefly outline the major ideas of Koopmanian mechanics. Koopmanian mechanics at-
tempts to offer a mathematical framework in which to cast classical mechanics in order to
make it more directly contrastable to quantum mechanics. The basic idea is to introduce a
Hilbert space of complex and square-integrable functions ψ(q, p) which can be thought of as
“classical” wave functions. These wave functions ψ must be such that ρ(q, p)
.
= |ψ(q, p)|2 can
reasonably be interpreted as a measure for the probability of finding a particle at the point
(q, p) in the phase space, which is parametrized by the independent and commuting variables
q and p. In classical mechanics, the probability density ρ(q, p) must evolve according to the
Liouville equation
i
∂
∂t
ρ(q, p) = L̂ρ(q, p), (2.3)
where L̂ is the Liouville operator which assumes the role of classical analogue to the Hamil-
tonian operator present in the Schro¨dinger equation. The Liouville operator is a functional
9It might be objected here that the technical choice of using the tensor product of the two subspaces
rather than the direct sum opens the argument to question. However, I think that this choice is justified
given that it is customary in quantum mechanics to use the tensor product when combining two subsystems
which individually continue to be in a state hosted by their sector, e.g. a two-particle system, and to opt
for a direct sum of the smaller Hilbert spaces in cases where the joint system is either in a state living in
one of the subspaces or in a state in the other subspace. Here, we are confronted by a physical system of
interacting fields which maintain their classical or quantum character and not by a system which assumes
either a classical or a quantum state altogether.
10But see also Peres (1993, pp. 317-319).
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of the classical Hamiltonian function H(q, p) defined on the phase space. Koopman and von
Neumann found that if one postulates the same Liouville evolution for the classical wave
function,
i
∂
∂t
ψ(q, p) = L̂ψ(q, p), (2.4)
then equation (2.3) is automatically satisfied. Equation (2.4) can be considered the dy-
namical evolution equation for the classical Hilbert space, in close analogy to the standard
Schro¨dinger equation of quantum mechanics. Koopman’s theorem (Koopman 1931, p. 316)
shows that the dynamical evolution of ψ(q, p) is unitary: given another Liouville wave func-
tion φ(q, p) which obeys (2.4), the scalar product 〈ψ(q, p)|φ(q, p)〉 is invariant over time.
In quantum mechanics, however, the nexus between (2.4) and (2.3) no longer holds, as
the quantum mechanical probability density spreads over time while it does not in classical
mechanics. In Koopmanian mechanics, the wave functions do not spread over time, and the
basic operators q̂ and p̂, the configuration and conjugate momentum operators, commute
with one another. Consequently, there is no uncertainty in the simultaneous measurement
of q and p and no interference pattern in a “classical” double-slit experiment.
Let me return to the argument by Peres and Terno (2001) purporting to establish the
inconsistency of quantum backreactions on the classical sector of the joint Hilbert space
H = Hq ⊗ Hc. The following reconstruction follows Terno (2006) rather than Peres and
Terno (2001) as the former offers a more detailed account than the latter. Since opera-
tors acting on different sectors of H commute, classical and quantum operators will always
commute, regardless of whether they correspond to observables or unobservables. If the in-
teraction part of the unitary evolution operator is a function of observable and unobservable
quantum operators on the one hand, but only of observable classical operators, then the in-
teraction term will always commute with the classical observables, thus effectively decoupling
the classical degrees of freedom from the quantum ones. In this case, therefore, quantum
backreactions on the classical sector are precluded and consequently any interesting form of
semi-classical theory of gravity is barred.
For this reason, the argument continues, the interaction term must also contain classical
operators associated with the unobservable classical dynamical variables, as it is those onto
which the quantum degrees of freedom latch. If one weaves such unobservable operators
into the interaction part of the evolution operator of the joint system, however, then the
equations of motion of the combined system will no longer formally be the same as for the
purely classical equation (2.4) or the purely quantum equations of motion, i.e. the standard
Schro¨dinger equation. In itself, such a structural dissimilarity would certainly not constitute
grounds for rejecting the equations of motion of the combined system; after all, by introducing
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an interaction between the classical and the quantum degrees of freedom, such dissimilarity is
bound to occur. But the failure to exhibit such formal “isomorphism,” Peres and Terno argue,
amounts to a violation of the correspondence principle, which is, of course, unacceptable.
If I understand their argument correctly, which is not a trivially true antecedent condition,
then the correspondence principle is also violated at the level of observable quantities only.
The failure of the correspondence principle is testified, as Terno (2006) elaborates, in
attempts to obtain the correct classical limit that must hold for the combined system, i.e.
in the limit where both sectors are classical. The reason for not obtaining the correct
classical limit for hybrid systems with full interaction is that the evolution of the motion
of observables differs if this formal correspondence does not apply. Since the presence of
non-observable classical operators in the interaction term is responsible for the differences
between the equations of motion, the argument continues, the interaction part can only
contain observable classical operators on pain of violating the correspondence principle. But
in this case, as explicated above, the quantum sector cannot influence the classical sector,
thus precluding quantum backreactions! Even under these relatively weak assumptions,
Peres and Terno conclude, it turns out to be impossible to define a mixed system with a
hybrid dynamics that consistently includes the full interaction between the two sectors.
Although Peres and Terno’s result also inhabits the semi-classical realm, I maintain that
this does not render it vulnerable to the above charges as it did the preceding argument. The
reason is simple: it does not compound two theories on whose principles it relies, but only
offers a no-go result using a general formalism and invoking the unitarity of the combined
evolution as well as the requirement for a hybrid theory to possess the correct classical limit.
These principles, it seems, constitute general desiderata for constructing theories rather
than axioms of a specific theory that may become redundant as the theory is superseded.
Although the validity of the principle of unitarity is controversial in QG, a full QTG is surely
expected to comply at least with the correspondence principle. Insofar as Peres and Terno’s
assumptions transcend particular theories, they are immune to the objections aired against
Doplicher, Fredenhagen, and Roberts (1995).
Having said this, however, there are serious problems with their, Peres and Terno’s,
argument. Quantum backreactions, in this scheme, can only be introduced if the interaction
part of the joint evolution operator does not commute with the classical observables. Since
any classical operators commute with the quantum ones, this coupling must be introduced via
classical unobservables which must therefore be present in the interaction term. In order to
be successful in this endeavour, the classical unobservables cannot commute with the classical
observables. But what is the justification for this? Could it not equally well be argued that
commutativity is the high watermark of classicality and that therefore all classical operators
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must commute with one another? In the argumentative scheme proposed by Peres and Terno,
this would imply that there is no backdoor for coupling the quantum degrees of freedom to
the classical ones. But if that’s the case, it becomes very questionable whether the formalism
chosen is indeed capable of offering an adequate framework for considering a semi-classical
QTG including quantum backreactions.
Another criticism, to be credited to James Mattingly,11 arises from the consideration of
semi-classical theories, which have actually been proposed, such as the QFT on curved space-
times as discussed by Wald (1994). The fact that Wald’s axioms, presented in Wald (1994,
p. 89), are consistent and appear to satisfy the correspondence principle, or at least I see no
reason why to think otherwise, suggests that either Peres and Terno’s argument is not valid
after all, or Koopmanian formalisms are not exhaustive of hybrid systems. Mattingly sus-
pects that although Peres and Terno’s argument might in fact undermine approaches which
attempt to directly mix quantum and classical variables, it may not apply to approaches
which operate by coupling the expectation value of quantum variables to the classical de-
grees of freedom. This, after all, is how semi-classical theories are typically characterized.
I thus conclude that while I accept Peres and Terno’s line of thought as strong evidence
that some ways of constructing semi-classical theories cannot be brought to fruition, it does
not exhaust all, or even the major, possibilities to approaching the formulation of a semi-
classical theory.
2.3 WHY NOT QUANTIZE GRAVITY?
Peres and Terno’s result may preclude the possibility of formulating a consistent semi-
classical quantum theory of gravity including full quantum backreactions by directly mixing
classical and quantum variables. But there exist more promising alternative approaches that
offer quantum theories of gravity which do not involve a quantization of the gravitational
field and, I will argue, escape Peres and Terno. Typically, they understand gravity as an
induced rather than a fundamental force. According to this view, gravity is not one of the
four fundamental forces; instead, it emerges at a higher level as a result of the fundamental
physics. In this section, I expose two proposals which, at least to some extent, do not regard
gravity as a fundamental force. For them, since gravity is not fundamental, it does not have
to be quantized. Thus, they provide quantum theories of gravity while denying the necessity
of its quantization.
11Mattingly expressed the following objection during our personal exchanges, most succinctly on 16 March
2006.
34
The reader may wonder why I wish to label these approaches as quantum theories of
gravity. Obviously, they do not constitute theories of gravity qua quantum field. But even
so, they offer a resolution of the conceptual tension between quantum theory and general
relativity and promise to restitute an account of those phenomena which led us to quest for
a quantum theory of gravity in the first place. Hence, they solve the problem that required
a quantum theory of gravity, and shall thus be termed as such.
2.3.1 Sakharov’s Induced Gravity
Most prominently, perhaps, among these alternative approaches is Sakharov’s induced grav-
ity theory. As it has recently been resurrected, it deserves particular attention.12 It claims
to implement the vision of Lorentz (1899-1900) contemplating the possibility of gravity as
an effective force induced by residual electromagnetic forces. For Sakharov, gravity is thus
not a fundamental physical field, but “induced,” i.e. emergent from quantum field theory
like hydrodynamics emerges from molecular physics. Nota bene, since the interaction part
of the action contains both classical and quantum terms, Sakharov’s account leads to a type
of semi-classical quantum gravity.
The general framework for an induced gravity theory in Sakharov’s vein is set up by first
assuming a Lorentzian manifold as a background on which to do quantum field theory. This
background is a continuous, classical, unquantized spacetime. It is left free “to flap in the
breeze,” i.e. no assumptions regarding its dynamical evolution are made. In particular, no
Einstein equations—modified or not—enter the picture. When we do quantum field theory
on this background spacetime, it turns out that the effective action at the one-loop level
automatically contains terms proportional to the cosmological constant and to the Einstein-
Hilbert action of general relativity, as well as higher order terms. Thus, it looks as if Einstein
gravity is generated at the one-loop level from the interaction of quantum fields.
It may be instructive to note that gravity was not really created ex nihilo. At the bare
minimum, a Lorentzian background manifold was assumed. Furthermore, the geometry of
the background manifold acted as an external field for the quantum fields living on the back-
ground manifold. Terms encoding the geometry of the classical background thus cohabited
in the Lagrangian of the effective action with the terms of the quantum fields. To the extent
to which the background geometry was presupposed, arguably, the gravitational degree of
freedom, but not its dynamics, was put into the theory from the start. Next, as the grav-
itational field is considered a degree of freedom, the variation of the effective action with
12The original paper is Sakharov (1967). There is a modern recast by Visser (2002). Sakharov’s original
article had over 350 citations in high energy physics as of April 2006, of which 61 since January 2003 alone.
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respect to its variables should automatically lead to the (semi-classical) Einstein equations.
While the fact that the Einstein-Hilbert action is mimicked at the one-loop level is very
suggestive, it is unclear whether this framework is sufficient to fully recover gravity. But it
is important to note that gravity, although arguably not fully “induced,” was not quantized,
as the geometry was assumed to be classical. Furthermore, as other ansa¨tze operating
with the expectation value of T̂µν , the approach avoids Peres and Terno’s prohibition of a
semi-classical theory of gravity with quantum backreactions using direct mixing. Since no
dynamical assumptions were made regarding the classical background (the classical sector),
i.e. no classical dynamics imposed on the classical sector, the gravitational action is induced
from the mutual interaction of the underlying quantum fields. The classical sector acts as
a mere background and does not interact with the quantum sector. Therefore, no hybrid
dynamics is necessitated in this approach.
Interestingly, there exist reverse efforts of constructing a fundamental quantum theory of
gravity, subsumed under the heading “non-commutative geometry,” which assume only grav-
ity to be a fundamental force and derive the standard model of electromagnetic, weak, and
strong forces from gravity. However widespread and persuasive the belief in a fundamental
theory containing gravity as a fundamental force may be, currently available observations
and experiments at most license inferences regarding the same semi-classical realm that
Sakharov’s approach describes. Not unlike the belief in the unity of nature, the belief in a
fundamental theory including gravity is exposed by Sakharov as an additional commitment
not warranted by the (currently available) resources of empirical physics alone.
2.3.2 Jacobson’s Gravitational Thermodynamics
More recently, Jacobson (1995) has offered a perspective that also cautioned against quantiz-
ing the Einstein equations. Rather than deriving the four laws of black hole thermodynamics
from the classical Einstein equations, as did Bardeen, Carter, and Hawking (1973), Jacobson
inverts the derivation by recovering the Einstein equations from the entropy’s proportionality
to the horizon surface area of a black hole together with the fundamental thermodynam-
ical relation δQ = TdS, connecting heat Q, temperature T , and entropy S. The heat
is interpreted as the energy flux across a causal horizon and the temperature as the Unruh
temperature relative to an accelerated observer just inside a local Rindler horizon. This heat
manifests itself via the gravitational field it generates. As in conventional thermodynamics,
where heat is interpreted as energy flux between unobservable degrees of freedom, the un-
derlying mechanics of the energy flux is irrelevant. Assuming cosmic censorship, Jacobson
formulates local gravitational thermodynamics for an observer by means of the boundary of
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her past (her “causal horizon”), associating this boundary with entropy. The system that
radiates heat is identified with the degrees of freedom behind the horizon, separated from
the observer’s past by a causality barrier and is therefore unobservable.
As Jacobson shows, this interpretation imposes conditions on the curvature of spacetime
such that the classical Einstein equations are implied. Therefore, he suggests that the Ein-
stein equations can be more adequately analogized with the wave equation for sound in a
medium, rather than interpreted as the dynamical equations for a fundamental field. These
equations, he urges, as higher-level equations of state, should then not be quantized as if
the gravitational field were fundamental, despite the fact that they may describe what is
ultimately a quantum reality.
As in Sakharov’s approach, gravity does not represent a fundamental force. Rather, it
emerges as a phenomenon supervenient on the energy flux from causally inaccessible degrees
of freedom. Again, Peres and Terno’s result does not apply. However, Jacobson’s claim that
gravity should not be quantized in this scheme because it represents a collective, higher-order
degree of freedom is simply false. Physicists routinely quantize collective degrees of freedom
such as sound (with “phonons” as quanta of sound). Whether or not a degree of freedom
must be quantized or not does not depend on whether it is collective or individual, but on
altogether different considerations. Hence, quantization cannot necessarily be escaped by
Jacobsonian gravity; but it is not forced on it either.
Jacobson’s incipient program, unfortunately, has so far not been worked out in any detail.
It remains to be seen, therefore, whether it will be able to offer a full picture of the workings
of gravity. If it will be successful in this undertaking, then the quantizers of gravity may
have met a challenge.
2.4 CONCLUSION OF THIS CHAPTER
This chapter has analyzed what I take to be the most influential arguments pertinent to the
issue of whether gravity must be quantized in a final quantum theory of gravity, taking a
closer look at two on each side of the debate. The argument exemplified by Doplicher and
collaborators, prevalent in the physics community—as far as the community is concerned
with the issue at all—, has been shown to be incomplete. It was charged with lacking a part
establishing that the operationally discrete spacetime results from an underlying discreteness
at the Planck scale. Next, I have discussed, but only partially accepted, Peres and Terno’s
argument as a proof of the impossibility of constructing a consistent semi-classical theory
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including truly hybrid dynamics. I insisted that it does not rule out accounts where either
gravity is not a fundamental, but only an effective force, or the quantum degrees of freedom
are coupled to the classical ones only via their expectation values, as is typical in semi-
classical theories.
Sakharov’s induced gravity program provides an effective, semi-classical approach to
gravity that does not require a quantization of gravity. Similarly, Jacobson’s gravitational
thermodynamics conceives of gravity as emergent from the energy flux of unobservable de-
grees of freedom. Although regret must be expressed that these accounts are but nascent
attempts to understand gravity and that they are therefore yet lacking in many respects,
they establish that it is at least conceivable that the final theory of gravity may not involve
quantization.
I have not addressed in this chapter the suggestion made by some that the fact that the
classical theory of general relativity generically admits singularities in its solutions, in an
attempt to exterminate these pathologies, necessitates the quantization of the gravitational
field. This issue, in particular the fate of the “big bang” singularity in cosmological models
based on LQG will be discussed at length in Chapters 6 through 8.
The question of whether the gravitational field must be quantized in a full quantum
theory of gravity thus turns out to be more subtle than is commonly assumed. Once stripped
from its endemic folklore, the field affords a wide variety of arguments drawing on the
resources of physical theories. None of these arguments can, by itself, claim conclusiveness.
Ultimately, I concur with Mattingly (2006) who takes the pragmatic view that different
programs of constructing a QTG start out from different motivations and seek to solve
different problems with different methods. It should not come as a surprise then that they
sometimes also differ about whether gravity needs to be quantized, if so, how, and if not,
why not. As far as LQG is concerned, it takes the view that quantizing is justified because
quantizing gravity along the canonical program promises to resolve the nasty difficulties
arising in perturbative approaches taken by semi-classical theories such as QFT on curved
spacetime. So for proponents of LQG, the preference of a non-perturbative fundamental
theory of gravity over a perturbative one offers plenty of reason to quantize.
Be this as it may, all these arguments in favour or against quantization address a mul-
titude of important foundational issues encountered in the Herculean task of formulating a
quantum theory of gravity. I have merely tried to scratch the surface of some of these issues
in the hereby finished chapter.
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3.0 PRINCIPLES OF GENERAL RELATIVITY
Although it has not been possible in Chapter 2 to establish the strict necessity of quantizing
gravity, I shall venture forward with my main topic, LQG and its foundations and appli-
cations. As I have mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, LQG assumes the view
that gravity must be quantized in order to avoid the difficulties that arise in perturbative
approaches in semi-classical QG. These perturbative approaches operate with a fixed space-
time background and will be seen in the course of this chapter as violating central tenets of
GTR. For advocates of the loopy approach, thus, LQG offers the dual attraction of follow-
ing in a principled manner the insights of GTR and of avoiding disastrous consequences of
perturbative approaches to understanding gravity in its quantum regime. This and the next
chapter, however, will illustrate that the former claim must be qualified and that the latter
is only purchased at the price of encountering several novel obstacles.
3.1 THE ORIGIN OF BACKGROUND INDEPENDENCE
The so-called equivalence principle constituted one of the two most important guiding prin-
ciples for Einstein in his search for the general theory of relativity (GTR). To this date,
it also stands tall in the “context of justification” of GTR. Due to its immense systematic
relevance, it can justly be said to embody the heart and soul of gravitational theory, but
by the same token, it is also responsible for most of the technical and conceptual difficulties
encountered on the road to a QTG.
One can find numerous equivalent, “almost” equivalent, and inequivalent formulations of
the equivalence principle in the literature. This variety can largely be explained by historical
evolution: it should not come as a surprise that Galileo’s equivalence principle is inequivalent
to Newton’s, as is Newton’s to Einstein’s. What is perhaps more surprising is that Einstein
seems to have oscillated between different inequivalent expressions of his own version of the
equivalence principle. Even worse, some of his alleged versions appear to degenerate into
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trivial or even false statements, at least if one believes some rather influential interpreters
of GTR.1 The motivation for the present occasion is systematic rather than historical and
I shall therefore not be concerned with finding a historically adequate reconstruction of
Einstein’s—or anybody else’s—possibly evolving understanding of the equivalence at stake.
The equivalence principle ordained below as Einstein’s should thus be considered as wearing
a tag without a claimed precise historical ascription of intellectual property.
Newton claimed that a physical body’s property of “mass” is proportional to its “weight,”
with the identical proportionality factor for all bodies.2 The “mass” here refers to a body’s
intrinsic resistance to any change of its kinematic state, i.e. to its inertial mass. “Weight,”
on the other hand, designates a force acting on a body in a gravitational field. The body’s
property to which the gravitational field couples, i.e. the source of its susceptibility to this
force, is of course its gravitational mass. Newton’s claim thus amounts to the proportionality
of the inertial and gravitational masses of all physical bodies, again with the proportionality
factor being the same if the field strength of the gravitational field is held fixed. In fact,
measurements indicate that the proportionality factor must be very close to one.3 This gives
rise to the following equivalence principle:
Postulate 1 (Weak Equivalence Principle (WEP)). The trajectory of a sufficiently
small body falling freely in a gravitational field does not depend on the body’s internal struc-
ture or composition. The gravitational mass to which the gravitational field couples is equal
to the inertial mass. This is true for all physical bodies.
Postulate 1 (WEP) has a serious implication: it precludes the possibility of a physical
procedure to directly determine inertial observers in the presence of a gravitational field.
Forces which admit observers unperturbed by the corresponding force field4 lend themselves
to a direct determination of their field: one just has to measure how the trajectories of a
sufficient number of test objects subject to the force deviate from the trajectories of the
unperturbed observers. But if—as Postulate 1 (WEP) claims—all observers are equally
subject to the gravitational force as are the test objects, then they will move precisely in
the same way and no deviation occurs. Without the introduction of ancillary constructions
1The main culprit for the dissemination of this uncharitable reading of Einstein seems to be Synge (1960).
For a recent account of the evolution of Einstein’s idea of an equivalence principle in a similar vein, see Janssen
(2005); for a more charitable interpretation, see Norton (1985).
2Assuming, of course, a homogeneous gravitational field. Equivalently, it can be assumed that this
proportionality factor is always measured “at the same spot” in the gravitational field or at least at spots of
equal field strengths.
3See Section 2.1 of Will (2001) for the current status of the experimental confirmation of Postulate 1
(WEP).
4Electrically neutral observers without magnetic dipole moment may serve as an example, as their tra-
jectories are not disturbed by the presence of an electromagnetic field.
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to single out “inertial” observers, there exists no “background motion” to gauge the test
objects’ motion. As a direct result of Postulate 1 (WEP), the gravitational field is thus not
amenable to a straightforward physical determination.
In the absence of gravity and other forces, the special theory of relativity (STR) per-
mits the construction of inertial observers via spatio-temporal measurements using rods and
clocks. Minkowski spacetime, the manifold R4 equipped with the flat metric ηµν , serves as
the inertial background in STR. But when gravity is switched on, inertial observers can no
longer be constructed as the presence of a gravitational field influences the readings on clocks
and rods. In this sense, the spacetime geometry cannot be considered flat anymore. Einstein
identifies the trajectories of freely falling observers in a gravitational field with the geodesics
of the now curved spacetime metric. Thus, the world lines of inertial observers coincide with
the world lines of the test particles subjected to the gravitational force. The coincidence of
inertial and gravitational trajectories suggests the identification of the fields responsible for
inertial and gravitational phenomena. The following formulation of an equivalence principle
captures this idea:
Postulate 2 (Einstein Equivalence Principle (EEP)). Effects due to inertia and ef-
fects due to gravity are manifestations of the same structure. This structure is called the
inertio-gravitational field. Depending on the kinematical state of an observer, the inertio-
gravitational field may be split into inertial and gravitational components differently.
Without promoting the extermination of one structure in favour of the other, as is often
done in the literature, let us just say that according to GTR there exists one physical field
which is responsible for both inertial and gravitational phenomena. Because this field is
dynamical, the fixed inertial background of STR has been abolished.
Conventional QFT, however, requires a fixed inertial background structure. Typically,
Minkowski spacetime offers such a background, but we may use any given fixed spacetime
metric, including a curved one, on which to do QFT. The background metric enters in most
equations of QFT; it underlies the formulation of the commutation relations, the operator
product expansions, the propagators, etc. Regardless of which background metric is as-
sumed, the important lesson is that some background spacetime must always be assumed in
conventional QFT. Conventional QFT cannot, therefore, evade excising the inertial compo-
nent from the inertio-gravitational field in order to get under way, and thereby assumes a
split of the metric field,
gµν = bµν + hµν , (3.1)
where bµν is a non-dynamical background field and hµν are those perturbations on the inertial
background field which we consider to be the gravitational field proper. The background bµν
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encodes spatio-temporal relations and thus the causal structure. On this smooth classical
background bµν lives the quantum field hµν , which must commute at spacelike separations as
determined by the background geometry encoded in bµν . A division of the gravitational field
into a fixed background and a fluctuating quantum field stands in strident contradiction with
Postulate 2 (EEP), according to which no fixed inertial background structure unaffected by
local degrees of freedom exists. A theory following Postulate 2 (EEP) must be background
independent, defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Background independence). A theory is background independent iff it
abides by Postulate 2 (EEP) in that it does not assume a split of the inertio-gravitational
field into a fixed inertial and a gravitational component as proposed in equation (3.1).
Background independence, so often invoked as a selling pitch by advocates of LQG,
can thus be seen to essentially amount to a postulate demanding a generalized equivalence
between inertial and gravitational masses.
3.2 GENERAL COVARIANCE
With the requirement for background independence in place, the challenge of its formal
implementation arises. Many authors simply equate, without due explication, background
independence with general covariance, which in turn is equated with invariance under active
spacetime diffeomorphisms. The ambition of this section is to disentangle this cluster of
related concepts by carefully investigating the relations they afford with one another. On
its conception, Einstein (1916a, §3) introduces the notion of general covariance along the
following lines:
Definition 2 (General Covariance). A theory is generally covariant just in case its equa-
tions retain the same form in any coordinate system, i.e. they are covariant under arbitrary
coordinate transformations.
The principle of general covariance would then be the demand that a physical theory
be generally covariant as defined in Definition 2. The precise formulation, which somewhat
alters the demand for general covariance as understood by Definition 2, follows below in
Postulates 3 and 4. Transformations as they are relevant to present purposes are described by
diffeomorphisms, i.e. one-to-one and onto C∞-maps between differentiable manifolds which
have a C∞-inverse, symbolically φ : M → N . In order to diffeomorphically transform
tensor fields living in a manifold, such as gµν and Tµν , one introduces a mapping called the
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“pullback” which is in a natural way associated with the diffeomorphism φ: φ “pulls back”
a function f : N → R on N to a function f ◦ φ : M → R on M composed in a natural
manner from φ and f (see also Figure 1). The function φ∗f on M is then defined as the
f
xµ yν
M N
R
m
R
n
φ∗f = f ◦ φ
φ
R
Figure 1: The pullback of f by φ, denoted φ∗, is defined as φ∗f .= (f ◦ φ).
function whose value at the point p ∈M is the value of f at φ(p) ∈ N :
(φ∗f)(p) .= (f ◦ φ)(p) = f(φ(p)). (3.2)
When φ maps points from M to N , then φ∗ maps functions from N to M. Analogously,
one can introduce a map φ∗ called “pushforward” (or sometimes “carry along”) which maps
functions from M to N .
To define the pullback more formally in the present context,5 a tensor T of type (r, s) at
a point p ∈M is formally defined as a multilinear function
T : T∗p(M)× · · · ×T∗p(M)×Tp(M)× · · · ×Tp(M) −→ R (3.3)
5A more general definition of the pullback can be given by associating it with linear maps φ ∈ L(V,W )
between vector spaces V and W . L(V,W ) is a more general group than Diff(M). Most of the subsequent
exposition is based on Hawking and Ellis (1973, Sec. 2.3), which offers a pleasingly clear and careful review
of the subject. For notational consistency, I use a different notation and a slightly different terminology.
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where there are r factors of the cotangent vector space of M at p, T∗p(M), and s factors of
the tangent vector space of M at p, Tp(M).6 The space of all such tensors is called Trs(p)
and is given by the tensor product between r factors of Tp(M) and s factors of T∗p(M).
Particularly, T10(p) = Tp(M) and T01(p) = T∗p(M). A tensor field of type (r, s) assigns each
point p ∈M a tensor (3.3).
From the introduction of the pullback of functions as defined in (3.2), one can define
the (contravariant) vector mapping, or pushforward for vector fields vi, φ∗vi(f) evaluated at
φ(p) as equal to vi(φ
∗f) evaluated at p. Similarly, one can introduce a vector mapping for
covariant vectors wi, the pullback for vector fields, by using the pushforward of functions.7
Upon completion of this step, we will have defined the maps
φ∗ : Tp(M)→ Tφ(p)(N ),
φ∗ : T∗φ(p)(N )→ T∗p(M).
From these constructions and from the definition of tensor fields in the previous paragraph,
one can construct maps φ∗ and φ∗ associated with φ which map general contravariant tensors
(i.e. tensors of type (r, 0)) from M to N and general covariant tensors (i.e. tensors of type
(0, s)) from N to M respectively. So for a covariant tensor T of type (0, s) defined on N ,
the pullback φ∗ of T by φ is given by a map φ∗ : T ∈ T0s(φ(p)) → φ∗T ∈ T0s(p) where for
any contravariant vector vi ∈ Tp(N )
φ∗T (v1, ..., vs)|p = T (φ∗v1, ..., φ∗vs)|φ(p). (3.4)
Similarly, for a contravariant tensor S of type (r, 0) defined on M, the pushforward φ∗ of S
by φ is given by the map φ∗ : S ∈ Tr0(p) → φ∗S ∈ Tr0(φ(p)) where for any covariant vector
wi ∈ T∗φ(p)(N )
φ∗S(w1, ..., wr)|φ(p) = S(φ∗w1, ..., φ∗wr)|p. (3.5)
Since it was stipulated at the outset that the map φ is always a diffeomorphism and there-
fore invertible, the associated mappings φ∗ and φ∗ also have an inverse, (φ∗)−1 = (φ−1)∗ and
(φ∗)−1 = (φ−1)∗, respectively. This fact can be used to define a pullback (or a pushforward,
as do Hawking and Ellis (1973)) which maps tensors of arbitrary rank from the tangent and
cotangent spaces of N to those ofM. This new, “extended” pullback is essentially composed
6The m-dimensional tangent vector space Tp(M) is defined as the space of all tangent vectors to M at
p. The m-dimensional cotangent vector space T∗p(M) is defined as its dual space, containing all covariant
vectors toM at p corresponding to the contravariant tangent vectorsM at p. For more details, cf. Hawking
and Ellis (1973, Sec. 2.2).
7The component indices are suppressed here; indices therefore indicate different vectors rather than
different components of the same vector.
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of the old pullback acting on the cotangent space N and from the old inverted pushforward
acting on the tangent space of N . Using this composition and the reformulation of (3.4) as
T (v1, ..., vs)|φ(p) = φ∗T ((φ−1)∗v1, ..., (φ−1)∗vs)|p,
we can define the generalized pullback as
T (w1, ..., wr, v1, ..., vs)|φ(p) = φ∗T (φ∗w1, ..., φ∗wr, (φ−1)∗v1, ..., (φ−1)∗vr)|p.
Since we will only be concerned with the case of diffeomorphisms as maps from one manifold
into itself, i.e. M = N , given a single n-dimensional manifold M, where n is typically
four, we will regard as a diffeomorphism an invertible C∞-map from M to M. These
diffeomorphisms constitute a group, Diff(M), with the normal conjunction of mappings as
group operation. The interpretation of diffeomorphisms as maps between manifolds which
move around points of the manifold which does not make recourse to any coordinate system
is called active. Diffeomorphisms may also be interpreted passively, as is done in Definition
2, i.e. in terms of transformations between coordinate systems. A coordinate system xµ on
M is an invertible differentiable map from an open subset ofM to Rn. For a tensor field T
onM, this coordinate map specifies the functions t : Rn → R, i.e. the “field T in coordinates
x.” A passive diffeomorphism is then an invertible differentiable map φ : Rn → Rn which
defines a new coordinate system yµ onM. The field value of T in the coordinates yµ is then
given by t′(yµ) = t(φ(yµ)).
To appreciate the difference between active and passive diffeomorphisms, the reader is
strongly encouraged to read Rovelli’s illustration of these distinct interpretations as given in
Rovelli (2004, Sec. 2.2.4). In this wonderful illustration, Rovelli considers Earth’s surface and
two points on it—the city of Paris and the village of Quintin in Brittany—as well as a tem-
perature field defined everywhere on Earth’s surface. He associates a passive diffeomorphism
with a re-expression of the temperature field at a fixed point as a consequence of a mere re-
coordinatization of Earth’s surface. Covariance under passively interpreted transformations
thus only means that nature does not care which coordinate system we impose upon her.
Actively interpreted transformations, on the other hand, relate two a priori distinct fields
with one another. For the sake of illustration, Rovelli considers a constant breeze which
has uniformly transported yesterday’s temperature field to today’s. Yesterday’s tempera-
ture field and today’s temperature field are a priori distinct fields. Therefore, postulating
covariance under actively interpreted transformations amount to more than just to claiming
that nature does not mind about her coordinate dress. The two interpretations are often
confused because for any two fields related by an active diffeomorphism, one can always find
a passive transformation such that in the new coordinate system, one field is expressed by
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the same functions as the other was in the old coordinate system. Imagine that the wind has
moved the air from Quintin to Paris within 24 hours, and thus rotated the temperature field
by a given angle α. If we think of this constant breeze which brings yesterday’s temperature
field into today’s as an active diffeomorphism relating the two, then today’s temperature
field at Paris can be given by the same expression as yesterday’s field at Quintin by rotating
the coordinate system in which we write the temperature field by the same angle α.
This consideration can be generalized. For any two tensor fields defined on a manifold
and related by an active diffeomorphism, we can find a corresponding passive diffeomorphism
encoding a coordinate transformations such that the functions which represent one of the
tensor fields in one coordinate system are identical with the ones that represent the other
tensor field in the other coordinate system. If a theory is generally covariant according to
Definition 2, then its equations of motion are the same in both coordinate systems. This
implies, in turn, that for a dynamical tensor field which satisfies the equations of motion of a
generally covariant theory, its relative by an active diffeomorphism must be a solution of the
same equations too.8 Introducing the notion of “invariance under active diffeomorphisms”:
Definition 3 (Invariance under Active Spacetime Diffeomorphisms). A theory is
invariant under active spacetime diffeomorphisms just in case active spacetime diffeomor-
phisms map a solution of the dynamical equations to another solution of the same equations.
In a theory whose dynamical equations can be derived from an action principle we call a
variational symmetry those transformations which are members of a group G of transforma-
tions which leave the theory’s action invariant. Every variational symmetry of the action is
a dynamical symmetry of the equations of motion, but not vice versa as there can be scaling
transformations which carry solutions of the dynamical equations into other solutions but
are not variational symmetries of the action. Cf. Earman (2003, Sec. 2).
I am concerned with GTR and the Einstein fields equations as its dynamical equations.
Given a manifold M, pairs of tensor fields (gµν , Tµν) solve these equations. Thus, the de-
mand for general covariance as expressed in Definition 2 together with the uncontroversial
codification of arbitrary coordinate transformations qua passive diffeomorphisms imply the
8It is unclear to what extent Einstein himself made a clean distinction between active and passive in-
terpretations of transformations. As the present effort is not exegetical in nature, I shall not be concerned
with this issue here. For detailed analyses, the reader should turn to Norton (1993) and Stachel (1980a).
In a letter to the French mathematician Paul Painleve´ in 1921, Einstein made a pertinent remark that “the
coordinates themselves do not possess a physical significance, which means that they do not represent results
of a measurement; only results obtained by the elimination of coordinates may pretend to objective signif-
icance.” (Cited after Biezunski (1989, p. 243), my translation) Earman (2006c, p. 448f) argues that this
passage is sufficiently ambiguous to justify a reading according to which Einstein may have had in mind here
the substantive version of general covariance, i.e. spacetime diffeomorphisms as gauge symmetries. Although
the passage is not entirely free of ambiguities, I do not see much motivation for this reading.
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invariance under active diffeomorphisms. Conversely, if a theory is invariant under active
diffeomorphisms and arbitrary coordinate transformations are captured by passive diffeo-
morphisms, then the theory is generally covariant. General covariance and invariance under
active diffeomorphisms will therefore, somewhat imprecisely, often be used interchangeably
here—and elsewhere in the literature.
Let me introduce a more formal manner of speaking, inspired by Earman (1989). Con-
sider a mathematical structure, a “theory,” and the associated set M of models. In GTR,
the set M consists of triples m = 〈M, gµν , Tµν〉 as models of the theory. The “laws” L of
the physical theory at stake, typically expressed as equations in the corresponding math-
ematical structure, pick out a subclass of models ML
.
= mod(L) ⊂ M. For GTR, this
subclass is constituted by those triples 〈M, gµν , Tµν〉 which satisfy Einstein’s field equa-
tions, Gµν [gµν ] = 8piGTµν . In this idiom, a symmetry operation is usually defined as a map
σ : M → M such that for any m ∈ ML, we find σ(m) ∈ ML. In other words, a symmetry
of the laws L preserves ML. The set ST is the set of all those maps which satisfy this
definition, or the set of all symmetries of theory T . Understood in this manner, a symmetry
of GTR maps solutions of the field equations to solutions of the field equations. However,
the present issue is more subtle: there are various potential notions of symmetry at stake
here, the one just described as well as one that is based on invariance under spacetime
diffeomorphisms. The first sense of symmetry, defined as a map σ : M → M such that
ML is preserved, implies that a solution of the field equations can be mapped to any other
solutions of the field equations and the map will still qualify as a symmetry, as long as
ML is preserved. In other words, the map which brings, say, Kerr-Newman spacetime into
Minkowski spacetime would be counted as a symmetry of the theory. Such a liberal con-
ception of symmetry is undesirable since it will not offer any help in getting a fix on gauge
in GTR. Instead, we will impose the further restriction that a map σ : M → M counts as
a symmetry of the theory iff it arises from a corresponding spacetime diffeomorphism φ ∈
Diff(M). A map σ :M→M is considered to arise from a corresponding φ ∈ Diff(M) in case
σ : m = 〈M, gµν , Tµν〉 7−→ σ(m) = 〈M, φ∗gµν , φ∗Tµν〉. These diffeomorphisms preserve the
Einstein-Hilbert action of GTR and therefore carry a solution of the Einstein field equations
into another solution of the same equations, which derive from the Einstein-Hilbert action
by varying the metric field gµν . If a symmetry transformation arising from φ ∈ Diff(M)
acts on M in the described manner, then every element of Diff(M) corresponds to a unique
element in ST . But while any map σ that is induced by such diffeomorphisms thus preserves
ML, the converse is not true. Thus, not every σ ∈ ST which preserves ML should properly
be considered as symmetry of the theory, but only the subset of ST of those transformations
which arise from a corresponding element in Diff(M). I will denote this subset by SymT .
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Formally, a theory T will be generally covariant just in case the set SymT consists of
those mappings σ which correspond to active spacetime diffeomorphisms.
Definition 4 (Formal general covariance). A theory T is formally generally covariant iff
∀φ ∈ Diff(M) ∃!σ ∈ SymT [m = 〈M, gµν , Tµν〉 ∈ML → σ(m) = 〈M, φ∗gµν , φ∗Tµν〉 ∈ML].
From this definition, one can deduce in an obvious manner how the formal principle
of general covariance, or, more accurately perhaps, the principle of invariance under active
spacetime diffeomorphisms, formalizes as a postulate:
Postulate 3 (Formal principle of general covariance (FPGC)). ∀φ ∈ Diff(M)∃!σ ∈
SymT [m = 〈M, gµν , Tµν〉 ∈ML → σ(m) = 〈M, φ∗gµν , φ∗Tµν〉 ∈ML].
Invariance under active spacetime diffeomorphisms is thus a symmetry of GTR. The laws
of motion of GTR are of course Einstein’s field equations. I will therefore label the set of
generally relativistic models as ME. It turns out that in GTR, the Einstein-Hilbert action
(4.1) is invariant under transformations φ ∈ Diff(M), and that therefore if 〈M, gµν , Tµν〉
solves the Einstein field equations, so does 〈M, φ∗gµν , φ∗Tµν〉. It is therefore possible to
construct a transformation σ ∈ SymT for each φ ∈ Diff(M) such that Postulate 3 (FPGC)
is satisfied. GTR is formally generally covariant.
As a matter of fact, active spacetime diffeomorphism should be interpreted not only as a
symmetry of GTR, but as a gauge symmetry. A gauge symmetry of a theory is a symmetry
such that models of the theory related by the gauge transformation correspond to the same
physical situation. This more substantive interpretation of general covariance is expressed
in the following postulate:
Postulate 4 (Substantive principle of general covariance (SPGC)). The group
Diff(M) of active spacetime diffeomorphisms is the gauge group of GTR.
This postulate is by no means implied by Postulate 3 (FPGC), which is perfectly con-
sistent with diffeomorphically related solutions representing physically different spacetimes.
Although there seems to be a certain re´sistance in philosophy of physics against this gauge in-
terpretation, most physicists happily embrace it.9 There are two main motivations in favour
of Postulate 4 (SPGC). The more traditional, and, among philosophers, better known, mo-
tivation originates from the so-called “hole argument” and the related issue of determinism
in GTR. The second reason for holding that spacetime diffeomorphisms should be taken
9There are also some philosophers, such as Earman (2006c), from whom the term “substantive general
covariance” is borrowed. Weinstein (1999) has argued that GTR should not be considered a gauge theory
because the group Diff(M) is not a gauge group in the sense of particle physics, i.e. it is not the automorphism
group of a principal fibre bundle. Although I agree that what is meant by the “physics” that remains invariant
under gauge transformations is very different in GTR and in the standard model, this does not suffice to
deny that it may be profitable to consider Diff(M) as GTR’s gauge group, as I will argue below.
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as gauge symmetry of GTR, which has more recently leaked into the philosophy of science
literature, stems from the general analysis of symmetries in theories which obey an action
principle. Let me briefly review both motivations.
The hole argument goes like this.10 Choose a φ ∈ Diff(M) such that it is the identity
map everywhere except in a compact region H ⊂ M, the “hole,” where φ is constructed
such that it smoothly differs from the identity map. Given a model 〈M, gµν , Tµν〉 ∈ ME,
then by Postulate 3 (PGC), 〈M, φ∗gµν , φ∗Tµν〉 will also be inME. But because of how φ was
constructed, the two models coincide everywhere except in H. This implies that specifying
the g- and the T -fields everywhere outside the hole does not suffice to uniquely determine the
fields inside the hole H. In order to avoid a failure of determinism, the two mathematically
distinct models 〈M, gµν , Tµν〉 and 〈M, φ∗gµν , φ∗Tµν〉 must be identified as representing the
same physical situation, turning Diff(M) into a gauge symmetry of GTR.
The second, and related, but more principled, motivation to see diffeomorphism invari-
ance as a gauge symmetry stems from a general analysis of theories with so-called variational
symmetries. Variational symmetries are just those transformations which leave the action
of a theory invariant. These transformations form a group, usually denoted by G. Theories
whose dynamical equations can be derived from an action principle and are therefore cast
as Euler-Lagrange equations fall under the reign of Noether’s theorems (Noether 1918). For
these theories, gauge symmetries are just those transformations which absorb the underde-
termination arising in the context of the second Noether theorem. This theorem states that
the action of such a theory admits an infinite-dimensional Lie group G∞s of transformations
which depend on s arbitrary functions of all independent variables and the first derivatives
of these functions just in case there are s identities between the Lagrangean expressions, i.e.
the left hand sides of the Euler-Lagrange equations, and their derivatives.11 Note that the
number s of these identities is equal to the number of arbitrary functions which define an
element of the group G∞s. The theorem implies that the Euler-Lagrange equations are not all
10The hole argument has originally been concocted by Einstein in late 1913 in order to absolve himself
from producing a generally covariant set of field equations. As far as I am aware, it was first alluded to in
correspondence to Ludwig Hopf (on 2 November 1913) and Paul Ehrenfest (on before 7 November 1913) and
first appeared in print in Einstein (1914a, passim) and Einstein (1914b, p. 178). It has been resurrected by
John Stachel (1980a), and brought into philosophical limelight by Earman and Norton (1987). I do not wish
to cover the entire reaction of the philosophical community to Earman and Norton’s interpretation of the
hole argument. Having said that, however, I would like to draw attention to Rickles (2005) who constructs
a hole argument for LQG and to Iftime and Stachel (2006) who propose a generalization of the argument to
any covariant theory.
11A Lie group G is a differentiable manifold endowed with a group operation such that (1) · : G × G →
G, (g1, g2) 7→ g1 ·g2, and (2) −1 : G→ G, g 7→ g−1. The dimension of the manifold is said to be the dimension
of the Lie group. Sometimes, it is required in the literature that a Lie group be finite-dimensional. In this
case, Noether’s second theorem would strictly speaking not be concerned with a Lie group, but instead with
infinite-dimensional groups that share many properties of (finite-dimensional) Lie groups.
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independent, but suffer from s “dependencies,”12 and thus suffer from underdetermination in
the sense that their solutions contain arbitrary functions of the independent variables. This,
in turn, leads to an indeterministic dynamical evolution because these arbitrary functions
that crop up in the solutions may be, for two solutions which only differ in the arbitrary
functions they contain, identical up to a certain time and diverge thereafter. As long as
any transformation between solutions of the Euler-Lagrange equations which differ only in
these arbitrary functions is considered as a gauge transformation, however, the threat of
indeterminism is immediately blocked as the solutions are no longer deemed physically in-
equivalent. Since the group Diff(M) is a variational symmetry of the Einstein-Hilbert action
(4.1), GTR falls under the spell of Noether’s second theorem. For GTR, the group G∞s is
thus just Diff(M) and s = 4, as four functions define a spacetime diffeomorphism. Therefore,
we are faced with a case of underdetermination as solutions of the Euler-Lagrange equations
of GTR—the Einstein equations—contain arbitrary functions. The underdetermination is
taken care of if Diff(M) is seen as the gauge group of GTR. Of the ten Einstein equations,
six are thus seen to be independent.13
Both motivations behind Postulate 4 (SPGC), the hole argument and the more general
considerations originating from Noether’s second theorem, thus offer reasons for endorsing
the postulate based on a desire to avoid an indeterministic dynamical evolution. While this
undoubtedly constitutes a sensible justification of Postulate 4 (SPGC), one should be aware
of the fact that determinism does not universally rule in the context of generally relativistic
spacetimes, not even modulo gauge. Suffice it to say on this occasion that deterministic
evolution in GTR is limited to the extent to which a spacetime is globally hyperbolic.14
What is the relation between background independence as defined in the previous sec-
tion and general covariance as parsed out above? Does a background independent theory
automatically satisfy Postulate 4 (SPGC) and vice versa? That the two requirements are
identical is certainly implied by the standard rhetoric found in canonical quantum gravity,
where the two notions are often used interchangeably. However, as it will soon turn out, the
exact identification is somewhat frivolous and, strictly speaking, false.
Let me first consider whether background independence is necessary for general covari-
ance in the sense of Postulate 4 (SPGC). Assume a split of the metric field into a fixed
inertial structure b and small perturbations h on this fixed background, “gravity proper.”
Replace gµν in the Einstein-Hilbert action by bµν+hµν , i.e. perform the split as given in (3.1).
12“Abha¨ngigkeiten” in Noether’s original wording.
13See also Brading and Castellani (2006, Sec. 6).
14This notion will be defined in Section 4.1. Cf. Earman (2004, Sec. 6) for a compact reference of the fate
of determinism in GTR or Earman (2006a, Sec. 6) for a extended and magisterial discussion of the same
material.
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Instead of varying the action with respect to gµν in order to obtain a field theory of gµν , only
vary hµν and receive a field theory of hµν on the fixed inertial background spacetime bµν .
In the derivation of the dynamical equations of motion for a theory which follows an action
principle, the resulting Euler-Lagrange equations will generally differ if the action is varied
with respect to different fields. One can thus expect to see different dynamical equations
arising from δS[gµν ]/δgµν = 0 and from δS[hµν ]/δhµν = 0. The exact difference, of course,
depends on what is chosen as the fixed background in the second case. No doubt the split
(3.1) can be made, and can be made in multiple ways. But for any particular choice of split,
it will not be preserved under arbitrary spacetime diffeomorphisms, but only under those
which preserve the particular splitting chosen. The mappings σ which should be considered
symmetries of the theory are no longer exactly those induced by any spacetime diffeomor-
phisms, i.e. SymT , but only those corresponding to the subgroup of elements in Diff(M)
which preserve the splitting, denoted by SymbT . Thus, the symmetry group of the theory will
essentially be broken down to the symmetry group of the background spacetime, provided
that the dynamical fields also obey the symmetry. For instance, if the background metric is
ηµν , then the remaining symmetries of the theory will be those of Minkowski spacetime, viz.
the Poincare´ group. The larger group Diff(M) will no longer be a symmetry of the theory.
The point becomes more obvious for a particular example. Bain (2004) discusses a version
of Newton-Cartan gravity introduced by Christian (1997), which retains as fixed background
a three-dimensional, spatially flat metric as well as a one-dimensional, temporal metric while
treating the connection as a dynamical variable. The two metrics live orthogonally on
one another and permit instantaneous causal signals. Bain finds that according to the
identification suggested by Noether’s second theorem, the spacetime as well as the dynamical
symmetries in the sense of the next paragraph are captured by the (extended) group Max(M)
of Maxwell transformations, which consists of transformations between rigid, non-rotating,
linear accelerating, Euclidean reference frames.
There is a distinction used by Earman (1989, p. 45) and going back to Anderson (1967,
Ch. 4) which nicely captures the issue at stake. If we introduce a distinction between fields
Bi that represent the inertial background structure (the “spacetime”) on the one hand, and
dynamical fields Dj (“gravity proper” and “matter”)—as we do when we insist on a splitting
(3.1)—, then we should likewise introduce a distinction between spacetime and dynamical
symmetries. A spacetime symmetry, then, is a mapping that leaves all the fields Bi invariant,
i.e. a diffeomorphism φ :M→M such that φ∗Bi = Bi for all i. A dynamical symmetry of a
theory with laws L is a transformation of the dynamical fields Dj such thatML is preserved
and the transformations arise from corresponding diffeomorphisms. In other words, a map
σ ∈ SymT is a dynamical symmetry iff for any m = 〈M, B1, ..., Bm, D1, ..., Dn〉 ∈ ML, it
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is also the case that σ(m) = 〈M, B1, ..., Bm, φ∗D1, ..., φ∗Dn〉 is an element of ML. Accord-
ing to this terminology, then, standard GTR, which satisfies the requirement of background
independence, has Diff(M) as a dynamical symmetry and in some of its models, such as
the Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker spacetimes discussed on Appendix C, we addi-
tionally find spacetime symmetries. For a background-dependent theory, however, he will
typically find Poincare´ invariance as spacetime symmetry and whatever dynamical symme-
tries the QFT of the dynamical fields tell you. In this idiom, splitting the metric as in (3.1)
breaks the diffeomorphism invariance down to Poincare´ invariance (plus perhaps some dy-
namical symmetries), and changes the symmetry from a dynamical to a spacetime symmetry.
Thus, a background-dependent theory violates Postulate 4 (SPGC) and general covariance
can be seen as implying background independence.
The point can be put slightly differently yet again. The gauge group of GTR, Diff(M)
is an infinite-dimensional Lie group.15 If one introduces a fixed background spacetime on
which the remaining fields propagate, then the group of variational symmetries of the action
can at most be a finite-dimensional Lie group.16 Thus, we are no longer in the realm of
Noether’s second theorem and have lost the important second justification of Postulate 4.
This line of reasoning also suggests that it is not the distinction between spacetime and
dynamical symmetries which does all the work for seeing Diff(M) as a gauge symmetry. If
this were the case, then the worry would surely arise that substantive general covariance has
been introduced by hand rather than by principle. As can be gleaned from the fact that the
variational symmetries form at most a finite-dimensional Lie group, the worry is allayed.
The claim that general covariance implies background independence can be challenged by
invoking a toy theory described by Sorkin (2002) and discussed in Earman (2006c). Sorkin
considers a classical scalar field Φ with massm propagating on a Minkowski spacetime.17 The
dynamics of this field is captured by the Klein-Gordon equation, which reads in a formally
generally covariant variant
ηµν∇µ∇νΦ−m2Φ = 0, (3.6)
where ∇µ is the covariant derivative operator determined by the Minkowski metric ηµν . The
variation of the action
S[Φ, η] =
1
2
∫
d4x
√−η(ηµν∇µΦ∇νΦ +m2Φ) (3.7)
15But see footnote 11.
16Stachel (2006, Ch. 3).
17More precisely, he considers a massless scalar field. Earman (2006c) generalizes the toy theory such as
to include scalar fields with non-vanishing mass m.
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with respect to Φ while holding ηµν fixed yields equation (3.6). The variational symmetry
group of this action, and thus its gauge group, is the Poincare´ group P (1, 3). In order to ren-
der the toy theory of this action not only formally generally covariant, but also substantively
so, we need to enlarge its gauge group such that it becomes Diff(M). This enlargement will
necessitate the following reformulation. First, we need to replace ηµν by a general pseudo-
Riemannian metric field gµν . Second, the covariant derivative operator ∇µ must now be
determined by gµν . Finally, equation (3.6) must be adjoined by a condition constraining gµν
to be flat,
Rµνρσ = 0. (3.8)
Any set of solutions of gµν∇µ∇νΦ−m2Φ = 0 coupled with equations (3.8) is also a solution
of (3.6), and vice versa. In order to remain faithful to the principled way of determining
the gauge group of the new theory, the variational symmetries of its action must be studied.
It turns out that if an auxiliary tensor field λµνρσ with the same symmetries as Rµνρσ is
introduced and the action is rewritten such that the λµνρσ play the role of a Lagrange
multiplier,
S[Φ, gµν , λ
µνρσ] =
1
2
∫
d4x
√−g(gµν∇µΦ∇νΦ +m2Φ + λµνρσRµνρσ), (3.9)
the gauge group of the toy theory becomes Diff(M). Thus, the toy theory satisfies a substan-
tive principle of general covariance. The variation of the auxiliary field λµνρσ immediately
gives the required flatness condition (3.8), while variation with respect to Φ gives the Klein-
Gordon equation, as before. Furthermore, varying gµν , which is now a dynamical field, leads
to field equations expressing that the stress-energy tensor for Φ acts as a “source” for the
auxiliary field.
I agree with Earman (2006c) that the two actions (3.7) and (3.9), which have different
variational symmetries and contain different sets of fields, encode not two different formula-
tions of the same theory, but two distinct theories. In this substantively generally covariant
theory given by (3.9), every solution contains a metric field and a scalar field such that
in each case, the metric field is the Minkowski metric ηµν and the scalar field obeys the
Klein-Gordon equation as determined by ηµν . Therefore, it could be argued, the theory (3.9)
should count as background-dependent. It that were the case, the above claimed implication
of background independence from (substantive) general covariance would no longer obtain.
I am not convinced that Sorkin’s toy theory (3.9) should be deemed as background-
dependent, for the following reason. Background independence, as a reminder, required that
a theory does not assume a split of the inertio-gravitational field into a fixed inertial field,
the “background,” and a gravitational field propagating on this background. The demand
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that the background remains “fixed” means that the theory’s action S[φ1, φ2, ...] is not varied
with respect to the background field bµν , which is not a dynamical variable of the theory, but
only with respect to the gravitational field “proper” hµν , and perhaps other dynamical fields.
Translated to the case at hand, the Minkowski spacetime is presumably the fixed background
field bµν , while the scalar field Φ and the tensor field λ
µνρσ are additional dynamical fields.
Interpreted like this, there is no gravity proper in Sorkin’s toy example.18 Thus, we see that
the dynamical equations of Sorkin’s toy theory are not gained from splitting the dynamical
metric field gµν into a fixed component bµν and a dynamical component hµν , re-expressing
action (3.9), and varying it with respect to hµν and the other dynamical fields. It is just that
the auxiliary field constrains the metric field to be the Minkowski metric. But the metric
field gµν is perfectly dynamical and interacts with the other dynamical fields. So there is
not much motivation for counting Sorkin’s example theory as background-dependent and I
maintain that substantive general covariance entails background independence.
But is background independence also sufficient for substantive general covariance? No,
as there could of course be background-independent theories of gravity with dynamical sym-
metries different from those found in GTR. Quite regardless of whether Sorkin’s toy theory is
considered as background-dependent or not, therefore, background independence and general
covariance are not equivalent notions and should thus not be used synonymously.
18This interpretation is incautious insofar as background independence demands that no split of the metric
is made into background and gravity, which is what is implicitly done when one says that “there is no gravity
in Sorkin’s toy example.”
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4.0 HAMILTONIAN GENERAL RELATIVITY
4.1 GTR AS A HAMILTONIAN SYSTEM
Casting GTR as a Hamiltonian system with constraints has many advantages, as Earman
(2003) affirmed: it gives the vague talk about “local” and “global” transformations a more
tangible meaning, it explains how the fibre bundle formalism arises in cases when it does,
it has a sufficiently broad scope to relate GTR to Yang-Mills gauge theories, it offers a
formalization of the gauge concept, it connects to fundamental foundational issues such as
the nature of observables and the status of determinism in GTR and in gauge theories in
general. Moreover, the Hamiltonian formulation affords a natural affinity to the initial value
problem in GTR.1 The real gain of a Hamiltonian formulation, however, arises when one
tries to quantize the classical theory. Typically, prescriptions to find a quantum theory
from a classical theory require either a Lagrangian (e.g. for the path integral method) or
a Hamiltonian (e.g. for canonical quantization) formulation of the theory. LQG relies on
a canonical quantization procedure and thus uses a Hamiltonian formulation of GTR as a
vantage point. This section offers an exhibition of the basic ideas involved in casting GTR
as a Hamiltonian system, without claiming mathematical rigour.2
The Hilbert or Einstein-Hilbert action for GTR without matter is given by
S[gµν ] =
∫
M
d4xL = 1
16piG
∫
M
d4x
√−gR, (4.1)
where L is the Lagrange density which induces the Lagrangian L = ∫
Σ
d3xL and g the de-
terminant of gµν .
3 This action leads to the (vacuum) field equations of GTR if one varies
(4.1) with respect to the metric gµν . Thus, Einstein’s field equations can be recognized as
1Cf. Wald (1984, Appendix E.2). A locus classicus for the Cauchy problem in GTR is Choquet-Bruhat
and York (1980), a more recent survey article is Friedrich and Rendall (2000).
2A useful introduction to the Lagrangian and the Hamiltonian formulation of GTR is given in Wald
(1984, Appendix E). Wald’s textbook of 1984 only deals with the ADM version of Hamiltonian GTR and
does naturally not treat Ashtekar’s version, pioneered in 1986.
3Σ ⊂M is a three-dimensional hypersurface of the four-dimensional manifold M.
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the equations of motion of the Lagrangian formulation of GTR, i.e. as the Euler-Lagrange
equations, as indicated in Section 3.2. They are second-order differential equations. The
solutions of the Euler-Lagrange equations will be uniquely determined by the independent
variables and their derivatives just in case the Hessian of L, i.e. the matrix ∂2L(q, q˙)/∂q˙n
′
∂q˙n,
is invertible. This is the case if and only if its determinant, sometimes also called “Hessian,”
does not vanish. However, in case the determinant vanishes, and the second derivatives of the
independent variables cannot be uniquely determined, the solutions of the Euler-Lagrange
equations will contain arbitrary functions of time and will thus no longer be uniquely deter-
mined by the configuration variables and their first derivatives. The impossibility of inverting
∂2L/∂q˙n
′
∂q˙n thus points to gauge freedom.
Finding a Hamiltonian formulation amounts to putting the Euler-Lagrange equations in
the form of Hamiltonian equations of motion, q˙ = ∂H/∂p and p˙ = ∂H/∂q, which are of first
order. This can be achieved by the introduction of the so-called canonical momenta via
pn =
∂L
∂q˙n
, (4.2)
where n = 1, ..., N , N being the number of degrees of freedom of the system at stake.
These momenta are not all independent in cases we are faced with a system exhibiting
gauge freedom—i.e. just in case the Hessian is singular, as follows. These dependencies are
captured in the Hamiltonian formalism by relations between the configuration variables and
the corresponding canonical momenta,
φm(q, p) = 0, m = 1, ...,M, (4.3)
where M is the number of dependencies. Thus, not all canonical variables are independent.
The relations (4.3) between q and p are called primary constraints and define a submanifold
smoothly embedded in phase space called the primary constraint surface. The phase space Γ
is defined as the space of solutions of the equations of motion. Assuming that all equations
(4.3) are linearly independent, which strictly speaking is not necessarily the case, this sub-
manifold will be of dimension 2N −M . Equations (4.3) imply that the transformation map
between the Lagrangean phase space Γ(q, q˙) and the Hamiltonian phase space Γ(q, p) is onto
but not one-to-one. Equations (4.2) define a mapping from an 2N -dimensional manifold of
the q’s an q˙’s to the (2N −M)-dimensional manifold defined by (4.3). In order to render the
transformation bijective and thus invertible, the introduction of extra parameters—“gauge
fluff”—is required.4
4For more details on how the constraints arise in some Hamiltonian systems, see Henneaux and Teitelboim
(1992, Ch. 1). My exposition largely follows this reference.
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Next, one introduces a Hamiltonian H as a function of position and momentum variables
as
H(q, p) = q˙npn − L(q, q˙). (4.4)
This canonical Hamiltonian, however, is only uniquely defined on the primary constraint
surface but can arbitrarily be extended to the rest of phase space. The Legendre transfor-
mations between the Lagrangean and the Hamiltonian phase spaces turn out to be invertible
just in case det(∂2L/∂q˙n
′
∂q˙n) 6= 0. Should the Hessian vanish, as above, one can add ex-
tra variables um and thus render the Legendre transformations invertible. In this case, the
Hamiltonian equations corresponding to the Euler-Lagrange equations become
q˙n =
∂H
∂pn
+ um
∂φm
∂pn
,
p˙n = −∂H
∂qn
− um∂φm
∂qn
,
φm(q, p) = 0.
These Hamilton equations lead via arbitrary variations δqn, δpn, δu
m (except for the boundary
conditions δqn(t1) = δq
n(t2) = 0) to the Hamiltonian equations of motion for arbitrary
functions F (q, p) of the canonical variables
F˙ = {F,H}+ um{F, φm}, (4.5)
where {, } is the usual Poisson bracket
{F,G} .= ∂F
∂qi
∂G
∂pi
− ∂F
∂pi
∂G
∂qi
.
It is clear that the notion of canonical coordinates and momenta should be appropriately gen-
eralized if one wishes to investigate a more general class of Hamiltonian generally relativistic
systems. The notion of a symplectic structure on the phase space Γ suitably generalizes the
structure captured by the canonical variables. The latter structure, encoded by the Poisson
bracket as defined above, thus generalizes as follows. Let (Γ, ω) be a symplectic manifold,
i.e. dim(Γ) is even and ω is a symplectic form.5 Given a Hamiltonian H as a smooth function
on Γ, one can define a so-called Hamiltonian vector field XH via the condition
ω(XH , ·) = dH,
5A symplectic form on the phase space Γ is a closed, skew-symmetric, non-degenerate two-form ω on Γ.
A two-form on Γ is a bilinear function TΓ× TΓ→ R which acts on pairs of vector fields on Γ. A two-form
ω is closed just in case dω = 0, skew-symmetric just if ω(A,B) = −ω(B,A), and non-degenerate just if
∀B(ω(A,B) = 0→ A = 0).
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where dH is the exterior derivative of H. The triple (Γ, ω,XH) is then called a Hamiltonian
system. The generalized Poisson bracket between smooth functions F and G is then given
by
{F,G} .= ω(XG, XF ), (4.6)
where XF and XG are vector fields defined in analogy to the Hamiltonian vector field XH .
Equivalently, one may define the generalized Poisson bracket as
X{F,G}
.
= [XF , XG], (4.7)
where [., .] is the Lie bracket, which is defined by [X, Y ]f = X[Y [f ]] − Y [X[f ]], where
X = Xµ∂/∂xµ and Y = Y µ∂/∂xµ are vector fields inM and f is a function onM. The Lie
bracket satisfies bilinearity, skew-symmetry, and the Jacobi identity.
Consistency requires that the primary constraints φm be preserved over time, i.e. that
φ˙m = 0. As primary constraints are phase space functions, equation (4.5) then implies
{φm, H}+ um′{φm, φm′} = 0. (4.8)
This equation has one of two possible forms: either it embodies a relation only between
the q’s and p’s, without any um, or it results in a relation including the um. In the latter
case, we just end up with a restriction on um. In the former case, however, (4.8) leads to
additional constraints, called secondary constraints, on the canonical variables and thus on
the physically relevant region of the phase space. These secondary constraints must also fulfill
the consistency requirement of being preserved over time, which leads to new equations of
the type of (4.8), which again are either restrictions on the um or constraints on the canonical
variables, etc. Once the process is finished, and we have all secondary constraints6, denoted
by φk = 0 with k = M + 1, ...,M + K, all constraints can be rewritten as φj = 0 with
j = 1, ..., J
.
= M + K. The full set of constraints φj = 0 defines a “subsubmanifold” in
the phase space Γ, i.e. a submanifold of the primary constraint surface φm = 0, called the
constraint surface C. The relevant difference between primary and secondary constraints is
that primary constraints are direct consequences of equation (4.2), whereas the secondary
constraints only arise once the equations of motion (4.5) are given.
Any two functions F and G in phase space that coincide on the constraint surface are
said to be weakly equal, symbolically F ≈ G. In case they agree throughout the entire phase
space, their equality is considered strong, expressed with the usual characters as F = G.
Above, I have introduced the qualification of constraints as primary. However, there is
6They are not referred to as tertiary, quaternary etc. constraints, but only collectively as “secondary”
constraints.
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a more important classification of constraints into first-class and second-class constraints,
defined as follows:
Definition 5 (First-class constraints). A function F (q, p) is termed first class if and only
if its Poisson bracket with every constraint vanishes weakly,
{F, φj} ≈ 0, j = 1, ..., J. (4.9)
A function in phase space is called second class just in case it is not first class.
The property of being first class is preserved under the Poisson bracket, i.e. the Poisson
bracket of two first-class functions is first class again.
The fact that arbitrary functions um enter the Hamilton equations (or, equivalently, the
Hamiltonian equations of motion) implies that a physical state is uniquely determined by a
pair (q, p), i.e. by a point in (Hamiltonian) phase space Γ(q, p), but not vice versa. In other
words, these arbitrary functions encode the gauge freedom which arises from systems with a
singular Hessian. It can be shown that a dynamical variable F , i.e. a function on Γ, differs
in value from time t1 to time t2 = t1 + δt by
δF = δva{F, φa} (4.10)
where the φa range over the complete set of first-class primary constraints and the v
a are
the totally arbitrary part of the um, with δva = (va− v˜a)δt where va and v˜a are two different
choices of va at t1.
7 In a deterministic theory, the transformation (4.10) does not modify
the physical state and is thus considered a gauge transformation. In this sense, the first-
class primary constraints generate gauge transformations. The famous “Dirac conjecture”
attempts to extend this result to include all first-class constraints. In general, however, the
conjecture is false as the existence of some admittedly contrived counterexamples implies.8
There is no harm for present purposes, however, if we assume that all first-class constraints
generate gauge transformations. The restriction of a phase space function F to C is gauge-
invariant just in case {F, φa} ≈ 0, in which case (4.10) implies δF ≈ 0. The first-class
constraints are thus seen to generate motions within C. In contrast, second-class constraints
generate motions leading outside of C.9 This distinction permits the explication of another
important concept: the gauge orbit. A gauge orbit is a submanifold of C which contains all
those points in C which form an equivalence class under a gauge transformation. The sets
of these points are simply connected in C since gauge transformations that connect these
7Cf. Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992, Sec. 1.2.1).
8Cf. Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992, Sec. 1.2.2).
9Cf. Belot and Earman (2001, Sec. 10.2.2).
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points do not leave C. They form a curve in C. The gauge motion produced by the first-class
constraints can thus be seen to be the tangents to these curves. The points of the gauge
orbits in C, equipped with a projection C → Γphys, constitute the so-called reduced or physical
phase space Γphys. The physical phase space Γphys is defined as the set of points representing
gauge equivalence classes of points in Γ. In other words, the physical phase space is obtained
by identifying all points on the same gauge orbits. This means that the bundle of admissible
dynamical trajectories passing through a particular point x ∈ C is mapped to the physical
phase space such that the bundle is projected onto a single dynamical trajectory through
the point in Γphys representing the gauge equivalence class in which x falls.
Assume a Hamiltonian system (Γ, ω,XH) with constraints is given. Assume further that
all constraints are first-class.10 Constraint equations are equations which the canonical vari-
ables must satisfy in addition to the dynamical equations of the system. If a set of variables
were to pick one and only one physical state, then, given the existence and uniqueness of the
solutions of the dynamical equations, one could plug the set of variables uniquely specifying
the state into the dynamical equations and could thus obtain the full deterministic dynami-
cal evolution of the physical degrees of freedom. If constraints are present, however, a set of
variables does not uniquely describe a physical state. Solving the constraints thus means to
use these additional equations to explicitly solve for a variable. This permits the elimination
of this variable (and the now solved constraint equation). Solving the constraints of the
constrained Hamiltonian system thus amounts to the reduction of the number of variables
used to specify the physical state of the system. Once all constraint equations are solved
and thus eliminated, the remaining canonical variables are ineliminable for the purpose of
uniquely specifying a physical state. In this case, we are back to an unconstrained Hamil-
tonian system in the sense that its phase space is its physical phase space. In the absence
of any second-class constraints, the total number of canonical variables (= 2N) minus twice
the number of first-class constraints equals the number of independent canonical variables.
Equally, the number of physical degrees of freedom is the same as half the number of inde-
pendent canonical variables, or the same as half the number of canonical variables minus the
number of first-class constraints.11
10Second-class constraints can be regarded as resulting from fixing the gauge of a “larger” system with
an additional gauge invariance. They can be replaced by a corresponding set of first-class constraints which
capture the additional gauge invariance. Second-class constraints are thus eliminable. In fact, in some cases,
it may prove advantageous to thus “enlarge” a system as this permits to circumvent some technical obstacles
(Henneaux and Teitelboim 1992, Sec. 1.4.3), albeit at the price of introducing new “unphysical” degrees of
freedom. Without loss of generality, we can thus consider a Hamiltonian system whose constraints are all
first-class.
11This manner of counting the physical degrees of freedom is well defined for any finite number of degrees
of freedom, and perhaps for countably many too. For uncountably many degrees of freedom, new subtleties
arise. Cf. Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992, Sec. 1.4.2).
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Hamilton’s equations, at least in the narrower standard sense, explicitly solve for the time
derivatives. This can only be achieved within GTR if its original 4-dimensional quantities are
broken up into (3+1)-dimensional quantities, with time accruing in the one single dimension.
A similar coercion must be exercised upon the four-dimensional structure of spacetime when
we wish to consider an initial-value formulation of GTR. In order to find a Hamiltonian or
an initial-value formulation, GTR must be regarded as describing the dynamical evolution
of something. Breaking up spacetime into “space” that evolves in “time” in order to deter-
mine whether a well-posed initial-value formulation exists, i.e. whether the physical degrees
of freedom enjoy a deterministic evolution, becomes manageable once we impose a gauge
condition to weed out any unphysical degrees of freedom. As will become clear in Section
4.2.1, the traditional formulation of GTR as a constrained Hamiltonian system entertains
twelve dynamical variables, the six independent components of the three-metric qab and the
six independent components of the corresponding conjugate momentum piab. Half this num-
ber is six, and there are four first-class constraint equations (4.14) and (4.15), which leaves
the gravitational field with two physical degrees of freedom per point in space. Fortunately,
this is the same number of degrees of freedom as one gets for a linear spin-2 field propagating
on a flat spacetime background, which can be considered as a weak-field limit of GTR.12
With a gauge condition enforced, Einstein’s field equations can be massaged into a form
of hyperbolic second-order differential equations defined on manifolds which admit existence
and uniqueness theorems. Even in an appropriate gauge fix, however, GTR allows for ways
in which the field equations may fail to uniquely determine their solutions. Such failure in
GTR is typically associated with the emersion of spacetime singularities or “holes” in the
fabric of spacetime. In order to characterize the extent to which given initial data can be
extended uniquely to a solution of the field equations, one imposes the condition of so-called
global hyperbolicity, which requires the introduction of a few foregoing technical terms. The
causal future of a set S ⊂M, denoted by J+(S), consists exactly of those points inM which
can be reached from S by a future-directed non-spacelike curve inM. The causal past J−(S)
is defined mutatis mutandis. The strong causality condition holds at a point p ∈ M just in
case every neighbourhood of p contains a neighbourhood of p which no non-spacelike curve
intersects more than once. In other words, a spacetime is strongly causal at a point p if p has
arbitrarily small causally convex neighbourhoods. If strong causality holds in all points of
a spacetime, this condition ascertains that the spacetime does not contain “almost” closed
causal curves. With these definitions in place, a set N ⊂M is said to be globally hyperbolic
just in case it satisfies two conditions: (i) for any two points p, q ∈ N , J+(p) ∩ J−(q) is
12See Wald (1984, Sec. 4.4b); cf. also Wald (1984, p. 266) for a slightly different way of calculating the
degrees of freedom of the gravitational field.
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compact and fully contained in N , and (ii) N is strongly causal at all points p ∈ N . A
spacetime 〈M, gµν〉 is then defined to be globally hyperbolic just in case N = M, with N
globally hyperbolic. Roughly, this means that the spacetime does not suffer from “infinities,”
“singularities,” or “holes.”
Another important notion is the future domain of dependence of a set S ⊂ M, denoted
by D+(S), which is defined as the set of all points p ∈M such that every past-inextendible
causal curve through p intersects S.13 Analogously, the past domain of dependence of a set
S ⊂M, denoted by D−(S) is the set of all points p ∈M such that every future-inextendible
causal curve through p intersects S. The domain of dependence of S is the union of the future
and the past domains of dependence, symbolically D(S) = D+(S) ∪D−(S).
Often, the subset S ⊂ M is assumed to be an “achronal” set, in which cases I will
denote it by Σ. A set Σ ⊂ M is achronal if there are no two points p, q ∈ Σ such that
q ∈ I+(p), where I+(p) designates the chronological future of p, i.e. the set of all points
in M which can be reached from p by a future-directed timelike curve. The chronological
past I−(p) is defined analogously. Thus, a set Σ is achronal exactly if I+(Σ) ∩ Σ = ∅. An
achronal set Σ ⊂ M is called a Cauchy surface in case D(Σ) = M. As it can be shown
(Geroch 1970), a necessary and sufficient condition that a spacetime has a Cauchy surface is
that it be globally hyperbolic. According to a well-known theorem,14 a globally hyperbolic
spacetime always admits a global time function t, i.e. a function such that each surface of
constant t is a Cauchy surface of the spacetime. In this case, the spacetime can be foliated
by Cauchy surfaces Σt and thus exhibits topology R×Σ, where the topology of the 3-spaces
Σt is arbitrary, but must be the same for all Σt.
15
Conversely, not every spacetime with topology R×Σ affords a global time function or a
Cauchy surface—at least not in the narrower sense as defined above. As a matter of fact, the
spacetime may be foliated using a “flow of space” rather than a “flow in time,” cf. Figure
2. Both spacetimes in Figure 2 are topologically R × Σ, but only the one on the left with
the foliation using a global time function has Cauchy surfaces and is globally hyperbolic as
these terms have been defined in the context of the initial value problem in GTR. A suitably
13A curve γ : I →M, where I designates an interval of the reals, is called inextendible in case there exists
no curve γ′ : I ′ → M such that I ⊂ I ′ and γ(r) = γ′(r) for all r ∈ I. A non-spacelike curve is termed
past- (or future-)inextendible if it is inextendible in the past (or future) direction as defined by the time
orientation.
14Theorem 8.3.14 in Wald (1984).
15At least for spatially compact Hausdorff spacetimes 〈M, gµν〉; this is essentially Geroch’s Theorem
(Geroch 1967) which states that for a compact spacetime 〈M, gµν〉 whose boundary is the disjoint union
of two closed spacelike three-manifolds, S and S ′, S and S ′ are diffeomorphic if 〈M, gµν〉 admits a time
orientation and does not contain closed timelike curves. Hence, in spatially open spacetimes, there may be
topology change. For a penetrating discussion of topology change in general and of Geroch’s Theorem in
particular, see Callender and Weingard (2000).
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Figure 2: Foliations of spacetimes using a “flow in time” and a “flow in space.”
generalized Hamiltonian formalism might be able to accommodate spacetimes of topology
R×Σ, regardless of whether the spacetime is foliated temporally or spatially. Carlo Rovelli’s
favorite way of conceiving a suitably generalized Hamiltonian formalism focuses on the idea
that data should be given on closed three-dimensional hypersurfaces that bound finite regions
of four-dimensional spacetime, i.e. on bounds of four-dimensional “balls.”16 Equation (4.6)
captures the structure of phase space without taking recourse to a particular coordinate
system. In particular, it does not necessitate the coordinatization of Γ with the coordinates
and canonical momenta of given spatial hypersurfaces. This liberation might help to clarify
the important point that a point in the phase space of Hamiltonian general relativity is not a
set of field variables and their time derivatives at some instant of time, but rather spacetimes
with topology R × Σ that solve the equations of motion. Thus, Hamiltonian formulations
might apply to a larger class of models in GTR than does the initial value formulation, which
only deals with globally hyperbolic spacetimes. There is a natural connection between these
two formulations, but they need not coincide. What families of constraints would arise for
posing data on timelike, rather than spacelike, hypersurfaces will need investigating.
The restriction to generally relativistic models with manifolds of topology R × Σ is far
from innocent, for at least two reasons. First, this restriction excludes models in ME which
may turn out to be of physical significance.17 Models with manifolds that permit a time-wise
16Personal communication, 3 July 2005. These balls, unlike those at the World Cup, need not be round.
17I disagree with Thiemann (2003, Sec. I.2) that the assumption of global hyperbolicity is forced on us,
“at least classically.” At the very least, I would prefer to be only bound to the claim that we are in the
business of studying globally hyperbolic domains of spacetimes which may not be maximal simpliciter and
could possess non-globally hyperbolic extensions.
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foliation into Cauchy surfaces of subsequent “moments in time” are globally hyperbolic and
do therefore not admit closed timelike curves, thus effectively ruling out the possibility of
time travel. Models with manifolds permitting a space-wise foliation into surfaces of adjacent
“places in space,” as they can conceivably emerge in a more general Hamiltonian formulation,
can contain closed timelike curves. In this sense, a Hamiltonian formulation of GTR does not
a priori rule out the existence of closed timelike curves. It should be noted, however, in both
known Hamiltonian formulations of GTR, spacetime is foliated using a global time function.
This is hardly surprising since the canonical variables introduced afford a more natural
interpretation for foliations reminiscent of the initial value problem, particularly in the so-
called ADM formulation, to be discussed in the next section. Thus, although in principle all
(vacuum) models inME with a topology R×Σ can be cast in a Hamiltonian dress, we usually
direct our attention to those models which disentangle “space” from “time” rather than those
which separate one spatial dimension from the remaining three spatiotemporal dimensions or
which distribute data on a three-dimensional hypersurface in an altogether different manner
such as Rovelli’s three-dimensional bound of a four-dimensional ball. Models with a time of
topology R of course spoil the business of any time travel agency. The class of models inME
with topology R× Σ is certainly a physically important subclass, but there is no guarantee
that it captures all physically relevant cases.
The second worry is much more threatening. For a spacetime theory manifestly obeying
Postulate 4 in Chapter 3, i.e. it has spacetime diffeomorphism invariance as a gauge symme-
try, cleaving the manifold into “space” and “time” breaks this manifest general covariance.
The cleavage amounts to an introduction of a family of privileged observers, moving in the
direction of the vector field normal to the folios of the foliation.18 But in GTR no observer
enjoys a privileged status like this. It must thus be ascertained one way or another that we
still, despite the splitting of the four-dimensional spacetime manifold in order to make the
theory amenable to a Hamiltonian formulation, adhere to Postulate 4, faithful to the motto
according to which no man shall pull asunder what Einstein has joined together. Unlike
the restriction to globally hyperbolic spacetime, the restriction to spacetimes of topology
R × Σ does threaten Postulate 4. So I invite you to join me in tracing general covariance
through the translation process of standard GTR with its manifest general covariance into
Hamiltonian GTR where it is apparently lost. In the last section of the chapter, I study the
fate of general covariance through the quantization procedure to which it is subjected in the
path to LQG.
18This statement only applies to spacetimes which admit time-wise foliations; for those with space-wise
foliations, no such physical observers can be introduced. Henceforth, I shall assume that the spacetimes
under consideration allow the introduction of a global time and thus admit time-wise foliations.
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Before I embark on this journey, another important limitation of Hamiltonian GTR must
be explained, although this time the limitation seems purely practical and not for principled
reasons. Relativists, of all people, sometimes use a peculiar distinction destined to confuse
even some physicists, viz. the separation between gravity and matter, where a gravitational
field can transpire even in the absence of matter. This is much less mysterious as it may
at first sound. Relativists usually refer to the left hand side of Einstein’s field equations as
“gravity” and to the right hand side as “matter.” In case Tµν = 0, the right hand side vanishes
and “matter” is absent. The subclass of generally relativistic models 〈M, gµν , Tµν = 0〉 ∈ME
are the so-called vacuum solutions of Einstein’s field equations, sometimes also referred to as
Ricci-flat spacetimes. These vacuum solutions build an important and comparatively well-
understood subclass of models. Not much is known about the initial value problem for models
containing matter, mostly because the application of pertinent theorems depends critically on
the dynamical equations of the matter fields and on how they couple to Einstein’s equations.
Most extant theorems guarantee the existence of a well-posed initial value formulation only
in case the coupled equations constitute a hyperbolic system of equations satisfying certain
additional conditions.19 Because matter is quantum, a full resolution can only be expected
in a correspondingly full QTG.
These difficulties are avoided in most Hamiltonian formulations of GTR in the simplest
conceivable way: matter is eliminated entirely and only vacuum solutions are studied. In
the related Lagrangian formulation of GTR, the Lagrange density in (4.1) corresponds to
the vacuum Einstein equations, i.e. to pure gravity and thus receives the honorary subscript
“G.” If one desires to include matter, then the corresponding Lagrange density must be
added to LG:
Ltotal = LG + Lmatter. (4.11)
It is clear at this point that studying pure gravity separately makes perfect sense and signif-
icantly simplifies the analysis. When the Legendre transformations are applied to switch to
the Hamiltonian formulation, which we will need for LQG, only pure gravity is considered.
Accordingly, both known Hamiltonian formulations of GTR, the ADM and the Ashtekar
formalisms, only deal with Ricci-flat models of GTR. This is fine, as long as it is understood
that matter will eventually have to be included in the full QTG. This may very likely turn
out to be a rather formidable task; as of now, LQG only offers preliminary speculations at
best as to how this could be achieved.
19If the matter content of the universe is exhausted by the fields φi satisfying themselves hyperbolic
equations of motion and if Tµν depends only of the fields φi, their first derivatives and the spacetime metric
gµν and its first derivatives, then there exists a well-posed initial-value formulation. This is the case e.g. for
the Einstein-Klein-Gordon, the Einstein-Maxwell (Wald 1984, p. 266), and the Einstein-Yang-Mills equations
(Arms 1979).
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4.2 OLD AND NEW VARIABLES
4.2.1 The ADM formalism
The first Hamiltonian formulation of GTR, relying on the action (4.1) and on a corresponding
interpretation of the EFEs as statements about metrics, has been foreshadowed by Dirac
(1958a,b) and was essentially completed by Arnowitt, Deser, and Misner in a series of articles
which culminated in Arnowitt et al. (1962). Their Hamiltonian approach to GTR has come
to be known as the “ADM formulation” of GTR. As explicated in the previous section,
consideration is limited to spacetimes of topology R × Σ. Again, the initial-value problem
is only relevant for this topology and since any globally hyperbolic spacetime necessarily
has this topology, the limitation does not appear to be severe. However, as I have argued
above, I consider the limitation at least noteworthy insofar as it excludes a significant class of
generally relativistic models. For the rest of this thesis, it shall be assumed that spacetimes
have topology R× Σ unless stated otherwise.20
The canonical ADM variables are the three-metric qab induced on the three-space Σ, the
so-called lapse function N and shift vector field Na and their conjugate momenta. The three-
metric captures the geometry of the three-spaces Σ, and its momenta depend essentially on
the extrinsic curvature and thus encode the information of how the three-space is embedded
in four-dimensional spacetime. The lapse function and the shift vector, on the other hand,
embody the gauge freedom, as they are arbitrary functions encoding time reparametrization
invariance and spatial diffeomorphism invariance respectively. Their dynamical evolution is
not determined by the theory.
The topology of the spacetimes considered implies that they admit a foliation, i.e. the
three spaces Σ can be parametrized by a global “time” t. Thus, a foliated spacetime then
entertains a one-parameter family of Cauchy surfaces Σt. So take one of the three-spaces
and let it act as an initial hypersurface whose geometry evolves to later (or earlier) times via
Einstein’s equations. This view of an evolving three-geometry evolving in time is often termed
“geometrodynamics.” The action (4.1) is decomposed in (3+1)-terms and thus reexpressed
as a functional of qab, N,N
a and their conjugate momenta. I will confine myself to merely
stating the most important steps in constructing the ADM formulation of GTR. The reader
should consult the literature in footnote 20, where all the results are derived.
The time function t chosen to parametrize the three-spaces is supplemented by a “time
20 For a detailed introduction and discussion of the ADM formulation of GTR, see Arnowitt et al. (1962),
Isham (1993, Sec. 3.3), Wald (1984, pp. 256ff, pp. 293ff, Appendix E.2), Isham and Kucharˇ (1985a, Sec. 2.3),
Thiemann (2003, Sec. I.2.1), Thiemann (2001b, Sec. I.1.1), Gambini and Pullin (1996, Sec. 7.2), Baez and
Muniain (1994, Ch. III.4). The subsequent brief outline is primarily based on Wald (1984).
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Figure 3: Geometric interpretation of Kab.
flow” tµ defined on all of M. Neither time function nor time flow, however, have any
physical meaning before the spacetime metric is known. But solving the Einstein equations
for the unknown metric field is exactly the purpose of the entire spiel. The time flow can be
decomposed into its normal and its tangential components, leading to the introduction of
the lapse function N essentially representing the normal component and the shift vector Na
constituting the tangential component. Naturally, the configuration variable should be one
that encodes the geometry of the three-spaces. The induced spatial metric qab satisfies this
requirement. It is related to the four-metric of spacetime via qµν = gµν + nµnν where nµ is
the unit normal vector on Σt. One can show that the information contained in (qab, N,N
a) is
equivalent to what is encoded in gµν . The Lagrange density in (4.1) can then be re-expressed
in terms of qab, N,N
a and their first derivatives:
LADM = 1
16piG
√
qN [3R +KabK
ab −K2], (4.12)
where q is the determinant of qab,
3R the three-dimensional scalar curvature of the three-
spaces, Kab is the extrinsic curvature of Σt and K = K
a
a. The extrinsic curvature is related
to the “time derivative” of qab, i.e. to the Lie derivative of qab in the direction of the time
flow. It is defined by Kab =
1
2
Lnqab where Ln is the Lie derivative in the direction of nµ.
The Lie derivative of a vector field X in the direction of or “along” another vector field
Y can be characterized via their Lie brackets as LXY = [X, Y ].21 The extrinsic curvature
encodes the information how Σt is embedded in the four-dimensional manifold and essentially
constitutes the momentum canonically conjugate to qab. Figure 3 illustrates the geometric
interpretation of the extrinsic curvature as a measure of difference between nµ at p2 and n
µ
at p1 parallel transported to p2 along a the hypersurface Σ. More precisely, the canonically
conjugate momentum density is defined as piab = ∂LADM/∂q˙ab = √q(Kab −Kqab). We can
21For a more thorough introduction and discussion of Lie derivatives, see Nakahara (2003, Sec. 5.3.2).
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introduce a derivative operator associated with qab and use this to derive relations between
the three-dimensional curvature tensor field 3Rµνρσ and the spacetime curvature R
µ
νρσ. These
relations are known as the Gauss-Codacci relations.
Since LADM does not contain N˙ and N˙a, the canonical momenta P of N and Pa of
Na identically vanish. This means that we do not obtain an invertible relation between N˙
and N˙a on the one hand and their canonical momenta on the other. Constraints arise, and
there is gauge freedom. The threatening indeterminism can in this case be overcome by not
considering N and Na and their conjugate momenta as dynamical variables and by redefining
the configuration space as only containing the three-metrics qab on Σt and the momentum
space accordingly. The dynamical variables of ADM are the six independent components of
qab and the corresponding six independent conjugate momenta pi
ab. Let me review how the
constraints arise and what they imply.
A Hamiltonian density can then be introduced via
H(qab, piab) = q˙abpiab − LADM
which, in turn, defines the Hamiltonian HADM of the ADM formulation of GTR by HADM =∫
Σ
Hd3x.22 A straightforward calculation yields
H = √q(NC +NaVa) (4.13)
where
C = −3R + q−1piabpiab − 1
2
q−1pi2 (4.14)
Va = −2Db(q−1/2piab), (4.15)
where pi = piaa and D
a is the unique, torsion-free covariant derivative operator on Σt asso-
ciated with qab.
23 Unsurprisingly, the Hamiltonian density in (4.13) proportionally depends
on terms involving the lapse function and the shift vector as its role is to generate the dy-
namical evolution of data on Σ and the lapse and shift push around the hypersurface Σ. But
because the canonical momenta P and Pa vanish and consistency demands that this holds
for all t, P˙ and P˙a vanish as well. From equations of motion (4.5), one obtains P˙ = −C and
P˙a = −Va, which of course implies that C = Va = 0. It turns out that C and Va are primary
constraints as they directly arise from the vanishing of the conjugate momenta of N and
Na, respectively. Equation (4.14) is called the Hamiltonian or scalar constraint function,
22Here, I am glossing over some subtleties concerning the conditions under which total divergencies vanish.
23Although C and Va are densities, I desist from labelling them with calligraphic letters in order to follow
more closely common notational practices.
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while equations (4.15) are the spatial diffeomorphism constraint functions. The Hamiltonian
constraint equation C = 0 relates the extrinsic curvature of a spacelike hypersurface to its
scalar curvature and the diffeomorphism constraint equations Va = 0 impose restrictions on
the extrinsic curvature of the spacelike hypersurfaces. One can also find these constraints
directly from the Gauss-Codacci relations, albeit in this case, they will not be functions of
the canonical variables qab and pi
ab, but rather of qab and Kab.
Solving the constraints, as above, means to eliminate “unphysical” degrees of freedom,
or the surplus description of physical states, such as to obtain a set of independent canonical
variables, or, equivalently, to identify the physical degrees of freedom. Either the constraints
are solved classically, and only the classical physical phase space with its symplectic structure
is quantized, or the constrained system is first quantized according to Dirac’s procedure, to
be described below, resulting in a (extended) Hilbert space of which the physical Hilbert
space is a proper subset, as well as quantum constraint equations, i.e. quantum operators
corresponding to the classical constraint functions acting on states in the extended Hilbert
space. In principle, both options should lead to the same destination, but the technical
difficulties along the way will generally be quite different. Typically, the second path is
chosen, as will be explicated below.
The amazing consequence of the constraint equations together with (4.13) implies that
the Hamiltonian is constrained to vanish in the ADM formulation of GTR. This is surprising,
as one would expect a theory with zero Hamiltonian to exhibit a rather dull dynamics, yet the
dynamics of GTR clearly seems more interesting. The constraint equations C = Va = 0, it
should be emphasized, correspond to the four Einstein equations which constrain the initial
data on Σt. If one studies the dynamical evolution of the remaining degrees of freedom,
however, it becomes clear that despite H = 0, something non-trivial can be said about the
evolution of the data on Σt. If one computes the explicit expressions for q˙
ab = {qab, H} and
p˙iab = {piab, H}, one recognizes that even on the physical phase space Γphys where H = 0
holds, Hamilton’s equations offer a non-trivial dynamical evolution.
As explicated above, the lapse and shift both contribute to the Hamiltonian and thus to
time evolution by pushing the hypersurface Σt in its normal and tangent direction, respec-
tively. If one sets the shift vector equal to zero, the Hamiltonian is only composed of its
normal part given by
H⊥
.
= C(N) =
∫
Σ
d3x
√
qNC,
which can be seen as generating a motion of Σ in the direction of its normal nµ. On the other
hand, if one lets the lapse function vanish, one receives the tangent part of the Hamiltonian
69
as given by
H‖
.
= V ( ~N) =
∫
Σ
d3x
√
qNaVa,
which can be understood as pushing Σ in its tangent direction. Unfortunately, there exist
some terminological imprecisions in the literature, as both H and H⊥ are sometimes called
Hamiltonian and designated by the same letter. I will attempt to consistently use the word
“Hamiltonian” and the letter “H” for the former and the term “Hamiltonian constraint”
and the letter “C” for the latter.
From the expressions (4.14) and (4.15) it follows that the constraints form an algebra
called Dirac algebra:
{V ( ~N), V ( ~N ′)} = κV (L ~N ~N ′),
{V ( ~N), C(N)} = κC(L ~NN),
{C(N), C(N ′)} = κV (q−1(NdN ′ −N ′dN)), (4.16)
where κ = 1/16piG and L ~AB is the Lie derivative of B in direction of the vector field
~A.24 This algebra is closed. Thus, the commutator of the Hamiltonian H with any of the
constraints can be written as a linear combination of constraints, which means that the
condition C = Va = 0 is preserved under dynamical evolution governed by the Hamiltonian.
The evolution is thus consistent. The algebra is also sometimes called constraint or hypersur-
face deformation algebra. I will discuss the structure of algebra (4.16) in Section 4.4. This
completes the discussion of the ADM formulation of GTR.
4.2.2 The Ashtekar-Barbero formalism
The formulation of LQG is based on Ashtekar’s “new variables” (Ashtekar 1986, 1987), a
connection formulation of classical GTR.25 Soon after the inception of these new variables,
Jacobson and Smolin (1988) found an infinite number of loop-like, exact solutions of the
Wheeler-DeWitt equation in Ashtekar’s formulation. These results provide the basis for the
“loop representation of quantum general relativity” (Rovelli and Smolin 1988), and thus
mark the birth of what matured into LQG.
The technical choice of what the basic variables should be consists of choosing an algebra
of functions of field variables, which will later become quantum operators. Based on previ-
ous work by Sen (1982a,b), Ashtekar (1986, 1987) introduced what then became known as
“new variables” of Hamiltonian GTR and today is called “Ashtekar” or “Ashtekar-Barbero”
24Cf. Thiemann (2003, Eqs. I.2.1.12)
25For a more recent textbook treating all the necessary concepts leading up to the new variables in an
accessible manner, see Baez and Muniain (1994).
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variables. Ashtekar’s reformulation was motivated by a desire to overcome what plagued
the canonical programme for two decades, viz. the complicated dependence of the constraint
equations on the ADM variables. These complications render the constraints insoluble. The
Ashtekar-Barbero variables simplify the constraints considerably, although the direct geo-
metrical meaning of the ADM variables is lost.
The first step to arrive at the Ashtekar-Barbero variables is to enlarge the phase space
of GTR by switching from the ADM formulation to the extended ADM formulation of GTR.
This step occurs by means of the introduction of a locally inertial frame in the form of a three-
dimensional triad field eia(x) instead of the three-metric qab(x) via qab(x) = e
i
a(x)e
j
b(x)δij. As
a result of this, the variables of the extended phase space will carry tensorial as well as
“internal” indices. These triads become the basic variables, with a conjugate momentum
which essentially consists of the extrinsic curvature piab. The Einstein equations are then
interpreted as statements about a connection rather than about a metric. The Ashtekar-
Barbero variables are obtained from a transformation from the variables of the extended
ADM formalism by
Aia = Γ
i
a + βpiabe
b i, (4.17)
where Γia is the so-called spin connection of the triad field e
i
a, defined by
Γia =
1
2
ij
kebk(∂ae
j
b − ∂beja + ecjeal∂belc), (4.18)
and β the Immirzi parameter, the only free parameter of LQG26 and by
Eai =
√
det q eai
β
. (4.19)
For a given three-space Σ, the configuration variable is thus the self-dual part Aia of the spin
connection.27 The conjugate momenta Eai are densitized triads, i.e. the triad e
a
i essentially
multiplied by
√
det q. These variables satisfy the “equal-time” Poisson bracket relations
{Aia(x), Ebj (y)} ∝ δbaδijδ3(x, y) (4.20)
26The parameter β ∈ C\{0} is often set either β = i, which makes the connection self-dual and thus more
physically intuitive but at the some time inhibits quantization, as in large parts of Rovelli (2004), or as an
element in R+, which permits quantization but no longer bestows a direct spacetime interpretation on the
connection, as in Thiemann (2003). The classical theory is not affected by the value of β, but the quantum
theory is, where different values of β lead to different physical predictions, e.g. in the spectra of the area
and volume operators and in the computation of the black hole entropy. The presence of this parameter in
the quantum theory may well reflect a one-parameter quantization ambiguity, as is conjectured by Rovelli
(2004, Sec. 4.2.3).
27Self-dual means that the connection is invariant under the so-called Hodge star transformation. For
more details, also on spin connections, see (Rovelli 2004, Sec. 2.1.1) and particularly (Baez and Muniain
1994, pp. 439ff).
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on each spacelike hypersurface Σ, as well as {Aia(x), Ajb(y)} = {Eai (x), Ebj (y)} = 0.
The Ashtekar-Barbero variables, the connection variable Aia and its conjugate momen-
tum, the triad variable Eai , offer the only successful path to a canonical formulation in terms
of connections, all others produce second-class constraints (Gambini and Pullin 1996). Three
different types of first-class constraints arise:
• The three Gauss constraint equations are
Gi
.
= DaE
a
i = 0, (4.21)
where Da is the covariant derivative DaE
a
i
.
= ∂aE
a
i +ij
kAjaE
a
k . The Gauss constraints Gi
are associated with the rotational gauge freedom of the triads, i.e. the Gauss constraints
generate the infinitesimal SU(2) transformation in the internal indices.
• The three (spatial) diffeomorphism (or vector) constraint equations are
Va
.
= F iabE
b
i = 0, (4.22)
where F iab
.
= ∂aA
i
b − ∂bAia + ijkAjaAkb is the curvature of Aia. The vector constraints Va
generate the spatial diffeomorphisms in Σ.
• The Hamiltonian (or scalar) constraint equation, finally,
C
.
= F iabE
a
jE
b
ki
jk = 0, (4.23)
is related to the time reparametrization invariance.
Given the Poisson bracket relation (4.20) between the basic variables, one can determine the
Poisson brackets among the constraints (4.21)-(4.23). Somewhat schematically, the result is
the (extended) Dirac or constraint algebra:
{V, V } ∝ V, (4.24)
{V,C} ∝ C, (4.25)
{C,C} ∝ V, (4.26)
{G,G} ∝ G, (4.27)
{V,G} = {C,G} = 0. (4.28)
From a purely classical point of view, the extension of ΓADM has complicated matters by
replacing twelve variables qab, pi
ab by eighteen variables Aia, E
a
i and by adding another family
of constraints, the Gauss constraints. However, as will be further explicated in Section 4.4,
the Gauss constraints remove the six “superfluous” degrees of freedom and thus establish
that working in the extended phase space is really equivalent to working in ΓADM . By
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introducing this additional gauge freedom, the theory becomes a gauge theory with a compact
gauge group, viz. the group of triad rotations. This makes the system amenable to the
powerful quantization techniques available for the canonical quantization of gauge theories.
Now the system is ready to be ground through the Dirac mill of canonical quantization.
Before we will do this, I discuss two immediate consequences of the Hamiltonian formulation
of GTR: the problem of time and the freezing of the dynamics on the one hand, and the
worry that foliating the four-dimensional spacetime breaks the manifest full four-dimensional
diffeomorphism invariance and thus the gauge group of GTR.
4.3 THE END OF TIME?
The problem of time in canonical GTR arises relatively directly as a result of how it encodes
its symmetries. The label of “problem of time” is often given to a number of related, but
slightly different issues. Although it can—with invariable success—be used as a party gag to
send philosophers of all but one persuasion into revolt or denial, one could argue that there
is no problem of time at all. There simply is no time, and that is not a problem. But rather
than merely shrugging it off like this, at least one would have to produce an account why we
experience a flux of time so vividly that many philosophers insist on the objective reality of
this flux. So while there is perhaps no problem of time, there seems to be a problem of no
time. The problem of (no) time, then, consists of at least two aspects: the disappearance of
time as a fundamental magnitude and the freezing of the dynamics. Let me address these
issues in turn.
The first issue, then, pertains to the objective existence of time. In a so-called time-
reparametrization-invariant theory, the action remains invariant under redefinitions of time
t′ = f(t). In other words, time-reparametrization-invariant theories deem two descriptions of
a physical system which only differ in their parametrizations of time as referring to the same
physical situation. This gauge freedom, captured by the group Diff(R), can be interpreted as
the equivalence of different observers measuring coincidences of measurable (gauge-invariant)
quantities with their clocks of different speeds. Consequently, time as an objectively measur-
able independent degree of freedom does not exist in theories of this type. However, values
for events as measured by an observer can be uniquely related to the corresponding values
of another observer. Thus, there exists an objective total ordering of events.28 Although one
28A bivalent relation R defines a total order on a set S iff for all a, b, c ∈ S the following properties hold:
(1) Raa (reflexivity), (2) Rab&Rba → a = b (weak antisymmetry), (3) Rab&Rbc → Rac (transitivity), and
(4) Rab ∨Rba (comparability).
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might therefore wish to deny the objective existence of time already at this level, at least the
possibility of a temporal flux or of objective becoming must still be acknowledged in the light
of this total ordering of events. The relativity of simultaneity of STR, however, degrades
this total ordering to a merely partial ordering.29 This “partialness” of temporal orderings
destroys all hope for absolute simultaneity and thus of objective becoming.30 The monolithic
time of absolutistic mechanics is replaced by the Lorentz times of inertial observers. All this
is well known. But it gets worse once we move on to GTR.
Generically in GTR and unlike in STR, temporal ordering relations cannot be weakly
antisymmetric—a necessary condition for a partially ordered set—due to the possibility of
causal loops. In analogy to time-reparametrization-invariant theories, coordinate time is not
a physical degree of freedom of GTR and evolution in it is thus not gauge-invariant. Any
observable evolution must occur in a physical degree of freedom, a “clock” variable. Despite
the various ways in which time surfaces in GTR, qua coordinate time, proper time, internal
time, cosmological time, or ephemeris time, the theory can be formulated entirely without
recourse to coordinate time.31 But a theory which admits a complete formulation without
a time parameter thus allows the elimination of time as a fundamental physical magnitude.
This disappearance of time is also testified by the fact that unlike the Schro¨dinger equation,
the Wheeler-DeWitt equation (5.4) contains no time parameter and describes a dynamical
evolution without recourse to time. Sic transit gloria temporis.
Importantly, the problem of time (and of change) arises for all canonical programmes of
quantum gravity. In fact, both the issues of time and change appear in an unmitigated fashion
already in classical GTR in its Hamiltonian formulation. It is sometimes said, however, that
while the disappearance of time already occurs at the classical level, it must only truly
be confronted at the quantum level.32 The reasoning behind this assertion relies on that
although we cannot formulate the dynamics of GTR in terms of a physical time, we can
introduce a handful of accessory times such as proper time, internal time, cosmological time
etc. These cannot be used, however, to define physical time since they are either not globally
definable, not observable, or defined only under specific conditions. The pseudo-Riemannian
manifold of classical spacetimes makes these accessory notions possible. Since canonical
QG no longer accommodates pseudo-Riemannian manifolds, the accessory times cannot be
29If a bivalent ordering relation satisfies the first three axioms of the definition of a total order but not
the fourth, it defines a partial order. Thus, comparability is lost in a merely partially ordered set.
30At least for objective becoming as traditionally understood; there exists the possibility of defining a
becoming relation in terms of the objectively given causal structure of Minkowski spacetime, cf. Clifton and
Hogarth (1995).
31Cf. Barbour (1994a) or Rovelli (1991c, 2004), but see also Ha´j´ıcˇek’s objection (Ha´j´ıcˇek 1991) and Rovelli’s
reply (Rovelli 1991d).
32Cf. e.g. Rovelli (2004, Sec. 10.1.3).
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transferred from the classical level into the QTG.33 Thus no recourse can be made to any
auxiliary notions of time and the dynamics must be defined in the absence of time. While
I agree with the point that auxiliary notions of time can be introduced in classical GTR
to allay the consequences of the disappearance of time, this will hardy console somebody
interested in foundational issues. As far as the foundations are concerned, time disappears
already at the classical level.
All this, however, is not quite as grave as it sounds, since physicists have learnt to
formulate theories, including QTs, in the absence of time.34 But the difficulties exacerbate
when we address the aspect of the problem of time which should perhaps more adequately be
called the problem of change. The issue was first recognized in print in Bergmann (1961),35
but has been brought into prominence in the context of canonical quantizations of GTR
mostly by Barbour (1994a,b, 1999).36 Despite their difference, the issues of time and change
are closely interrelated, so these articles typically treat both.
What is the problem of change and how does it arise? Most of the work to understand the
issue has already been accomplished in the preceding sections of this chapter. In Definition
5, the distinction between first-class and second-class constraints has been introduced. The
distinction becomes pertinent for the problem of change because it is used to define Dirac
observables. Typically, these are defined to be functions on the constraint surface C which
are gauge invariant. More rigorously, an equivalence class of Dirac observables, sometimes
considered as representing one Dirac observable, is defined as the set of those functions in
phase space that have weakly vanishing Poisson brackets with all first-class constraints and
coincide on the constraint surface. Alternatively, and equivalently, Dirac observables may
be defined as functions in phase space which are constant along gauge orbits on the con-
straint surface. The equivalence obtains because it has been granted, for present purposes
at least, that Dirac (1964) has established that the gauge transformations are generated by
the first-class constraints of the system. It should be stressed that (Dirac) observables are
whatever satisfies this technical definition, not the observable or measurable quantities of a
theory. Observables exhaust the physical content of a theory. Their precise conceptualiza-
tion, therefore, must indirectly offer an interpretation of the theory.
Since in GTR, according to Postulate 4, general covariance is interpreted as a gauge
33Carlo Rovelli, personal communication, 21 July 2004.
34Cf. Rovelli (1990) and Rovelli (2004, Secs. 3.2.4, 5.4.1 et passim).
35And presumably the first time ever in Bergmann’s letter to Dirac on 9 October 1959, in which Bergmann
clearly states that all field variables in canonical gravity suffer from “frozen dynamics.” Bergmann’s corre-
spondence with Dirac is archived at Syracuse University, but unfortunately, I have not yet had the opportu-
nity to peruse this archival resource.
36See also Butterfield’s reaction (Butterfield 2002), Ha´j´ıcˇek (1996, 1997), Isham (1993, 1994a), Kucharˇ
(1991, 1992), and the papers mentioned earlier by Rovelli (1990, 1991a,c,d, 1995).
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invariance under active spacetime diffeomorphisms, it seems as if Dirac observables should
be invariant under spacetime diffeomorphisms. That this is far from obviously the case will
be discussed in Section 4.4; the main reason for my reservations is that Dirac observables
as defined above are magnitudes living in canonical formulations of gauge theories while
general covariance is a concept from the standard formulation of GTR. In order to make this
transition, then, we will need to understand how substantive general covariance is translated
in the Hamiltonian formulation of GTR.
As is clear already prior to a more detailed study, invariance under spacetime diffeo-
morphisms leads in the constrained Hamiltonian formalism to spatial diffeomorphism and
Hamiltonian constraint equations, such as Va = C = 0 in the ADM formalism, where Va and
C are defined by (4.14) and (4.15). In other words, both the normal as well as tangential
component of the Hamiltonian, which according to (4.5) generates the dynamical evolution
of the three-spaces, are constrained to vanish. This implies that the Hamiltonian density
(4.13) and therefore the Hamiltonian itself are constrained to vanish!37 Because the Hamil-
tonian generates transformations with respect to “time,” this means that motion is pure
gauge and the Dirac observables must all be constants of the motion. Equivalently, they
must commute weakly with all first-class constraints, particularly including the Hamiltonian
constraint. From equation (4.5), one can immediately recognize the equivalence of the two
statements. Therefore, no Dirac observable of GTR suffers change. If the dynamics of space-
time is completely encoded in Dirac observables, then its dynamics is “frozen.” Not only do
we live in a block universe, but it appears as if this block was a very dull one indeed.
The reaction in the quantum gravity community to the problem of change has been
mixed. There are full endorsers such as Barbour (Barbour 1994a,b, 1999) who take it,
combined with the aspect of the problem of time mentioned above, as evidence for the
three-dimensionality of the world. Change, or the dynamics if you prefer, is fully encoded
in the three-dimensional relational structure of spatial geometry. Rovelli (1991c,d, 2004),
while supportive of the relational conclusion and himself a full endorser of the consequences
of the “problems” of time and change, does not follow the rather idiosyncratic path of
Barbour. Instead, he proposes the concept of partial observables (Rovelli 2002d), which
designates physical magnitudes for which a measuring procedure can be defined leading to a
measurement result in form of a number. According to Rovelli, although Dirac observables
are constants of motion, correlations between partial observables change and can actually
be measured.38 Others again, like Kucharˇ (1991, 1992, 1993) have simply refused to accept
37Generally covariant systems have weakly vanishing Hamiltonian constraints just in case the canonical
variables transform as scalars under spacetime diffeomorphisms (Henneaux and Teitelboim 1992, Sec. 4.3.2).
38For a very recent philosophical assessment of this response to the problem of change, see Rickles (2006).
So recent in fact that I did not yet have the time to devote myself to Rickles’s article. He appears to attempt
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this, as he calls it, Parmenidean conclusion. He associates observables with observability
and thus considers the problem of change to be a reductio against the relevance of Dirac
observables.39 In their stead, he proposes to regard what I baptize Kucharˇ observables, i.e.
dynamical variables which are invariant under the action of the Diff(Σ) group but not of
Diff(M), as the physically most useful magnitudes to study. Kucharˇ observables commute
with the spatial diffeomorphism constraint, but not with the Hamiltonian constraint and are
therefore not constants of the motion. They capture changes in the spatial three-geometry.
As Earman (2002a) has pointed out, the price to be paid for Kucharˇ’s manoeuvre is the
loss of an elegant implementation of general covariance. Also, the daemon of indeterminism
rears its ugly head. The gain of Kucharˇ’s proposal, however, is that it does not preclude the
experience of change. Those who prefer to swallow the frozen pill, on the other hand, owe an
explication of such experience and they will have to show how to do physics without time.
The causal spinfoam proposal of Markopoulou and Smolin,40 to be presented in Section
5.3.2, can also be considered as a reaction to the problems of time and change.41 Their
causal spinfoam models seems to allow a definition of observables which permits an un-
freezing of the dynamics. These models encode the causal structure already at the Planck
scale. They purport to avoid the problem by insisting that whatever is observable to any
observer must reach them from within their causal past. Thus, the problem can allegedly
be solved by re-establishing the broken link between observability and what the theory as-
serts regarding the physical reality, similar to Kucharˇ’s insistence on observability. In these
causal spinfoam models, causal propagation is governed by a small set of rules regulating
the temporal evolution of the quantized spatial three-geometry. Alternative approaches to
formulate a quantum theory of gravity exist that take the causal structure to be paramount
in overcoming or avoiding altogether the problem of time.42
The philosophical reaction to the problem of change has been incomprehensibly meagre.
One would expect that philosophers of physics would have jumped on the opportunity to
to give a structuralist basis to Rovelli’s idea of correlations between partial observables. I will return to the
notion of partial observables in Section 8.1.
39He calls Dirac observables “perennials”; see e.g. his (Kucharˇ 1993, Sec. 5). Usually, observables designate
genuine physical magnitudes and do not imply observability. Another historical misnomer to cause abundant
confusion, even among physicists! For a serviceable introduction to Kucharˇ’s programme, see Belot and
Earman (2001, Sec. 10.6).
40Markopoulou (2000a,b,c); Markopoulou and Smolin (1997, 1998).
41Kauffman and Smolin (1997) have proposed a more general class of quantum cosmological models with
causality built in at the fundamental level. Smolin (2001a) has given a somewhat different reconstruction of
how the problem of time arises and has suggested two principles which mount resistance to the consequences
the problems of time and change are typically taken to entail. These principles consist of an insistence on
connecting observables with observability and on the finite computability of the theoretical magnitudes.
42This is the so-called causal sets approach by Sorkin and co-workers (Bombelli et al. 1987; Brightwell
et al. 2003; Rideout and Sorkin 2000), also to be discussed in Section 5.3.2.
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serve themselves not just to a free lunch of philosophical finger food, but to a royal banquet
of exuberant foundational meals. Presumably, at least part of the answer to this puzzle lies
in the indigestive mathematical dressing with which the meals come. Over the last few years,
Earman (2002a,b, 2003) has spearheaded its introduction into philosophy of physics. Belot
and Earman (2001) have studied the thorny conceptual issues in the wake of implementing
general covariance as a gauge symmetry of GTR and thereby illuminated how these relate to
technical and conceptual problems in the canonical programme of quantizing gravity. Ear-
man (2002b) has explained how the problem of change in classical and quantum gravity is
grist for McTaggart’s mill. If one insists that change in Dirac observables is a necessary
condition for physical change and that physical change is a necessary condition for physical
time, then one reaches the neo-McTaggartian conclusion that physical time cannot be real.
Maudlin (2002) and Healey (2004) have strongly resisted this conclusion in print. Maudlin
seems to be rather critical of the constrained Hamiltonian formalism and worries that the
problem of change might be an artefact of this formulation of GTR. Quite apart from the
motivations for applying the constrained Hamiltonian codification of the theory, Earman
(2002b) cites the attempt by Ashtekar, Bombelli, and Reula (1991) to recast GTR in an
alternative formulation—albeit of limited validity—in which the problem of change resur-
faces. This, according to Earman, strengthens the claim that the problem of change is not a
mere artefact of the formalism. Healey has opposed Earman’s conclusion by casting doubt
on Earman’s premise that Dirac observables completely capture the physical content of a
generally relativistic system. He suggests that change and its observability are restituted if
one acknowledges that genuine physical magnitudes when observed must be frame-dependent
quantities. By introducing frame-dependency, according to him, physical change supervenes
on the deep structure of Dirac observables.
An awful lot thus depends on what one takes to be the genuine physical magnitudes in
which the complete physical information is packed. In other words, the problem of change
leads directly to an analysis of what we should take to be the observables of GTR. I have dis-
cussed or at least mentioned Dirac observables, partial observables, Kucharˇ observables, and
observables as understood by Healey. Rovelli (1991b, 2002c) has shown how gauge-invariant
observables can be introduced for GTR coupled to four particles. These observables are
termed GPS observables, because they are defined by the physical reference frame actualized
by the GPS technology. But the most important notion of observables that I have so far
avoided are the so-called Bergmann observables. They were introduced by Bergmann (1961)
and designate magnitudes that can be predicted uniquely from initial data. Observables,
for Bergmann, encode the deterministic content of a theory. If observables must enjoy a
deterministic evolution, as became clear in the discussion of the hole argument in Section
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3.2, they must be confined to magnitudes which are invariant under active spacetime dif-
feomorphisms. Whether or not, and if so, to what extent, Bergmann observables coincide
with Dirac observables will only be resolved once it becomes clear how the full spacetime
diffeomorphism invariance is translated into the canonical approach. One would surely ex-
pect that the set of Dirac observables fully corresponds to the set of Bergmann observables.
The next section will offer remarks towards this goal.43
4.4 IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL COVARIANCE IN CANONICAL
FORMULATIONS
The reader may have wondered above why I spend any spacetime presenting the ADM
formalism when LQG uses the Ashtekar-Barbero connection formalism as its vantage point.
The ADM formalism was discussed not only because of its intrinsic systematic and historical
interest, but also because it will turn out to be of crucial importance to understand and
assess the implementation of general covariance in the connection approach. The dilemma
which prevents a direct evaluation of general covariance in the connection approach hinges
on the value of the Immirzi parameter β: for β ∈ R, which permits quantization, the
connection acquires a spacetime meaning only after solving the Gauss constraints; for β
purely imaginary, the covariant Lagrangian is the self-dual part of the Palatini action and
the connection thus affords a spacetime interpretation—but the system is no longer amenable
to quantization.44 The analysis in this section will thus consist of two parts: first, it must
be established that solving the Gauss constraints in the connection version of the generally
relativistic Hamiltonian system with constraints leads back to the ADM phase space; second,
it must be ensured that general covariance is taken into account in the ADM version of
Hamiltonian GTR.
For the first part, referred to in the literature as the symplectic reduction of the con-
strained Hamiltonian system subject to the constraints (4.21)-(4.23) with respect to the
Gaussian constraints, I defer to Thiemann (2001b, Sec. I.1.3) for the proof and contend
myself with stating the pertinent theorem:
Theorem 1. Consider the phase space Γ coordinatized by (Aia, E
a
i ) with the Poisson brackets
43Another conceptualization of observables are the so-called generalized coincidence observables, which
have first been constructed by Komar (1958) via the use of fields to coordinatize the spacetime manifold.
Earman (2002b, p. 11) provides a very accessible discussion of Bergmann and generalized coincidence ob-
servables and their respective relation to Dirac observables.
44I wish to thank Thomas Thiemann for pointing this out to me (on 3 August 2005). Cf. also footnote 26.
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(4.20) and the constraints Gj, Va, C of (4.21)-(4.23). Solving only the constraint equations
Gj = 0 results precisely in the ADM phase space ΓADM with constraints C and Va.
The symplectic reduction with respect to the Gauss constraints thus leads us back to
ΓADM , alleviating any worries one might have had concerning the extension of the phase
space by introducing the SU(2) rotational degrees of freedom of the tetrads. The constraint
equations (4.21) exhibit that these degrees of freedom are non-physical. This already termi-
nates the first part of this section.
Let me turn to an examination of the fate of general covariance in Hamiltonian GTR a`
la ADM. The so-called “Dirac conjecture,” as mentioned in Section 4.1, maintains that all
first-class constraints generate gauge transformations, i.e. the group of gauge transforma-
tions can be represented by the algebra of first-class constraints which generate the gauge
transformations just as elements of the group SO(3) can be represented by matrices which
generate ordinary rotation in three-dimensional space. While Dirac’s conjecture is known to
be false in the full generality just stated,45 the counterexamples tend to be rather exotic and
the adoption of the conjecture as a “working theorem” poses no threat for most practical
purposes.
Let me briefly remind the reader about Lie groups and their associated Lie algebras,
which are of eminent importance to the treatment of gauge theories as they provide the
continuous groups on which all non-Abelian gauge theories are based.46 A Lie group G is
a differentiable manifold endowed with a group structure such that its group operations
G × G → G are differentiable. A group is constructed by its generators, i.e. a set of group
elements such that possibly repeated application of these generators onto themselves and
each other produces all the elements in the group. It is both usual and convenient to restrict
attention to those groups which are generated by group elements arbitrarily close to the
identity, the idea being that each group element can be reached by the iterated action of
these infinitesimal generators. For our purposes, of course, where the differentiable manifold
isM endowed with the group structure of diffeomorphic transformations, these infinitesimal
generators will be elements in Diff(M) which are arbitrarily close to the identity map. The
set of generators T a of a Lie group must span the space of infinitesimal group operations.
Therefore, the Poisson bracket of generators must be a linear combination of generators such
that we have
{T a, T b} = ifabc T c, (4.29)
where the numbers fabc are called the structure constants. The set of vector fields g which
45For a counterexample to the conjecture, consult Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992, Sec. 1.2.2).
46For a more detailed discussion of Lie groups, their associated algebras, and their role in QFT, see Peskin
and Schroeder (1995, Sec. 15.4). Cf. also Nakahara (2003, Sec. 5.6).
80
span the space of infinitesimal group transformations of a Lie group G with the Lie bracket
[., .] : g × g → g as given by the commutation relations (4.29) constitute a Lie algebra,
sometimes also denoted g. The commutation relations (4.29) completely determine the
multiplication of group operations of the associated Lie group, but only sufficiently close to
the identity. If one considers sufficiently large, but finite, transformations, additional global
issues may arise: a well-trodden example concerns the two Lie groups SU(2) and O(3) which
have identical Lie algebras su(2) = o(3) but inequivalent global structure: the manifold of
O(3) is simply connected, whereas the one of SU(2) is doubly connected.
Translated to the case at hand, Dirac’s conjecture means that the constraints (4.21)-
(4.23) are expected to generate the gauge transformations of the corresponding action. The
Gauss constraints (4.21), which unproblematically generate the rotational gauge freedom of
the tetrads, have already been eliminated by the symplectic reduction affirmed in Theorem
1. As can be seen from (4.28), the constraint algebra (4.24)-(4.28) is not simple as it has
an invariant subgroup, constituted by the Gj’s. This is already an indication that the
Gauss constraints can be divided out in a relatively straightforward manner, as it attested
by Theorem 1. The remainder of this section is devoted to an analysis of the subalgebra
(4.24)-(4.26) of the constraint algebra and of the transformations this subalgebra generates.
According to Dirac’s conjecture, which is not the source of difficulties here, it seems as if this
subalgebra must generate the group of spacetime diffeomorphism Diff(M). This, however,
is not quite the case.
There is a clear sense in which the constraints Va generate spatial diffeomorphisms. In
order to see this, consider an arbitrary tensor field tab built from qab, pi
ab defined on Σ. Such
a tensor field then has the following Poisson bracket relations with the constraint functions:
{V ( ~N), tab} = κL ~N tab (4.30)
{C(N), tab} = κLN tab (4.31)
where κ = 1/16piG andL ~N andLN are the Lie derivatives in tangential and normal direction
with respect to the hypersurface Σ, respectively. Thus, it can be seen from equation (4.30)
that V can be interpreted as the generator of spatial diffeomorphisms, i.e. it generates the Lie
algebra diff(Σ) of the spatial diffeomorphism group Diff(Σ), up to a caveat. The reservation
to be raised at this point is that as mentioned above, a Lie algebra does not uniquely
single out an associated Lie group in that its commutation relations only determine the
multiplication of group operations of the associated Lie group in the neighbourhood of the
identity operation of the group. This caveat becomes pertinent here for manifolds Σ whose
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Figure 4: A manifold of genus one.
topology is of non-zero genus.47 In these cases, the group Diff(Σ) consists of more than
one connected component, meaning that diffeomorphisms from different components are
not homotopic48 to one another. Figure 4 illustrates this with a manifold of genus one,
where the two diffeomorphisms φ1 and φ2 ∈ Diff(Σ) cannot be smoothly deformed into one
another and are therefore not homotopic. The group Diff(Σ) where Σ is topologically of
genus one, as in Figure 4, and the group Diff(Σ) of a simply connected manifold Σ have the
same associated Lie algebra diff(Σ). Thus, the Lie algebra diff(Σ) does not uniquely choose
among inequivalent groups of diffeomorphisms acting on manifolds of different genera and
does therefore not encode the entire information contained in the structure of the group.
This is why it is sometimes said that Postulate 4 should be modified to the effect that only
the connected part of Diff(M) containing the identity should be considered as the gauge
symmetry of GTR, denoted by Diff0(M).
Analogous to the case of Va, C can be considered as the generator of time reparametriza-
tions, or “temporal diffeomorphisms” Diff(R). These transformations are often also called
deformations of the hypersurface Σ normal to how it is embedded in M.
Importantly, equations (4.30) and (4.31) only hold on shell, i.e. for generic functions in
ΓADM when the vacuum Einstein equations hold. Off shell, the constraints generate different
47The genus is a property of connected surfaces which can be used to characterize its topology. It is defined
as the topologically invariant number g ∈ N0 of non-intersecting simple closed curves that can be drawn on
the surface without separating the surface.
48Two continuous maps f, g : X → Y are said to be homotopic, denoted by f ∼ g, just in case there exists
a continuous map F : X × I → Y such that F (x, 0) = f(x) and F (x, 1) = g(x), where I represents a real
interval. In this case, the map F is called a homotopy between f and g.
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motions, implying that the set of gauge symmetries is not Diff(M) everywhere in phase space.
But this is not particularly worrisome in itself.49
The really disturbing worry is different. The real problem is that the gauge group
Diff(M) disappears in the canonical formalism. Apparently, in the heyday of geometrody-
namics, many people have been worried about this issue, as is testified by Isham and Kucharˇ
(1985a,b). As a result of this pioneering work though, physicists in canonical GTR have
ceased to be worried about the disappearance of Diff(M) and either gloss over the issue
entirely, or state that the constraints encode the full spacetime diffeomorphism invariance
non-trivially, but unproblematically. It appears at least initially wrong to just gloss over the
issue as the threatening loss of substantive general covariance clearly amounts to a serious
challenge for the defender of the canonical approach. Deflating the worry by indicating that
the full spacetime diffeomorphism invariance is still at work in the canonical formulation is
of course acceptable, as long as one can offer valid reasons for doing so. These reasons, alas,
are rarely offered in the literature. It almost seems as if Isham and Kucharˇ (1985a,b) have
placated the community to the extent that its being sedated borders on local anesthesia.
Let me attempt to initiate an awakening, or at least a sensitization.
A sufficient criterion for clearly seeing the full spacetime diffeomorphism invariance at
work in the canonical approach would be if the Lie algebra diff(M) of Diff(M) were isomor-
phic to the Dirac algebra of constraints (4.16). If this condition were satisfied, this would
offer convincing evidence that the symmetries of the theories were in both cases the same and
that changing the action from the traditional (4.1) to (4.12) was a harmless transformation
and not a change of theory. Changing the symmetries is typically taken to mean that one
changes the theory, and not just its formulation. However, in the case of gauge symmetries,
the issue is more subtle: what is relevant in this case, it seems, is whether the reduced phase
space has been modified or not, modulo the well-understood extension of the ADM phase
space in the Ashtekar-Barbero formulation which introduced the internal SU(2) degrees of
freedom. In order to find this out, one would have to solve the constraints, which is im-
possible in geometrodynamics because the Hamiltonian constraint has a highly non-trivial,
because non-polynomial, form. Let me thus return to comparing the two algebras mentioned
above: what is the relation between diff(M) and the Dirac algebra (4.16)? Should it turn
out that these algebras are not isomorphic, the canonical gravitist has the onus of producing
a proof that the constraint algebra correctly codifies the gauge symmetry of GTR.
Unfortunately, however, not only do the commutation relations (4.16) not constitute
a Lie algebra isomorphic to diff(M), but it is not a representation of a Lie algebra at
49If this issue is related to whether the constraint algebra closes only on or also off shell, then the worries
of Nicolai, Peeters, and Zamaklar (2005), to be discussed in Section 7.2, apply.
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Figure 5: Dependence of pure deformations on the embedding.
all!50 As can be gleaned from the last commutation relation in (4.16), the Poisson bracket
of C with itself does not only explicitly depend on the pair of lapse functions, but also
on the canonical variable qab. This means that the factor of the right-hand side of the
relation is not just a structure constant, as it should be for a Lie algebra as explicated above,
but involves an explicit dependence on the phase space. Essentially, as Isham and Kucharˇ
(1985a, pp. 297f) explain, the decomposition of the generators of Diff(M) into normal and
tangential components introduces a reference to the metric gµν of M with respect to which
the embedding of Σ into M is spacelike. Isham and Kucharˇ find it hardly surprising, then,
that the induced three-metric qab appears in the last commutation relation in (4.16). The
decomposition of diffeomorphisms into pure stretching in the direction of the shift vector
Na and pure deformations in the direction of the lapse function N thus does not constitute
a Lie group because the pure deformations require for their definition that the equations of
motion are solved beforehand. This implies that the reference to how the hypersurfaces on
which the pure deformations act are embedded cannot be omitted. The dependence of the
Lie derivative of an arbitrary tensor field tab living in Σ on the embedding of Σ is illustrated
in Figure 5. On the other hand, the action of an element of Diff(M) on p ∈ Σ leads to a
unique point in M, unlike the generator of pure deformations which only delivers a unique
action relative to a given embedding. In Figure 5, it is diagrammatically evident that the Lie
derivatives of tab along two different normal vector fields arising from different embeddings
50Cf. Isham and Kucharˇ (1985a, p. 297), Isham (1993, p. 191), Thiemann (2003, Sec. I.2.1). Thiemann
states that the algebra defined by (4.16) is an “open” algebra in the BRST sense (Henneaux and Teitelboim
1992, Sec. 3.2.5) of whose representation only very little is known.
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of Σ will, in general, differ: Ln1tab 6= Ln2tab.
Thus, the fact that diff(M) and the constraint algebra defined by (4.16) are not iso-
morphic can be seen as arising from the canonical split of the four-dimensional spacetime
structure into a three-dimensional “space” which is evolved in “time.” Isham and Kucharˇ
(1985a, p. 297) warn, however, that this should not mislead one to argue superficially that
the loss of full spacetime diffeomorphism invariance is inevitable in a canonical scheme. This
argument, they explain, is flawed since there are counterexamples where a manifest four-
dimensional invariance is broken by the imposition of a foliation of spacetime yet the full
set of generators of the group encoding the full four-dimensional symmetry can be repro-
duced by dynamical variables on phase space. They cite Minkowski space field theory as
a case in point, where the manifest Poincare´ invariance is broken by the introduction of
a specific foliation of Minkowski spacetime necessitated by the canonical formalism. The
energy-momentum vector and the angular momentum tensor as dynamical variables on the
phase space, however, represent the full set of generators of the Poincare´ group P (1, 3).
Not only is there the worry, now appeased, that forcing a foliation upon a four-dimen-
sional spacetime irremediably breaks its four-dimensional symmetry group, but the fact that
the Dirac algebra (4.16) is not Lie algebra also endangers the initial ambition of finding a
quantization of GTR. According to Isham and Kucharˇ (1985a), no quantization techniques
are known for constructing Hilbert space representations for non-Lie algebra commutation
relations of the type (4.16). These difficulties can be overcome, apparently, in at least two
different ways—or at least so it has been claimed. The older idea, original of Bergmann
and Komar (1972), is to propose a much larger invariance group for geometrodynamics than
Diff(M): the group of mappings within the function space of the field variables gµν , i.e. the
group of functions from the set of all metrics gµν on M into Diff(M). This larger group
involving a specific reference to the spacetime metric preserves the coordinate conditions
which specify the imposed foliation. In this sense, it nicely captures the extension of the
symmetry group from Diff(M) to Diff(Σ) plus pure deformations described above. Bergmann
and Komar prove that Diff(M) is a non-invariant subgroup of this newly proposed group.
The important result derived by Bergmann and Komar (1972) is that an invariant with
respect to any of these three groups must be an invariant of all three. Therefore, they
conclude, the invariants of GTR must be unaffected by a substitution of one of these groups
by another one. This result bears consequences for the question of whether or not the set
of Bergmann observables corresponds to the set of Dirac observables as introduced in the
previous Section 4.3. Quantities which are invariant under transformations belonging to the
third group constitute Dirac observables, while those invariant under transformations of the
second group are Bergmann’s observables. Bergmann and Komar’s result, therefore, implies,
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if true, if a quantity is a Dirac observable, it will also qualify under Bergmann’s criterion and
vice versa. The set of observables, and therefore the physical content of the theory, remains
the same, regardless of whether we consider the invariance group to be Diff(M), the group
associated with the Dirac algebra (4.16), or the extended group considered by Bergmann and
Komar. The relevance of this result surely warrants more scrutiny and I hope to return to
this issue on a future occasion. Without considering the details of their proposal, however, I
am prepared to accept the conditional that if their claim is correct and the set of observables
is indeed unaffected by the choice among the three groups, then the worry about the loss of
full spacetime diffeomorphism invariance in canonical GTR is moot.
The more recent proposal, due to Isham and Kucharˇ (1985a,b), presents a scheme that
can be considered “complementary” to the approach of Bergmann and Komar. Instead of
enlarging the symmetry group, they seek to extend the phase space by adding embedding
variables and by introducing corresponding constraints. This disallows the lapse and shift
to be freely specifiable as they were in the approach described in Subsection 4.2.1. They
are now definite functionals of the embedding variables, which permits Isham and Kucharˇ to
claim that the Dirac algebra (4.16) now reproduces the Lie algebra diff(M). This proposal,
too, shall be the topic for another occasion.
One can seek to eliminate all the difficulties with representing the full four-dimensional
diffeomorphism invariance that one encounters in the canonical formulation of GTR by
choosing a radically different approach: avoiding a decomposition of spacetime into a “space”
that evolves in “time” altogether. This can be achieved by renouncing the canonical phase
space and by replacing it with a fully covariant one, i.e. one in which each point represents a
spacetime solution of Einstein’s equation. The phase space, thus, consists of entire histories
rather and does not involve references to particular moments in “time.” Ashtekar, Bombelli,
and Reula (1991) have proposed such an approach which treats all spacetime diffeomorphisms
on the same footing. Here, the four-dimensional symmetry remains manifest, unlike in the
canonical approach. This covariant proposal, however, has not been worked out in detail.
I suspect that the reason for this negligence must be found in the severe limitations of
the covariant account proposed by Ashtekar, Bombelli, and Reula (1991): the dynamical
behaviour of a quantum theory based on the covariant phase space of GTR would mimic the
one of the classical theory. In particular, the account is expected to be incapable of avoiding
the singularities of the classical evolution. Also, it appears as if such a quantum theory could
not account for typical quantum effects such as tunneling. Furthermore, it does not admit
strong gravitational fields and thus obliterates one of the primary motivations for seeking a
QTG.51
51Cf. Ashtekar et al. (1991, Sec. 6).
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5.0 A QUICK GUIDE TO LOOP QUANTUM GRAVITY
Importantly, LQG does not pretend to offer a unified field theory for all fundamental forces
as ST does. Rather, it harbours the more modest goal of quantizing gravity while observing
background independence. It should therefore be kept in mind that, unless a theory extends
to include the other fundamental forces, it will not constitute a final, unified theory, even if
it will correctly predict Planck-scale observations. What relation LQG might have to such
a unified theory is unknown, although it has been suggested that it might be capable of
offering a framework for such a theory.
The two major challenges for LQG remain to find a complete and consistent formulation
of the dynamics of the theory and to derive its (semi-)classical limit. The former is attempted
in both, the canonical (loop) formulation, as well as in its covariant (spinfoam) extension,
to be addressed in Section 5.3. As I will argue, the rigorous establishment of the relation
between the two formulations would greatly contribute to the understanding of the theory.
I also will return to the problem of the semi-classical limit in chapter 9 when I discuss weave
states and the emergence of spacetime.
This chapter gives a brief and non-technical account of the main ideas that define LQG.
For a review of LQG, see Rovelli and Gaul (2000); Rovelli (1997, 1998a,b, 1999, 2004);
Rovelli and Upadhya (1998); Smolin (1992, 2004b). For more technical reviews of LQG, see
Ashtekar and Lewandowski (2004); Gambini and Pullin (1996); Thiemann (2001b, 2003).
Rovelli (2003b) and Smolin (2001b, 2004a) give popular accounts.1 The fact that leading
proponents of LQG have recently been invited to describe LQG for the much wider audience
of popular science journals may testify that the theory has reached a certain threshold
of maturity and relevance also from the outsider’s perspective. Exponents of LQG such
as Markopoulou have almost gained celebrity status by having been portrayed by popular
science journals (Gefter 2002), as well as in the general media (Kindhauser 2003). This
makes it all the more urgent that philosophers of physics start to study LQG’s conceptual
1The bibliographical references in this chapter are far from complete, as I focused on outlining the theory
rather than on attributing all the individual contributions. My exposition borrows from Rovelli (2004),
which is also an excellent source for further references.
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foundations, commitments, and implications.
The present chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 will outline the canonical quan-
tization programme in general terms as well as applied to Hamiltonian GTR according to
LQG. Section 5.2 sketches the kinematical level, i.e. the theory of “quantum space,” the
so-called kinematical Hilbert space which results from solving the Gauss and spatial dif-
feomorphism constraints. Section 5.3, finally, briefly presents both the standard canonical
dynamics of LQG, as well as the covariant extension of the theories, which has been pro-
posed in order to resolve the problem of dynamics in the canonical approach. I close with
a few remarks about the relation between the two. The reader should be warned that what
follows will only serve badly as an independent introduction to LQG. It merely introduces
the elements relevant for the further development of the argument.
On numerous occasions, LQG has been hailed as the full realization of relationism or of
(physical) structuralism. It thus seems appropriate the remind enthusiastic structuralists of
an argument, which has been developed in philosophy of mathematics and can be seen as a
reductio of at least one common form of structuralism. Appendix B will offer this challenge
to the spacetime structuralist. As it is somewhat peripheral to present concerns, it has been
demoted to the appendix in order not to interrupt the continuity of the argument.
5.1 THE CANONICAL QUANTIZATION OF HAMILTONIAN GTR
Let me first address the question of how general covariance, and its codification in Hamil-
tonian GTR, fare through the quantization process. This is a crucial point: if LQG wants
to claim that it is a quantization of GTR, then it better correctly quantizes the classical
structure. The present section briefly reviews the main steps in the canonical quantization
of Hamiltonian GTR according to LQG.
The so-called canonical quantization procedure for Hamiltonian systems with constraints
was originally introduced by Dirac (1964), and subsequently explicated in virtually every
review article on canonical QG.2 The implementation of the procedure is highly non-trivial
and has never, so far, been fully executed for a Hamiltonian formulation of GTR. Therefore,
it offers a programmatic scheme rather than a ready-made recipe for solving the problem of
quantizing GTR and it still awaits its fulfillment.
The first step was essentially completed in the last section, viz. the casting of the theory
in Hamiltonian form and the identification of a pair of canonical conjugate variables in the
2Some recent examples include Gambini and Pullin (1996, Sec. 3.2.2), Henneaux and Teitelboim (1992,
Sec. 13.3), Kucharˇ (1981, 1993), and references therein. My exposition mainly follows the first reference.
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phase space and their Poisson bracket relation. The identification of the canonical variables
and their Poisson relation amounts to the selection of an algebra of classical quantities. This
is a rather technical choice which has a huge impact on the tractability of the mathematical
challenges that arise in the course of steering through the procedure. This choice should in
principle not incite philosophical worries, since it is merely a choice of a coordinate system
in the phase space. The phase space, and therefore the theory, is the same in both cases.
It must be noted, however, that a non-standard choice of classical observables will lead to
non-standard quantization, and thus to inequivalent quantum theories.
Second, the algebra chosen at stage one is represented as a set of operators with the
Poisson relations among the classical quantities promoted to commutation relations among
these operators. The operators act on a functional space H of quantum states. Once one
has chosen canonical variables qn, pn at the first stage, one can seek for a configuration
representation of the functionals Ψ[q] living in H with the fundamental operators defined by
q̂Ψ[q] = qΨ[q] and p̂Ψ[q] = −i(δΨ[q]/δq) with the canonical commutation relation [q̂, p̂] = i.
Next, the constraint equations must be quantized to wave equations with the constraint
operators acting on the space H. This must be performed such that the Poisson relations
of the constraints are consistent with the commutation relations at the quantum level. This
process depends on regularizations and factor orderings and does thus not yield a unique
result, but gives rise to so-called quantization ambiguities.3 The space of solutions of the
constraint equations is a subspace of H, let’s call it H˜. The next step is to implement the
evolution of the states via the Schro¨dinger equation or of the observables via the Heisenberg
equation. For the case at hand, the Hamiltonian constraint equation will play the part of
the Schro¨dinger equation. Finally, define an inner product on H˜. This step turns H˜ into a
Hilbert space H with normalized state vectors. With all this quantum structure in place,
one can compute expectation values and make physical predictions. The choice of an inner
product is not strictly speaking specified by the Dirac quantization scheme. Additional global
symmetries such as Poincare´ symmetry in QFTs on flat background spacetime uniquely
determine the inner product. But in field theories of gravity, no such help is available. To
find an inner product and thus a physical Hilbert space, as we will see, is perhaps the largest
unresolved challenge for LQG.
As an example, let me briefly revisit the case of geometrodynamics. As a canonical alge-
bra, one picks the 3-metric qab and its conjugate momentum pi
ab and represents the 3-metric
3These ambiguities may incite philosophical worries as they imply the existence of inequivalent quantum
theories with the same classical limit. One would thus hope for a physically well-motivated regularization and
ordering procedure. According to Carlo Rovelli (personal communication, 30 June 2004), however, physicists
should only start to worry about this once they have produced one consistent and complete QTG, which is,
alas, not the case so far.
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q̂ab as a multiplicative operator and the momentum pi
ab as a derivative operator. The state
vectors are required to be invariant under the symmetries of the theory, which are represented
as constraints in the Hamiltonian approach. Hence, the state vectors must be annihilated
by the constraint operators. The problem is to find the physical Hilbert space with an inner
product. There are factor orderings such that one can solve the diffeomorphism constraint.
The result will be that the state vectors must be functionals of the geometric properties of
the 3-space which are invariant under spatial diffeomorphisms, rather than functionals just of
qab. But the Hamiltonian constraint cannot be solved. This difficulty originates in the non-
polynomial dependence of the constraint equations on the ADM variables. This means that
the general procedure of promoting the constraint equation to a wave equation, apply some
physically motivated factor ordering and regularization, and solve the resulting (Wheeler-
DeWitt) equation cannot be accomplished and the program of quantum geometrodynamics
grinds to a halt at this point. The problem of imposing a physically motivated inner product
on the space of state vectors is compounded by the fact that no Dirac observable of the
system is known. These obstacles lead to the search for new variables, which were indeed
found by Sen and Ashtekar in the eighties. These new variables paved the way to LQG,
where the situation is somewhat more hopeful.
The Ashtekar-Barbero variables, introduced in Section 4.2.2, are promoted to quantum
operators acting on a functional space H of quantum states Ψ, abiding by the canonical
commutation relation
[Âia(x), Ê
b
j (y)] = iδ
b
aδ
i
jδ
3(x, y). (5.1)
Choosing a configuration (i.e. connection) representation, the action of the operators can be
represented by
Âia(x)Ψ[A] = A
i
a(x)Ψ[A] (5.2)
and by
Êai (x)Ψ[A] = −i
∂
∂Aia(x)
Ψ[A], (5.3)
where the Ψ[A] are elements in H. The constraint operators necessary to turn the constraint
equations into wave equations are based on these two operators Â and Ê. It is in constructing
the constraint operators that a choice of the orderings of basic operators creates quantization
ambiguities. In actual practice, these ambiguities are resolved by making a “practical choice.”
Let us define the physical Hilbert space H as the space of functions Ψ that solve all the
constraints. Solving the Gauss law and the spatial diffeomorphism constraints is non-trivial,
but can be done, and yields the kinematical Hilbert space K of LQG, which corresponds to
a quantization of three-space. The last step is to solve the Hamiltonian constraint, which is
responsible for the evolution of the three-dimensional space and therefore for the dynamical
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aspect of the system. Classically, the Hamiltonian constraint encodes the last step to space-
time diffeomorphism invariance by reducing the phase space to the space of (equivalence
classes of) solutions of the Einstein equations. In the quantum theory, the Hamiltonian con-
straint equation—the so-called Wheeler-DeWitt equation—projects the kinematical Hilbert
space onto the physical one by excluding all quantum states which are not annihilated by
the Hamiltonian constraint operator.
These are the rather abstract general steps toward a complete canonical QTG based on
Ashtekar-Barbero variables. Now let’s look at some of the more concrete results at both
levels, the kinematical as well as the dynamical one.
5.2 KINEMATICAL LOOP QUANTUM GRAVITY
Connections enable the parallel transport of objects such as tangent vectors along curves in
the manifold. The result of parallel-transporting an object will generally depend on the path
chosen, but preserves vector addition and scalar multiplication. Consider a smooth path γ
from a point p to a point q in the manifold M and a vector (or fibre) bundle structure E
with a connection D defined on M. For a given vector u ∈ Ep, one designates the result of
parallel-transporting u from p to q along γ as h[D, γ]u. The linear map h[D, γ] : Ep → Eq
is called a holonomy along the path γ. Only closed curves (i.e. loops) will be considered in
what follows. In other words, we identify p and q.
At the quantum level, these holonomies, based on the spin connection, become the cre-
ation operator of the “loop states,” i.e. of states which represent an everywhere vanishing
gravitational field except along the loop γ. That a loop representation, based on Ashtekar-
Sen variables, can be used to find exact solutions of the quantum constraints was first
discovered by Jacobson and Smolin (1988). This original approach, however, appeared to
be incapable of solving all constraints simultaneously and was subsequently simplified by
Rovelli and Smolin (1988, 1990), who laid the groundwork for the loop representation of
quantum general relativity.
Many loops can be combined by knotting, linking, and kinking them into larger networks
of loops. The study and classification of such knotted networks of loops is the subject of the
branch of mathematics called knot theory.4 Linear combinations of these loop states span
4Apart from the early articles by Rovelli and Smolin (Rovelli and Smolin 1988, 1990), see also Baez
(1996), who reaffirms with mathematical rigour how these knotted networks relate to knot theory. For a
textbook on knot theory with a special emphasis on how it applies to physics, see Kauffman (2002).
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a space. The so-called spin network states constitute an orthonormal basis of this space.5
The spin network states describe quantum space according to LQG, i.e. they result from a
canonical quantization of the three-spaces Σ of the Ashtekar-Barbero version of GTR.
These spin networks are embedded in manifolds. They are represented by embedded
graphs with nodes and edges linking the nodes. The spatial diffeomorphism invariance
exacts the abstractness of the graphs. In other words, it does not matter how they are
embedded into a background manifold, and deformations that do not change the number
of nodes nor how they are linked together are considered physically meaningless. Thus, an
abstract labelled graph represents an equivalence class of spin networks under the action of
the spatial diffeomorphism group. This implies that the physical information contained in a
spin network state does not depend on its embedding in a manifold.6
The (abstract) spin network states result after one has solved the Gauss and the spatial
diffeomorphism constraints, but not the Hamiltonian constraint yet. These spin network
states can be represented by abstract graphs withN nodes, whereN is the number of “grains”
of space to which they correspond. The links between the nodes represent a contiguity
relation between the nodes so linked. Each link corresponds to a contribution towards the
area of the surface that separates the adjacent quanta of space. The quantum state is
characterized by both this graph as well as labels on the links and the nodes, where the
label in on node n represent the quantum number of the volume and the label jl on link l is
the quantum number of the surface area between the two volumes represented by the nodes
which the link connects. The resulting picture of space at the Planck level is thus a granular
one, with indivisible Planck-scale chunks of space combining to form the three-dimensional
macroscopic space. Spin networks do not represent quantum excitations in space. Rather,
they constitute space and are quantum excitations of space. Figure 6 shows an example of
a simple spin network. Figure 7 illustrates how spin network states are equivalence classes
under spatial diffeomorphisms, i.e. they do not change under deformations of their embedded
representations as shown in the figure.
The abstract spin network states form a complete orthonormal basis for the kinemati-
cal Hilbert space K (Rovelli and Smolin 1995b). Rovelli (2004, Sec. 6.7), as many others
in LQG, interprets the kinematical Hilbert space with its spin network basis as offering a
picture of quantum space. According to this interpretation, the spatial geometry can be
5“Spin” because they carry spin SU(2) representations on the nodes and links.
6And therefore not on how knots are embedded in manifolds either; this implies that whatever has
physical significance must be invariant under what knot theorists call Reidemeister moves, which codify
moves under which the interlacements are preserved. For an accessible approach to the theory of invariants
in knot theory, see Kauffman (1988). Abstract spin network states are sometimes called “s-knots” in the
literature. Whenever I use the term “spin network” or “spin network state,” I refer to the abstract ones,
unless I explicitly state the contrary.
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Figure 6: A simple spin network state |s〉 with two trivalent nodes.
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Figure 7: Deforming the (embedded) spin networks as shown does not change the state.
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studied by analyzing the properties of the operators defined on K corresponding to geo-
metrical magnitudes, particularly the volume and area operators that can be constructed.
These operators act on the spin network states. Their spectra yields important information
concerning the geometrical interpretation of the spin network states. Since we study the
properties of the gravitational field via the geometry of the physical space, the properties of
(three-dimensional) gravitational fields are determined by the spectral properties of the vol-
ume and area operators. These operators, which will be discussed in more detail in Section
9.2.2, turn out to have discrete spectra (Ashtekar and Lewandowski 1997, 1998, 1999; Rovelli
and Smolin 1995a,b). The granularity of the spatial geometry—the “polymer” geometry of
space—follows from the discreteness of the spectra of the volume and the area operators.
Essentially, each node (and only the nodes) in the network contributes a term to the sum
of the volume of a region. On each node, there sits an “atom” of space with volume Vn.
These elementary grains of space are separated from each other by their surfaces of contigu-
ity. Just as the volume operator receives contributions from the nodes of a region, the area
operator acquires contributions from all the links that intersect the surface. For instance,
the surface whose only intersecting link is a link with quantum number jl has a surface area
of Al ∝
√
jl(jl + 1) (Rovelli 2004, Sec. 6.7). The problem, however, is that these operators
do not correspond to Dirac observables and should therefore taken with a grain of salt. They
are partial observables in the sense of Rovelli (2002d). I will return to this point in Sections
8.1, 8.2.4, and 9.2.2.
Physical three-space, in Rovelli’s interpretation, is a quantum superposition of spin net-
work states, analogously to the physical electromagnetic field consisting of superposition
of n-photon states. LQG predicts the existence of indivisible quanta of volume, area, and
length, as well as their spectra (up to a constant). Importantly, this was a result of the loop
quantization, rather than an assumption. According to LQG, measurements of the Planck
geometry of space must therefore yield one of these values in the spectrum of the concerned
operator.
5.3 DYNAMICAL LOOP QUANTUM GRAVITY
5.3.1 Canonical dynamics: Wheeler-DeWitt evolution
As was exhibited in chapter 4, the Hamiltonian of a generally covariant system vanishes
weakly and thus generates a motion of pure gauge. The switch from the classical to the
quantum theory involves the adaptation of the constraint equations as corresponding wave
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equations with constraint operators acting on quantum states. The quantum Hamiltonian
operator Ĥ is thus defined on the space of (abstract) spin network states K because the other
two families of constraints have already been solved at this stage. Replacing the Schro¨dinger
equation as the quantum dynamical equation, the Hamiltonian constraint equation
Ĥ|s〉 = 0, (5.4)
the so-called Wheeler-DeWitt equation, captures the dynamics of canonical QG. The final
goal of the procedure, establishing the physical Hilbert space H is (at this stage) tantamount
to solving this equation, as solving the Wheeler-DeWitt equation reduces K to H. Equiv-
alently, one can try to find a projection operator P̂ : K → H that projects spin network
states onto the space of solutions of (5.4) (and the other constraint equations).
To construct a Hamiltonian Ĥ, or, equivalently, a projector P̂ , poses a major challenge
along the path to the complete formulation of LQG. There are currently several proposals
on the market, but it is not yet clear which one of them, if any, captures the correct dy-
namical behaviour. Thiemann (1998a,b) has so far offered the most rigorous and complete
construction of a Hamiltonian. As discussed in Section 7.2, however, there are various dif-
ficulties with Thiemann’s construction. It is unclear, e.g., whether the resulting constraint
algebra closes as it should (Nicolai et al. 2005). Quantization ambiguities similar to those
encountered earlier seem to spoil the happy resolution. Generally, however, the Hamiltonian
will only act on the nodes of the spin networks. For an outline of the concrete construction
of the Hamiltonian operator, see Rovelli (2004, Sec. 7.1).
As in background-dependent QFT, the quantum dynamics of the theory is also fully
coded by the transition amplitudes between spin network states. In fact, the matrix elements
of the projector P̂ are transition amplitudes between initial and final spin networks. Let us
denote these transition amplitudes with W (sf , si). The matrix elements define an inner
product of the physical Hilbert space:
W (sf , si)
.
= K〈sf |P̂ |si〉K = H〈sf |si〉H. (5.5)
The transition amplitudes between the spin network states is then just their physical inner
product.
Since the gravitational field is not a denizen dwelling in a spacetime background, and
in particular not evolving with respect to a (physical) fiducial time, unitary evolution is
an ill-defined concept. Unitary evolution designates the conservation of a total probability
amplitude over time. So if there is no time, unitary evolution becomes ill-defined. It is
important to appreciate, however, that the transition amplitudes—sufficient to specify the
dynamics—remain well-defined, despite the absence of time.
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The construction of Ĥ or P̂ completes the formal framework of the theory. The major
difficulty is to actually calculate transition amplitudes (or, equivalently, construct a physical
inner product). In order to circumvent these difficulties, physicists have started to search
for alternative dynamical models and thus to study manifestly covariant Lagrangian models
to obtain an understanding of the dynamics. Some of these models can be related to LQG
and thus constitute an extension of the theory. Others arise from rather different contexts,
but are still studied side-by-side with the LQG models due to their formal resemblance.
Unfortunately, the relation between Hamiltonian LQG and these Lagrangian extensions is
not yet well understood.
The codification of general covariance in LQG must be sought, as in classical Hamiltonian
GTR, in the realization of the constraint algebra. LQG follows the substantive principle of
general covariance as encoded in Postulate 4 in Chapter 3 insofar as it implements at the
quantum level the classical constraint algebra (4.24)-(4.28). I have discussed the classical
constraints and how they are supposed to capture general covariance in Section 4.4. I have
briefly sketched the interpretation of spatial diffeomorphism invariance as a gauge symmetry
in the quantum theory in Section 5.2, and in particular in Figure 7. How time reparametriza-
tion invariance will have to be understood in the quantum theory can only be adjudicated
once the physical Hilbert space will be constructed.
5.3.2 Covariant dynamics: spinfoams
The Lagrangian spinfoam formalism, discussed in Rovelli (2004, Ch. 9), permits the explicit
calculation of transition amplitudes W (sf , si) between initial spin networks |si〉 and final
spin networks |sf〉. The spinfoam idea follows Feynman in that it interprets the transition
amplitudes as sums over paths or “world histories” of spin networks. The paths represent
possible combinations of actions of Ĥ on the nodes of the spin network |si〉 such that it
matches up with |sf〉, and thus constitute possible world histories of spin networks. If
the projection operator P̂ is expanded perturbatively, the spinfoam approach suggests, in
Feynman’s spirit, to interpret each term in the sum as a dynamically possible world history
between two given spin networks.
The Hamiltonian can be concretely understood as acting on the nodes of a spin network
state such that edges split. Its action is combinatorial in that it either multiplies an existing
node into three or it collapses three nodes into one (see Figure 8; the numbers a, b depend
on the labels of the spin network acted upon.). In this way, it affects the structure of the
spin network and allows it to grow or to shrink.
A spinfoam σ, thus, can be understood as a labelled Feynman graph of spin networks
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Figure 8: The basic action of the Hamiltonian on nodes of a spin network.
encoding the interactions occurring at the nodes, bounded by |si〉 and |sf〉. In comparison
with a Feynman graph which consists of vertices and of edges connecting the vertices, a
spinfoam has an additional structure: it collects vertices, edges, and faces. Faces are the
world histories of links in the spin networks, and they join at edges, the world histories of the
nodes. Edges, in turn, meet at vertices, which represent the interactions among the nodes,
i.e. the actions of the Hamiltonian as represented in Figure 8. The edges and the faces of
a spinfoam are labelled with the corresponding quantum numbers for volumes and areas,
respectively.
Expand the transition amplitudeW (sf , si) perturbatively as a sum over all possible spin-
foams bounded by the given spin networks |si〉 and |sf〉. To be more precise, the expansion
sums over the weighted amplitudes associated with each spinfoam. The idea is schemati-
cally illustrated in Figure 9. A(σ) represents the amplitude corresponding to a particular
spinfoam σ. These spinfoams are endowed with quantum numbers on the vertices, edges,
and faces. These numbers have been suppressed in the figure. Here, both |si〉 and |sf〉 are
the simple spin network of Figure 6. In order to calculate these spinfoam amplitudes A(σ),
one decomposes the entire spinfoam into its vertices v. Each of these vertices owns a vertex
amplitude Av(σ), which is determined by the matrix element of Ĥ between the incoming and
the outgoing spin networks. Similarly, one constructs the amplitudes of the faces Af (σ) and
of the edges Ae(σ). The amplitude A(σ) of a spinfoam σ is then obtained by the product of
the amplitudes of all its individual vertices, edges, and faces:
A(σ) = µ(σ)
∏
f
Af (σ)
∏
e
Ae(σ)
∏
v
Av(σ) (5.6)
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W (sf , si) ∼ A (
sf
si
) + A (
si
sf
) + . . .
Figure 9: Schematic example of how to calculate a transition amplitude W (sf , si).
where µ(σ) introduces the weight given to the amplitude of spinfoam σ. In fact, the ampli-
tudes Af , Ae, Av do not depend on the entire spinfoam σ, but only on the quantum numbers
of the adjacent faces and edges.7
The goal of a spinfoam model is to explicate equation (5.6) such that the transition
amplitudes become calculable. Strictly speaking, some of these models do not systematically
and did not historically arise from LQG, but from rather different contexts. However, due
to their formal resemblance, they are studied side-by-side with models constructed in the
context of Lagrangian LQG. The Ponzano-Regge model (Ponzano and Regge 1968), which
dates back to well before the inception of LQG, relates to a discretization of three-dimensional
GTR. These models significantly simplify the problem since GTR in three dimensions does
not exhibit local degrees of freedom, i.e. the variables must satisfy a number of constraints
which is equal to their local degrees of freedom. The so-called BF theory (Baez 1999) extends
the formalism of the Ponzano-Regge models to four dimensions. The Barrett-Crane models
(Barrett and Crane 1998; DePietri and Freidel 1999; Perez 2002) include local degrees of
freedom, but do not exactly relate to GTR. There exist more models, but instead of babbling
on, let me content myself with describing one in more detail, the Markopoulou-Smolin causal
spinfoam model.
Penrose (1975) has argued, and has continued to argue ever since, that quantizing gravity
bears the immense danger of quantum fluctuations of the spacetime imposing uncertainty
on the causal structure of spacetime. This implied that there would be a non-vanishing
7For a more detailed discussion of spinfoam models and how they relate to LQG, see Rovelli (2004,
Ch. 9). As far as I know, Reisenberger and Rovelli (1997) were the first ones to derive the formal framework
that encapsulates the dynamics in terms of sums over histories from canonical LQG. They started out by
expanding the exponential projection operator P̂ as a sum and gave each term of the sum a geometrical
interpretation as a spinfoam. A rigorous introduction to spinfoams gives Baez (1998).
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probability of causal interaction between originally spacelike-separated points. This in turn
would threaten the foundation of QFT, since its commutation relations require an a priori
causal structure such that spacelike-separated operators always commute. Penrose proposed
to resolve the tension by assuming the causal structure to be fixed a priori and thus to remain
“sharp.” This proposal is strangely reminiscent of past attempts in philosophy of science to
formulate a causal theory of time in that it equally assumes causal relations to logically or
metaphysically precede (spatio-)temporal relations.
Markopoulou and Smolin (1997, 1998) propounded a spinfoam model that realizes Pen-
rose’s proposal. Their causal spinfoam model combines the kinematical states of LQG, the
spin network states, with a discrete causal structure that captures the evolution of the kine-
matical states.8 This causal model is different from the original spinfoam proposals in that
it does not try to find the explicit actions the Hamiltonian can perform on the nodes of the
spin networks via a quantization procedure. Rather, it starts out from the kinematical states
of LQG and combines these discrete “spatial slices” by “null” edges. These null edges offer
a Planck-scale replica of the null geodesics we find in the continuous spacetimes of classical
GTR. The dynamical rules of combining the spatial slices into a “spacetime network” are
now such that information can only propagate in accordance with the discrete causal struc-
ture as encoded in the null edges. The resulting spacetime networks (or causal spinfoams)
exhibit the structure of a causal set. Causal sets C are endowed with a binary relation ≺
such that for all a, b, c ∈ C (i) a ≺ b and b ≺ c imply a ≺ c (transitivity), (ii) a 6≺ a (acyclic-
ity),9 and (iii) all past sets P(a) .= {b : b  a} are finite. Markopoulou and Smolin thus
combine what are apparently the advantages of spinfoam models with the approach to QG
based on causal sets (Bombelli et al. 1987, 1988; Brightwell et al. 2003; Moore 1988; Rideout
and Sorkin 2000). Markopoulou (2000a,b,c) has generalized the approach to what she dubs
quantum causal histories.10 Motivated by cosmology, these models are built to account for
observers internal to the universe which they observe. It might be fruitful to exploit these
models to formulate a theory of physical causation.
8Discrete models based on causal structures have also been proposed in the context of non-perturbative
Lorentzian quantum gravity from path integral methods which are not related to LQG; cf. e.g. Ambjørn
and Loll (1998). Livine and Oriti (2003, 2004) have developed a method for implementing causality in the
framework of the Barrett-Crane model.
9This amounts to ruling out closed causal curves a priori. A theorem due to Malament (1977) establishes
that if 〈M, gµν〉 and 〈M′, g′µν〉 are both past and future distinguishing spacetimes, and if there exists a
bijection f between M and M′ such that both f and f−1 preserve the causal precedence relations, then
f must be homeomorphism, i.e. a topological isomorphism between the manifolds. This implies that an
approach encoding only the causal structure cannot allow closed causal curves. This means that such
an approach does not command the resources to recover the metric structure of classical GTR in its full
generality. The spacetimes that can be captured in the continuum limit by a causal-set approach thus
represent a proper subset of those admitted by the Einstein equations.
10See also Hawkins et al. (2003).
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5.3.3 Canonical vs. covariant formulations
How are we to interpret the spinfoams physically? The traditional interpretation of Feynman
graphs conceives of the graphs as representing the dynamical possibilities of how a prepared
initial state may interact such as to evolve into the subsequently measured final state. If
we add up the weighted contributions of all graphs to the transition amplitude between the
prepared and the measured state, we can predict the probability with which the final state
will occur given the prepared initial state.
At first glance, imposing an analogous interpretation on spinfoams seems outright crazy
because, after all, the spin network states that mark off the spinfoam are supposed to repre-
sent instantaneous three-spaces—and all of space. Preparing or measuring the entire quan-
tum state of the universe is not only fiscally irresponsible, but impossible in principle. Dis-
regarding the problem of coupling matter to spin networks, the resolution of which would
certainly be necessary to understand the interaction between the material observer and the
observed spatial geometry, it seems impossible to separate the system to be prepared and
then measured from the observer, as the observer cannot be outside the spatial slice under
scrutiny. Let us hence delimit the scope of the experiment to a “medium-sized” region, per-
haps inside a detector or a similar measuring device, assuming the observer to suffer from
no interactions with the region under the microscope. Of course, this assumption idealizes
the true situation, where a chunk of “space” can hardly be prepared and measured and still
remain completely isolated from the rest of the universe. Since spin networks are eigenstates
of the area and volume operators, these delimiting states |si〉 and |sf〉 can be interpreted as
describing the results of geometrical measurements of these states in medium-sized regions.
The area and volume operators do not commute with the Hamiltonian and are therefore not
Dirac observables. They constitute, however, partial observables in Rovelli’s sense (Rovelli
2002d). The orthodox physical interpretation of spinfoams therefore maintains that the ini-
tial and final spin network states represent spatial regions and that the transition amplitudes
predict the probability with which a prepared initial state evolves to the measured final one.
The Hamiltonian theory as exposed in Section 5.2 provides an interpretation of the initial
and final states, i.e. of the spin networks. In order to obtain a complete physical interpre-
tation, one would like to have a more solid understanding of the relationship between the
Hamiltonian formulation of LQG and the covariant spinfoam models. Reisenberger and
Rovelli (1997) have supplied the sketch of a formal derivation of a spinfoam model from
Hamiltonian LQG. Filling in the details of such a derivation would amount to finding the
equivalent of the Feynman-Kac formula in the context of a QFT with a spatio-temporal
diffeomorphism invariance as a symmetry of the theory. The Feynman-Kac formula offers a
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method of solving the wave equations of the canonical formalism by relating them to covari-
ant path integrals. Establishing the link between LQG and spinfoams in a manner which is
simultaneously explicit and rigorous, and which captures full-fledged four-dimensional grav-
ity has as yet defied resolution. The most recent in a short series of partial successes has
been achieved by Noui and Perez (2005). They explicitly construct the projector P̂ from
the kinematical Hilbert space K of the canonical theory onto the physical Hilbert space H,
leading to a spinfoam model. Their construction of the physical inner product, however,
only applies to the three-dimensional, Euclidean case. The extension of their approach to
the Lorentzian case might be manageable.11 However, different techniques would be needed
in four dimensions, since the Hamiltonian and the spatial diffeomorphism constraints can no
longer be subsumed as one single constraint, as they can in three dimensions. The general
derivation of Lagrangian spinfoams from Hamiltonian LQG has so far eluded mathematically
rigorous formulation.
In order to mathematically understand the relation between covariant and canonical
formulations of a theory, it can be helpful to study the issue in the context of so-called
Gelfand-Naimark-Segal constructions. A GNS construction establishes that any positive
linear functional on a C*-algebra A, called a state, determines a unique cyclic *-representation
of A, up to unitary equivalence. A C*-algebra can be concretely enacted as a complex algebra
A of continuous linear operators over a complex Hilbert space H amended by two additional
properties: (i) A is topologically closed under the norm topology of operators, and (ii) A is
closed under the *-operation, which in this case is taking the adjoint of an operator. More
generally, * is a map from A to itself called involution. A *-representation of a C*-algebra A
on a Hilbert space H is a map pi : A→ Besa(H), where Besa(H) is the algebra of bounded,
essentially self-adjoint operators acting on H, such that (i) pi is a ring homomorphism which
carries the involution on A into an involution on operators, and (ii) pi is non-degenerate, i.e.
if A has an identity, then pi is unit-preserving.
The so-called (Streater-)Wightman (Streater and Wightman 1964), which is an applica-
tion of this GNS construction, and Osterwalder-Schrader (Osterwalder and Schrader 1973,
1975) reconstruction theorems in background-dependent QFT address the challenge of re-
covering the canonical QFT from a covariant path integral formulation. Streater and Wight-
man (1964) and Wightman (1956) showed that the vacuum expectation value distribution
together with the so-called Wightman axioms are sufficient to reclaim canonical QFT. These
axioms, however, have only been shown to apply under simplifying assumptions such as lower
dimensionality and no interaction. It remains open whether they can be satisfied in more
generic cases. Wightman’s reconstruction theorem applies to the Lorentzian case. Under
11Alejandro Perez, personal communication, 7 May 2004.
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some technical assumptions, the Osterwalder-Schrader reconstruction theorem asserts that a
Euclidean QFT can be Wick-rotated into a Lorentzian QFT satisfying Wightman’s axioms.
Since the inception of spinfoam models in LQG, results translating the reconstruction
theorems into the context of diffeomorphism-invariant theories have been few and far be-
tween. Perez and Rovelli (2001) have constructed functions representing transition ampli-
tudes between spin network states with a fixed number of “quanta of space” which can
be calculated perturbatively, using the sums-over-four-geometries approach sketched above.
The physical Hilbert space of the theory, they claim, can then be reconstructed from these
functions, provided that some conditions parallel to Wightman’s axioms obtain. In this sense
the Perez-Rovelli construction is also an application of the GNS reconstruction theorem,
one that generalizes Wightman’s construction to background-independent QFTs. Ashtekar,
Marolf, Moura˜o, and Thiemann (2000) have similarly extended Osterwalder and Schrader’s
general reconstruction scheme to include background-independent theories.
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6.0 CLASSICAL SINGULARITIES AND THEIR FATE IN QUANTUM
THEORY
6.1 SINGULARITIES IN THE CLASSICAL THEORY
The Hawking-Penrose singularity theorems in classical GTR have convinced many physicists
that spacetime singularities, understood as geodesic incompleteness in the context of these
theorems, generically occur for both gravitational collapse models as well as for a large
class of cosmological models.1 By generically, I mean that the singularities do not result
from idealizations, including symmetry idealizations such as homogeneity and isotropy. This
excludes the escape championed by Einstein who believed that the initial singularity in
the standard cosmological models of GTR, the so-called Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-
Walker (FLRW) spacetimes,2 vanished in more realistic and therefore somewhat asymmetric
spacetimes:
[...] one can seek to escape this difficulty [i.e. the occurrence of singularities] by pointing
out that the inhomogeneity of the distribution of stellar material makes our approximate
treatment illusory. (Einstein 1931, p. 237)3
A typical singularity theorem assumes that the spacetime satisfies everywhere an energy
condition, a causality condition, and a boundary or initial condition and then proves that
the spacetime is geodesically incomplete.4 The genericity of the geodesic incompleteness is
1On singularities in GTR, see Hawking and Ellis (1973, Chs. 8-10) and Wald (1984, Ch. 9). For a
philosophical discussion of singularities in GTR, see Earman (1995, Ch. 2).
2Appendix C offers a summary on the FLRW cosmological models of GTR.
3My translation. Original: “[Man kann] der Schwierigkeit durch den Hinweis darauf zu entgehen suchen,
dass die Inhomogenita¨t der Verteilung der Sternmaterie unsere approximative Behandlung illusorisch macht.”
4A curve γ(t) : I →M, where t ∈ I ⊆ R, is called a geodesic with respect to a connection ∇ on M just
in case, for every point p ∈ γ([I]) in the image of I under γ, ξb∇bξa = 0 where ξa is the tangent field to γ(t).
Thus, a geodesic is a curve whose tangent vector is propagated along the curve itself. A parametrization of a
curve γ(t) yielding ξb∇bξa = 0 is termed an affine parametrization. The affine parameter of a geodesic curve
is determined only up to a multiplicative and an additive constant expressing the freedom to renormalize
the tangent vectors by a constant scale factor and to choose an initial point, respectively. An incomplete
geodesic is then a geodesic which is inextendible in at least one direction despite its only having covered a
finite range of the affine parameter. More formally, a curve γ(t) : I →M is an incomplete geodesic iff γ(t) is
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inferred from the belief that the premises of the theorems must be satisfied in a wide class of
physically realistic models of GTR.5 So GTR is plagued by the occurrence of singularities.
Einstein himself was deeply worried about the occurrence of singularities in solutions
to his field equations. He insisted that the final unified field theory be free of singularities.
His aversion to spacetime singularities was clearly expressed, albeit in a slightly different
context, in a joint paper with Nathan Rosen:
A singularity brings so much arbitrariness into the theory [...] that it actually nullifies its
laws. [...] Every field theory, in our opinion, must therefore adhere to the fundamental
principle that singularities of the field are to be excluded. (Einstein and Rosen 1935, p. 73)
Similar reactions to singularities are very common, particularly among the older generation
of relativists. The younger members of the community, to a degree at least, have grown up
with singularities firmly in place and seem much less disturbed by their prevalence. Forty
years after its inception, any scandal loses its shock value as people grow accustomed to
its perpetual offense. However, this does not in itself make the infamy more acceptable.
The infamy of singularities, Einstein and Rosen tell us, consists of the fact that they bring
“arbitrariness into the theory.” What does this mean? At the 1979 centennial symposium
held at Princeton in honour of Einstein, Peter Bergmann hinted at the answer when he aired
what I take to be the community’s canonical reaction to the singularity theorems:
[Singularities] are intolerable from the point of view of classical field theory because a
singular region represents a breakdown of the postulated laws of nature. I think one can turn
this argument around and say that a theory that involves singularities and involves them
unavoidably, moreover, carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction [...] (Bergmann
1980, p. 156)
Bergmann’s statement, however, equivocates on two common, but different, meanings of the
term “singularity.” The first meaning is that of geodesic incompleteness. This is the sense
in which the theory “involves [singularities] unavoidably,” since it is geodesic incompleteness
which is established by the singularity theorems. But when Bergmann speaks of a singular
region representing a “breakdown of the postulated laws of nature,” he must have in mind a
different, albeit related, meaning. The laws of nature mentioned in the quotation, I take it,
are the equations of motion which govern the physical system at stake. In this second sense
an inextendible geodesic and I 6= R. Intuitively, in the case of a timelike geodesic, this means that a freely
moving observer might ride on a world line which is exhausted after only a finite proper time. A spacetime
(M, gµν) is geodesically incomplete iff it contains an incomplete geodesic. Finally, a spacetime is geodesically
complete if it is not geodesically incomplete. At least timelike and null geodesic completeness are widely
regarded as minimal conditions for a spacetime to be regular.
5However, the singularity theorems do not quite warrant such a strong conclusion as they suffer from
a number of loopholes. For the identification and discussion of these loopholes, consult Senovilla (1997,
particularly Sec. 6), which offers also the best account of the singularity theorems that I know.
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then, a region of spacetime is termed singular in case the equations of motions do not permit
to determine the dynamical evolution of the system in this region and thus fail to operate as
valid dynamical laws. In relativistic cosmology, of course, the pertinent equations of motion
are the Friedmann equations (C.5) and (C.6). These equations break down in singular regions
because if components of the metric, the curvature, or the energy-mass density diverge, the
equations become meaningless. Thus, singularities pose a threat to Laplacean determinism
in that the evolution of the physical system, which is governed by the field equations, is no
longer well-defined. It is not a priori clear that these two meanings that can be assigned to
the term “singular” must coincide in all instances.
To what extent do singularities compromise determinism? Let us return to the terminol-
ogy introduced in Chapter 4 for the purpose of answering this question. If the gravitational
field is given on a spacelike hypersurface Σ ⊂ M, then its value is determined (up to dif-
feomorphisms) within the whole domain of dependence of Σ. If there exists a spacelike
hypersurface Σ such that the domain of dependence of Σ equals the entire spacetime, then
data on Σ actually determines the physical state of the gravitational field through spacetime
and the spacetime is globally hyperbolic. The dynamical evolution of FLRW models occurs
regularly, i.e. for all specifications of k, Λ, and an “initial” value a(t0) = a0, there exists a
unique solution of the Friedmann equation (C.5), at least for all t > 0. Thus, all FLRW
models as they are defined by (C.1) in Appendix C, viz. for a manifold of topology 3+1
with time coordinate t ∈ R+, admit Cauchy surfaces. Therefore, the FLRW models are
globally hyperbolic, with their surfaces of transitivity6 as spacelike hypersurfaces with the
entire spacetime as their domain of dependence.
Thus, FLRW models guarantee Laplacean determinism, at least back to the big bang,
where determinism fails. Equally, several physical magnitudes diverge as the big bang is
approached going backward in time.7 What exactly happens at the “big bang”? For the
FLRW models, the Einstein field equations imply an initial singularity, a point where the
matter-energy density ρ blows up as the scale factor a approaches zero. But under reasonable
assumptions,8 general relativity astonishingly predicts that for FLRW models, there was a
time t = 0 in the finite past when a(0) = 0. Conservation of energy and momentum
implicates via (C.4) that ρ grows as a(t) decreases, which is what happens as we go back in
time. Equation (C.2)
3R =
k
a20a
2(t)
6See Appendix C.
7Of course, this “approaching” occurs in thought; i.e. it is not the case that physicists can make the time
turn backwards.
8For details, see Appendix C.
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shows that the same holds for the curvature scalar 3R of the three-spaces if k 6= 0. Since the
leading term in the expression (C.7) for the four-dimensional curvature scalar 4R goes with
1/a, 4R diverges for a→ 0 regardless of the values chosen for k. The Einstein field equations
are not necessary to see that ρ, 3R, and 4R diverge, which is why I call this type of scalar
singularity a kinematic singularity. If we conceive of the FLRW models as offering a picture
of a universe evolving in time, which is not problematic as, to repeat, we have a preferred
time coordinate defined by the isometries of the spacetime geometry, then we can call the
instantaneous states which the universe can in principle assume kinematic states, analogous
to the fac¸on de parler in canonical general relativity.
In this picture, the trajectories of the galaxies will converge as they are tracked backward
in cosmological time such as to finally intersect at the point t = 0. In contrast to an
analogous scenario with a fixed Newtonian spacetime as background, where the trajectories
of galaxies converge in one point as well, and where the density thus also diverges, spacetime
itself becomes singular in the relativistic model as all distances between “points in space”
tend to zero. This precludes that any physical law could be well-defined in this point of
convergence. The singular point is therefore excluded from the spacetime. This means that
the guarantee of Laplacean determinism cannot be extended through this initial singularity
since the physical fields, including the gravitational field and thus spacetime itself, are no
longer well-defined there. In this sense, the initial singularity is not part of spacetime and
space and time themselves lose whatever meaning they had for regular spacetime points.9
At least for the cosmological models at stake, hence, the initial singularity cannot “nul-
lify” determinism and the evolution of the gravitational field throughout all of (regular)
spacetime, but it halts the (backward) dynamical evolution of the universe at t = 0. This
can be seen from the Friedmann equation (C.5) which governs the dynamical evolution of the
scale factor a(t). For this equation, no regular solution a = a(t) can pass through a = 0 and
the evolution is ill-defined. As the Friedmann equation is nothing but one of the Einstein
equations encoding the dynamics of the FLRW models, the singularity is dynamical. The
impossibility to “dive through” the singular region is also captured by the geodesic incom-
pleteness that this region exhibits. It is captured insofar as geodesics constitute permissible
spatio-temporal paths of particles or radiation and their incompleteness means that for some
finite value of the affine parameter, the curve is exhausted but has not met an endpoint.10
9One is tempted to say, with Wittgenstein, that “the limits of my language are the limits of my world.”
(“Die Grenzen meiner Sprache sind die Grenzen meiner Welt.” Tractatus (5.6))
10A point p ∈ M is said to be a future endpoint of a future-directed non-spacelike curve γ : I →M just
in case for every neighbourhood U ⊆ M of p there exists an r ∈ I such that γ(r′) ∈ U for every r′ ∈ I
with r′ ≥ r. A past endpoint is defined analogously (where the “≥” sign must be replaced by a “≤” sign).
An endpoint may or may not be on the curve, but it must be in M. If a curve has an endpoint—future or
past—, it is extendible.
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The FLRW models are defined by a high degree of spacetime symmetries: they are all
spatially isotropic and homogeneous. Since we have reason to believe that our universe ap-
proximately exhibits these symmetries at large scales, isotropic and homogeneous spacetimes
must be taken physically seriously. Clearly, despite their empirical success as far as the large-
scale structure is concerned, these spacetime symmetries constitute idealizations of the real
cosmos. And it is these idealizations which may be taken to be responsible for the global
hyperbolicity of the models. The real cosmos is likely to contain stars collapsing into black
holes and similar events leading to singularities in the spacetime fabric, thus threatening
to rescind global hyperbolicity. Global hyperbolicity, and thus Laplacean determinism, is
reaffirmed, however, if the strong version of Roger Penrose’s cosmic censorship conjecture
is true. The strong version of this conjecture claims that no singularity—except a possible
initial singularity—can ever emanate causal signals to any observer living in a physically
realistic spacetime. In other words, the strong cosmic censorship conjecture demands that
all physically realistic spacetimes be globally hyperbolic. The weak companion hypothesis
requires that singularities resulting from gravitational collapse are “hidden” behind their
horizons such that they cannot send causal signals to any distant observer present in the
asymptotically flat spacetime region. This means that no gravitational collapse of matter
ever results in a “naked singularity,” but only in black holes.11
Although no proof or disproof of the conjecture has so far been forthcoming in spite
of vast efforts, there is evidence that it may be violated, even in its weak form, in non-
generic situations of highly symmetric gravitational collapse.12 Simultaneously, the corpus
of evidence suggesting that the conjecture, at least in its weak form, may be true for generic
physically realistic spacetimes has significantly grown over the last years.13 The violation
of either or both of the cosmic censorship hypotheses has consequences for the validity
of determinism. The existence and uniqueness theorems for the initial value problem for
Einstein’s equations, such as Theorem 10.1.3 in Wald (1984, p. 251f), guarantee that there
is a unique solution for which the initial value hypersurface Σ is a Cauchy surface. This
solution, of course, is unique only up to diffeomorphisms. The question then arises whether
this solution on the domain of dependence D(Σ) of Σ is maximal or can be further extended
beyond D(Σ). If D(Σ) is not maximal, then either a poor choice of initial value hypersurface
was made, or else, intuitively, naked singularities have developed to prevent maximality
11The strong version of the cosmic censorship conjecture is sometimes also said to demand that there
be no “naked” singularities. In this context, “non-naked” of course means that the spacetime is globally
hyperbolic. The weak conjecture does not imply the strong one, nor does the strong conjecture entail the
weak one. For a more detailed account of both versions of the cosmic censorship hypothesis, see Wald (1984,
Sec. 12.1).
12Cf. e.g. Shapiro and Teukolsky (1991).
13For a handy review, see Wald (1999).
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of the deterministic evolution licensed by the existence and uniqueness theorems. Be this
as it may, my main focus in this chapter is the big bang singularity and how it fares in
quantum general relativity. I will therefore mostly ignore the ramifications brought about
by gravitational collapse.
On a more general level, singularities may be considered as infecting the entire theory
which breeds them. As exemplified in the Bergmann quote above, physicists often take the
occurrence of singularities not so much as evidence against particular models of a theory,
but as evidence against the theory itself. Later in his life, Einstein seems to have concurred
with this attitude. In a departure from his earlier expectation that the singularity in FLRW
models was an artefact of the unrealistically high symmetries of the models, Einstein seems
to have shifted to placing his hopes in a unified field theory. He wrote in the appendix of
The Meaning of Relativity added for the second edition in 1945:
[f]or large densities of field and of matter, the field equations and even the field variables
which enter into them will have no real significance. One may not therefore assume the
validity of the equations for very high density of field and matter, and one may not conclude
that the “beginning of the expansion” must mean a singularity in the mathematical sense.
(Einstein 1950, p. 129)
With Stachel (1980b), we can interpret this passage to mean that the very concept of Tµν
will break down near the singular region. Alternatively, we may take Einstein to make the
weaker implication that the classical theory of general relativity will break down because
some variables in the field equations become meaningless, i.e. leaving open the possibility
that the breakdown originates in the gravity side of the field equations rather than in the
matter side.
Two strategies can been pursued to rectify the problem: either GTR is modified such
that some non-singular regime takes over in the vicinity of singularities while retaining the
empirically confirmed low energy limit; or show that quantizing GTR washes out the sin-
gularities of the classical theory. As it has been argued in Chapter 2, there exist strong
physical motivations to quantize GTR, which arise quite independently of the desire to con-
trol singularities. Furthermore, results from quantum theories have inspired an admittedly
pious hope that a quantization of GTR may smooth out at least some of its singularities,
including, perhaps, the initial singularity of FLRW models. This hope will be substantiated
in the next section. Taken together, these two facts suggest that the second route should be
pursued.
Note, however, that both the expectation that quantum effects will wash out the singu-
larities as well as independent motivations for quantizing gravity are required to fully justify
the second route. Many physicists, of which Kiefer (2005, p. 1f) is only a recent example,
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believe that this justification can be cut short by just stating that the singularity theorems
of classical GTR alone imply that a quantum theory of gravity is needed. But the dialectic
of the situation is different: the singularity theorems only constitute a motivation for the
disjunction of the two strategies mentioned above, not for one of them in particular. It would
be a perfectly rational reaction to the singularity theorems to claim that GTR must only
be modified or extended such that the singular regions also enjoy a regular regime, which
of course does not imply quantization. That is why independent motivations for quantizing
are needed to prefer the second strategy over the first.
6.2 DISSOLVING CLASSICAL SINGULARITIES
Before we embark upon an investigation on whether, and if so, to what extent, classical singu-
larities may be “smoothed away” by quantum effects, a characterization of what should count
as a quantum singularity is in order. Two distinct characterizations of quantum singularities
are offered in the literature, somewhat parallel to curvature and dynamical singularities in
the classical theory. There seems to be no consensus in the community as to how quantum
singularities should be characterized, beyond the usual acceptance of the fact that there be a
disjunction of two types. The first suggestion looks at the expectation values of “physical op-
erators,” i.e. of operators which are believed to correspond to important physical observables,
and checks whether they diverge as the spacetime region under examination is approached.
If so, proponents of this suggestion say that the quantum system is singular. Whenever the
distinction must be used in order to avoid confusion, I shall refer to this type of quantum
singularity as expectation-value singularity. The second proposal, what I wish to call dy-
namical (quantum) singularity, speaks of a singular quantum system whenever the state of
the system at one given instant does not uniquely determine the dynamical evolution of the
system for all other times.14 This is the case if the quantum Hamiltonian operator Ĥ, which
governs the dynamical evolution of the quantum system, is not essentially self-adjoint on a
C∞ domain with compact support in L2, a Hilbert space of square integrable functions.15
Whenever the Hamiltonian operator or its closure is self-adjoint, then the evolution operator
Û(t)
.
= exp(−iĤt) is unitary and well-defined for all t, avoiding a dynamical singularity.
The hope that the quantum may dissolve the singularities of classical GTR is nourished
14Horowitz and Marolf (1995, 5670) seem to have the same, or at least a sufficient similar, distinction
in mind. Brunnemann and Thiemann (2006a) use a slightly different dichotomy between local and global
singularities (see also Sec. 8.2.4), which goes back to Wald (1984, Ch. 9).
15A Hermitian operator Â is called essentially self-adjoint in case Â is closable and its closure is self-adjoint.
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by three families of considerations. First, there are cases in ordinary quantum mechanics
where quantum effects regularize the motion of point-like particles when it was singular at
the classical level. Second, there exists ample evidence that quantum matter violates some
of the energy conditions used to derive the singularity theorems. For instance, the strong
energy condition may no longer be satisfied in the very early epochs of the universe. Third,
in some curved spacetimes, the dynamics of quantum fields is well-defined and unique despite
the appearance of singularities in the background spacetime. In these examples, the classical
singularity does not bring about a dynamical quantum singularity in the relevant QFT in
curved spacetime. Let me address the three families in turn.
For the first grounds for hope, consider a system of N point-like particles in three-
dimensional Euclidean space R3 with interactions determined by a so-called Kato potential.16
The Kato potentials include attractive Coulomb potentials and potentials of the form r−m
for |m| < 3/2, i.e. they cover a rather general and important class of interactions. It has
long been know that the N -body problem in Newtonian mechanics suffers from singularities.
These singularities arise either from a collision of the point-like bodies or when bodies escape
to infinity in finite time. A theorem by Hugo von Zeipel establishes that there exist no other
possibilities.17 Ziahong Xia (1992) proved the so-called Painleve´ conjecture which surmises
that there exist solutions of the Newtonian N -body problem with non-collision singularities
for N > 3.
The reason why these singularities—both collision and non-collision—become pertinent
for present purposes is that it turns out that the dynamics of N -body systems is less singular
in ordinary quantum mechanics than in Newtonian mechanics. For interactions captured by
Kato potentials, Hunziker (1966) has shown that every initial state with well-defined particle
observables, such as position, momentum and energy, enjoys a regular global time evolution
in these observables.18 Thus, the quantum evolution smooths the classical singularities.
Whether this smoothing occurs generically for N -body quantum systems, including those
with arbitrarily large N and with different interactions, is not known. Radin (1977) has
proven that in case the number of particles involved is infinite and the interactions among
them are sufficiently repulsive, then the quantum dynamics too is ill-defined. This result, to
be sure, does not change the verdict that in some cases at least, classical singularities in the
dynamical behavior of N -body systems are spirited away by the quantization of the system
16The original Kato condition is found in Kato (1951, p. 197). A different formulation gives Hunziker
(1966, p. 300). I have no idea whether the two conditions are equivalent, as of course they should.
17Cf. Saari and Xia (1995).
18Kato (1951) previously established the significant assumption of Hunziker (1966) according to which the
Hamiltonian which governs the evolution of the system of N bodies is essentially self-adjoint, i.e. that its
closure is self-adjoint.
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and its dynamics.
The second set of considerations concerns possible violations of one or several of the
conditions invoked in the proofs of the singularity theorems. Could it be the case that
in a semi-classical or full quantum theory of gravity, these conditions can no longer be
expected to hold?19 There exists a multitude of local energy conditions often discussed in
the context of classical GTR, only two of which shall be mentioned here.20 The weak energy
condition requires for any timelike vector field V µ that the energy-momentum tensor satisfies
TµνV
µV ν ≥ 0 everywhere in M. Physically, the condition demands that the local energy
density is positive as measured by any timelike observer. In a suitable orthonormal frame,
the components of the energy-momentum tensor take the form of a perfect fluid defined by
T µˆνˆ =

ρ 0 0 0
0 p1 0 0
0 0 p2 0
0 0 0 p3
 , (6.1)
where ρ is the rest energy density and the pi are the three principal pressures. If the energy-
momentum tensor can be written in the form (6.1), the weak condition requires that both
ρ ≥ 0 and ∀i, ρ+pi ≥ 0. A spacetime satisfies the strong energy condition iff, for any timelike
vector field V µ, (
Tµν − T
2
gµν
)
V µV ν ≥ 0
holds anywhere in M, where T is the trace of the energy-momentum tensor, T = Tµνgµν .21
For a perfect fluid (6.1), this means that the strong condition is satisfied just in case ∀i, ρ+
pi ≥ 0 and ρ+
∑
i pi ≥ 0.
The strong condition does not, in general, imply the weak condition—nor vice versa. For
a perfect fluid, if
∑
i pi > 0, then the weak condition will imply the strong one, whereas for∑
i pi < 0, the strong condition entails the weak one. In case
∑
i pi = 0, the two conditions
become identical. If the rest energy density and all principal pressures are positive, both
conditions will automatically be satisfied. At the very least, the principal pressures cannot
become too negative, i.e. there cannot be strong tensions equal in magnitude or larger than
ρ, without violating the energy conditions.
19The initial singularity in FLRW models may be unacceptable because the models cannot be extrapolated
back into the Planck regime of the early universe for thermodynamic reasons, as Bekenstein (1989) has shown
for radiation-dominated FLRW universes. This result has been generalized by Schiffer (1991).
20For a great review and further discussion of various energy conditions, see Visser (1995, Ch. 12).
21Some authors include in the definition of the strong condition that the inequality must also hold for null
vector fields; see e.g. Senovilla (1997). I follow Visser (1995) who does not extend the condition to cover null
vector fields as well. The strong energy condition was first introduced independently by Komar (1956) and
by Raychaudhuri (1955, 1957).
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It turns out that the more vulnerable candidate for violations appears to be the strong
energy condition, which is assumed, at least in its averaged version, in most singularity theo-
rems. Already at the classical level, the strong condition may be violated, e.g. for a classical
massive scalar field.22 The classical scalar field satisfies all other energy conditions. Because
an increasing number of singularity theorems require weaker energy conditions, it is thus
not entirely clear whether singularities can be avoided altogether by having a massive scalar
field violate the strong condition. The quantum cousin of the classical massive scalar field
infringes the weak condition, as was first formally established for axiomatic QFT by Epstein,
Glaser, and Jaffe (1965).23 However, their proof has no stringent implications for the strong
condition. If the spacetime contains a massive scalar field prepared in a coherent quantum
state, it also violates the strong energy condition and the singularity can be avoided by a
“big bounce.”24 Because a classical scalar field also violates the strong energy condition,
however, one is lead to believe that “bouncing” may also be possible if the gravitational field
is coupled to a purely classical scalar field.25 As Borde and Vilenkin (1997) have argued,
non-singular bouncing occurs generically in inflationary scenarios, which are likely to violate
already the weak energy condition. It may be the case, they continue, that all averaged
energy conditions are violated in these scenarios. This may well be interpreted as result-
ing from quantum effects, as inflation is expected to be powered by quantum mechanisms.
Vilenkin (1983) has proposed an inflationary model without recurrence to bouncing: after
its creation ex nihilo, it “quantum tunnels” into a de Sitter spacetime with finite curvature
ab initio. The regularity seems to be achieved by virtue of the Higgs field contained in the
model spacetime, and this field’s instanton effects. Further violations of energy conditions
play on the Casimir effect, on Hawking radiation from evaporating black holes, on distortions
of the quantum-electrodynamic vacuum called “squeezed vacuum,” on the Hartle-Hawking
vacuum, and perhaps on other vacua (Visser 1995, Sec. 12.3).
Let me turn to the third family of considerations fuelling the hope that a quantum the-
ory may exhibit perfectly regular dynamics. Horowitz and Marolf (1995) have investigated
the occurrence of dynamical quantum singularities in certain models of quantum field the-
ory on curved classical spacetime with singularities. They have analyzed static spacetimes
22Cf. Hawking and Ellis (1973, pp. 95-96) and Visser (1995, Sec. 12.3.1).
23For a discussion of the validity of the so-called averaged energy conditions, which require the conditions
to be valid only when averaged along sufficiently long null curves, see Yurtsever (1990), who conjectured
that at least the averaged weak condition might hold for a large class of models of QFT on asymptotically
flat spacetimes. Klinkhammer (1991) has shown that for spacetimes with non-trivial topologies, free massive
scalar fields can violate even the averaged weak energy condition.
24Cf. Parker and Fulling (1973). Davies (1977) has found that quantum-field theoretic effects avoid the
initial singularity under a wide range of circumstances.
25Cf. Bekenstein (1989, p. 971).
112
with timelike curvature singularities and have found that test particles exhibit non-singular
dynamical behaviour in case they are treated quantum mechanically. According to their
analysis, it turns out that the regularity of the evolution of the test wave packet results from
an effective repulsive potential which shields the classical singularity. Konkowski, Helliwell,
and Wieland (2003) have extended Horowitz and Marolf’s analysis by considering classically
singular cylindrical and spherical spacetimes which are probed by quantum particles rather
than by trajectories of classical observers. They reach a similar conclusion as Horowitz and
Marolf, except that they find cases where the repulsion of the effective potential is not quite
sufficiently large as to keep the probability of the quantum mechanical particle penetrating
into the singular region small enough. Furthermore, it has been found that the Ellis-Schmidt
type of the classical singularity does not matter and neither does—in most cases at least—
the type of quantum probe, i.e. whether the quantum particle is a scalar field, a null vector
field, or a spinor field.26 However, quantum fields do not always evolve regularly on curved
background spacetimes with classical singularities. Konkowski and her collaborators have
studied the so-called “Levi-Civita spacetime,” some of which “contain” classical singularities
and some of which do not (Konkowski et al. 2004, 2005). Those Levi-Civita spacetimes which
are classically singular generically still suffer from a singularity when probed with a quantum
field, while the classically regular Levi-Civita spacetimes remain regular with quantum fields
evolving on them.
So do quantum effects generically wash out the initial singularity? There exists a plethora
of further examples and counterexamples in the literature. This wealth of possibilities makes
it impossible to draw any general conclusion. While some of the results discussed in this
section can be taken as indication that quantum effects may generically smooth out classical
singularities, at the bare minimum they induce the hope that a full QTG will be free of the
singularities that so persistently plague the classical theory of general relativity. But this
hope is a pious one, as the examples discussed here and elsewhere differ significantly from
what can be expected to happen in a full QTG. First, whether or not classical cosmological
singularities are smoothed out seems to depend on the quantization strategy. The typical
strategy in canonical quantum cosmology is to freeze out degrees of freedom already at the
classical level by restricting oneself to isotropic and homogeneous solutions of the Einstein
equations. The highly symmetric system is then quantized a` la Wheeler-DeWitt. It turns
out in geometrodynamics that if one tries to construct a quantum operator corresponding
to the scale factor starting from the basic ADM variables, the spectrum of this operator
is not bounded above as it is in models based on LQG. The ADM quantization thus leads
26Ellis and Schmidt (1977) have introduced a classification of classical singularities into quasi-regular,
non-scalar curvature and scalar curvature.
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to what I termed an expectation value singularity. Bojowald and Morales-Te´cotl (2004,
Sec. 3) and Ashtekar, Bojowald, and Lewandowski (2003a, p. 246) claim that the indirect
quantization procedure followed by LQC, as discussed in Section 7.2, is responsible for the
fact that the eigenvalues of its scale factor operator will not go beyond a certain maximum.
Husain and Winkler (2004) have indeed shown that if one opts for a quantization procedure
akin to the one employed in LQC, then the cosmological singularity vanishes in quantum
cosmology based on geometrodynamics as well. Hence, they conclude, it is not the nature
of the classical variables which can be held responsible for the resolution of the singularity,
i.e. the choice made between ADM and loop variables, but rather the quantization strategy
pursued.
Even if the most promising quantization technique is chosen, however, success is not
guaranteed. The second important point to be considered is that the extreme astrophysical
situation encountered in the very early universe requires non-perturbative methods since we
cannot assume the fields to be sufficiently small for a perturbative expansion to be well-
behaved. Furthermore, in any theory in which the fields are embedded in the geometry, the
fact that the classical geometry degenerates as the initial singularity is approached demands
background independence. Canonical quantizations of GTR seem to be able to offer both.
Let us turn to an analysis of cosmological models based on LQG then.
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7.0 INTRODUCING LOOP QUANTUM COSMOLOGY
In cosmological models based on LQG, henceforth referred to as loop quantum cosmology
(LQC), the novel quantization strategy indeed appears to lead to the dissolution of both
the kinematic as well as the dynamical singularities of the classical theory.1 The strategy
pursued by Bojowald, who spearheaded many of the developments in LQC, and his fellow
loop quantum cosmologists differs from the traditional Wheeler-DeWitt approach insofar as
it retains the full theory in the early stages of the quantization procedure, and only then
confines itself to quantum states in the kinematical Hilbert space which exhibit isotropy and
homogeneity. More specifically, the strategy refrains from imposing any additional symmetry
requirements on the classical models, then proceeds to solve the Gauss and vector constraint
equations to obtain the kinematical Hilbert space K of the full theory, just as in full LQG,
and only then freeze out degrees of freedom by only considering highly symmetric kinematic
states. Imposing these symmetries drastically simplifies the Hamiltonian constraint, which
now becomes explicitly solvable and yields the physical Hilbert space of LQC. In this sense,
LQC is not merely an exercise in cosmology, but can also be seen as an attempt to arrive at
a toy model of the full theory, hopefully offering a few insights pertaining to the structure of
the physical Hilbert space of the full theory. I believe that this latter goal cannot be attained
due to the excessive symmetry demands which were imposed on the kinematical states. It
will actually turn out, at least in one particular scenario discussed in Section 8.2.1, that the
Hamiltonian constraint equation is only solved by a single state, which by itself constitutes
the physical Hilbert space of LQC. This conclusion strongly suggests that too many degrees
of freedom may have been frozen out.
In the classical theory, as is explicated in Appendix C, the density ρ, the three-dimension-
al spatial curvature 3R, and the four-dimensional spatio-temporal curvature 4R—all scalar
quantities—tend to grow beyond all bounds as the scale factor a tends to zero. In LQC,
however, it turns out that the inverse scale factor is bounded and that the universe thus has a
1For an introduction to the application of LQG to cosmology, see Bojowald and Morales-Te´cotl (2004);
but see also Ashtekar (2002) and Rovelli (2004, Sec. 8.1). For the mathematical foundations of LQC, see
Ashtekar et al. (2003a). Bojowald (2004, 2005) are the most recent review articles.
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maximal spatial (and spatio-temporal) curvature and a maximal density and thus avoids the
kinematic singularity of the classical theory, although with an important qualification as will
be discussed in Chapter 8. One can construct a self-adjoint curvature operator on the Hilbert
space of spatially isotropic and homogeneous spin network states in the kinematic Hilbert
space K. This operator, it turns out, is vested with a spectrum bounded from above. This
entails that even for a universe of vanishing size, the curvature does not blow up. In fact,
like in the classical case, the curvature grows as the scale factor decreases. But unlike the
classical universe, the quantum universe changes to a different regime after having reached
a maximum curvature. This second regime actually tames the quantum curvature such as
to drive it into zero as the scale factor vanishes. As this effect may testify, the mathematical
properties of the loop quantization have indeed far-reaching physical consequences.
Furthermore, another, somewhat parallel, delight awaits us at the dynamical level: the
dynamical singularity also vanishes in LQC, although again, this claim will be qualified
in Chapter 8. The fact that the curvature did not diverge for arbitrarily small volumes
of the universe may incline us to assume that the dynamical evolution of the LQC model
remains non-singular—even at the big bang. This expectation is not entirely disappointed.
As in LQG, the evolution is governed by the Hamiltonian constraint equation, which is
a wave equation with the constraint operator acting on the isotropic, homogeneous states
of kinematical LQC. These kinematical states depend on the scale factor a (and perhaps
other physical fields). The scale factor a is used as a fiducial time with respect to which
the isotropic, homogeneous spin network states evolve. But since a assumes discrete values,
partial derivatives with respect to it must be replaced in LQC with finite difference operators.
Thus, the Friedmann-Wheeler-DeWitt equation of evolution, aka the Hamiltonian constraint
equation for the symmetry-reduced theory, becomes a difference equation, as opposed to a
differential equation. Evolution occurs in discrete steps, although the notion of discreteness
at work here will have to be clarified. Numerical studies of this evolution equation (Bojowald
2001a,b) have revealed that the dynamical behaviour of the LQC models on and around n = 0
is (almost) non-singular, where n symbolizes the iteration step of the discrete evolution,
and that for sufficiently large n, the correct semi-classical limit follows in the form of the
expected Friedmann evolution. The regularity of the evolution around the big bang permits a
continuation of the model into a new realm of negative n. In other words, one can evolve right
through what used to be a singularity into a mirror universe which did not exist classically
as the classical evolution ground to a halt at the initial singularity. The n, which serve as a
substitute for a time here, continue to decrease beyond the big bang as they adopt negative
values. The dynamical singularity, despite claims to the contrary, does not vanish altogether
as a singular residue survives the quantization.
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Before I proceed to explicate these two aspects of how LQC washes out classical singu-
larities, and in what sense and to what extent it does so, it should be noted that alternative
approaches to QG may equally offer a resolution of singularities. While in classical GTR—
as well as in cosmology in a Newtonian spacetime—, the trajectories of any two galaxies
must intersect in the finite past, including quantum effects according to the tastes of any
QTG may prevent galaxies from coming arbitrarily close to one another and undergo a “big
bounce” rather than a “big bang.” Thus, it seems as if QG quite generally might open up the
possibility of pre-bang universes. The application of string theory, for example, to cosmology
suggests that the big bang is either replaced by a transitional phase from an accelerated to
a decelerated expansion of the universe or is the result of the collision of different “branes.”
According to the first scenario, the so-called pre-big bang scenario, the universe has existed
forever and was incredibly empty at first.2 As the forces gradually gained in strength, matter
began to clump and formed black holes in some regions and rebounded in big bangs, thus
creating effectively distinct universes. The second scenario, the so-called ekpyrotic scenario,
suggests that our universe occupies a multi-dimensional membrane or “brane” which lives
in a higher-dimensional space. This brane might have collided with another brane, thereby
releasing kinetic energy as matter and radiation and thus resulting in something with obser-
vational signatures very much like the big bang in standard cosmology.3 Veneziano (2004),
who gives a popular introduction in cosmological models based on string theory, claims that
these scenarios both afford observational signatures just sufficiently different from those of
conventional inflationary models that they might be registered by the LIGO and VIRGO
observatories. Furthermore, the frequency distributions predicted by the two scenarios also
differ from one another sufficiently so that they should be distinguishable by the LIGO and
VIRGO data.
According to Veneziano, both the pre-big bang and the ekpyrotic scenarios offer a per-
fectly regular dynamical evolution through what used to be the singular big bang. It is worth
emphasizing, however, that at least the ekpyrotic universe still suffers from (a mild version
of) the big bang singularity. Khoury (2004) concedes that a formal proof that the transition
through the big bang can successfully be completed is still missing. The regularity of the
dynamical evolution of the universe also at the big bang constitutes an assumption of the
scenario, rather than a formally derived result. For LQC, the claim is stronger: given the
theoretical framework of LQG, the regularity can be established under the usual assumptions
of global symmetries that cosmological models must satisfy. As we will discover in paragraph
2Cf. Gasperini and Veneziano (2003) for a detailed review of the pre-big bang model.
3The original article on the ekpyrotic model is Khoury et al. (2001), a more recent review can be found
in Khoury (2004).
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7.3, however, this claim must also be enjoyed with an important qualification.
The remainder of this section is divided, like Gaul, into three parts: the first subsection
gives a brief account of the foundations and the main technical choices made by LQC, followed
by subsections on the fate of the kinematical and dynamical singularities respectively.
7.1 FOUNDATIONS OF LOOP QUANTUM COSMOLOGY
The main source for this subsection is Ashtekar, Bojowald, and Lewandowski (2003a). Its
rather technical account of LQC shall be explained with less mathematical rigour, but with
hopefully correspondingly wider appeal; it is abbreviated and adapted to my notation as
introduced in Chapter 5.
Returning again to the terminology introduced in Section 3.2, where we introduced a
distinction between spatio-temporal background fields Bi and dynamical fields Dj and an
analogous distinction between spacetime and dynamical symmetries. We have seen in Chap-
ters 4 and 5 how the dynamical symmetry of GTR, understood in the sense of Section 3.2,
or something just like it, is encoded in both the classical and the quantum theories via con-
straint equations. Quantum cosmology, like generally relativistic cosmology, assumes certain
spacetime symmetries, where the original definition of “spacetime symmetries” must be ad-
justed as follows. Originally, a spacetime symmetry was a mapping which leaves all the fields
Bi invariant, i.e. a diffeomorphism φ :M→M such that φ∗Bi = Bi for all i. Because GTR
entertains no background fields Bi at all, however, it seems as if this definition has become
vacuous. If we extend this definition to equally apply to the now dynamical spacetime struc-
ture, we can again contentfully speak of spacetime symmetries. Let us say, therefore, that a
spacetime symmetry is a mapping which leaves dynamical field(s) Dj encoding the spacetime
structure invariant, i.e. a diffeomorphism φ ∈ Diff(M) such that φ∗Dj = Dj for all j.
This re-definition works just fine for classical relativistic cosmology, but it will not be
applicable tel quel to the quantum states. One might argue that such an application of the
concept of spacetime symmetry to quantum states is unnecessary for the simple reason that
one might as well pick the relevant symmetric spacetimes already at the classical level and
then simply perform a quantization of this reduced theory. Such a resort, however, would
suffer from two disadvantages: first, one would have to establish the equivalence of the state
space obtained by a loop quantization of the classically reduced theory on the one hand
and the subspace of symmetric states of full LQG on the other; second, even if that can be
done—and in principle it should be possible—, the first road, unlike the second, would not
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easily enable the interpretation of the quantum states of the reduced theory as symmetric
states of the full quantum theory without recourse to the classical level. As a consequence,
the reduction to symmetric states at the level of the full quantum theory appears much
more attractive. However, this strategy presupposes a concept of symmetry at the level of
the quantum theory.
To introduce such a concept, however, is not entirely trivial. Building on the symmetry
concept as it has been developed in the context of the (classical) fibre bundle formalism for
bundles with connections, Bojowald and Kastrup (2000) have proposed a definition of what
should count as a symmetric state in the quantum theory.4 They repudiate as inappropriate
for diffeomorphism-invariant theories the usual procedure for determining symmetric states
via the invariance of the action of the symmetry group on the physical Hilbert space as this
would lead to trivial results because the rotation group is a subgroup of the diffeomorphism
group. Bojowald and Kastrup define symmetric quantum states invoking the theory of con-
nections which are invariant under the action of symmetry groups on principal fibre bundles.
With this definition at hand, they identify spaces of symmetric quantum states with certain
spaces of spin-network states. Interestingly, it turns out that these spaces of symmetric
quantum states can be equipped with a scalar product such that they form a Hilbert space
again.
One problem arises in any attempt to implement this strategy: not all constraints have
been solved in LQG, which means that effectively the physical Hilbert space containing
those states amongst which one would like to select the states exhibiting the symmetry of
interest is not yet available. The procedure must be carried out starting from the kinematic
Hilbert space, then selecting the symmetric states, and then solve the reduced constraint
equations on the spaces of symmetric states. This slight change of procedure bears advan-
tages as well as disadvantages. First, given the collective failure of solving the Hamiltonian
constraint and of thus finding the physical Hilbert space, one would hope that reducing
the theory at the kinematic level might simplify the Hamiltonian constraint just enough to
find the symmetry-reduced, but physical—as opposed to purely kinematic—Hilbert space.
Furthermore, success with this modified strategy would instill the hope that one might re-
ceive pivotal insights concerning the quantization of the full theory from solving the reduced
Hamiltonian constraint. On the other hand, however, one must be aware of the fact that
there is no guarantee that these symmetric states in the kinematic Hilbert space which solve
the reduced constraints coincide with the symmetric states in the physical Hilbert space of
4For the relevant definition of symmetric spaces in the context of the fibre bundle formalism as Bojowald
and Kastrup apply it, see Kobayashi and Nomizu (1969, p. 225). The canonical introduction to fibre bundles
is found in Kobayashi and Nomizu (1963).
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the full theory. In particular, the reduction from a field theory to a mechanical system with
one degree of freedom may be sufficiently radical to alter some of the characteristics of the
full theory.
For open models, i.e. for classical cosmological models where the spatial curvature is
negative or zero and Σ is diffeomorphic to R3, the symmetry group, denoted by Sym(Σ), is
the Euclidean group.5 In this situation, as is usual in cosmology, one can find a fiducial metric
0qab. Given
0qab, one can fix an orthonormal triad
0eai and a co-triad
0ωia. In the full theory
of LQG, the gravitational phase space is coordinatized by pairs (Aia, E
a
i ), representing fields
on the three-dimensional manifolds Σ, viz. an SU(2)-connection and a triplet of (densitized)
vector fields, respectively. Ashtekar, Bojowald, and Lewandowski (2003a) declare a pair
(A′ia, E
′a
i ) of base fields on Σ to be symmetric just in case for every σ ∈ Sym(Σ) there exists
a local (Gauss) gauge transformation g : Σ→ SU(2) such that
(σ∗A′, σ∗E ′) = (g−1A′g + g−1dg, g−1E ′g). (7.1)
Ashtekar, Bojowald, and Lewandowski (2003a) note that for every symmetric pair (A′, E ′)
which satisfies the Gauss and the spatial diffeomorphism constraints, there exists a unique
pair (A,E) which is equivalent to (A′, E ′) such that
A = c˜ 0ωi τi, E = p˜
√
0q 0ei τ
i, (7.2)
where the τs are essentially the Pauli matrices, 0q the determinant of the fiducial metric,
and c˜ and p˜ are the constants which carry the non-trivial information contained in (A′, E ′).
One can therefore change the base canonical variables from A and E to c˜ and p˜. The fiducial
metric 0qab can be rescaled by a constant factor k
2 without consequence for the physical
situation. Blowing up or shrinking the universe like this merely amounts to a rescaling
of the only degree of freedom left by an arbitrary constant. Under such a rescaling the
now canonical pair (c˜, p˜) becomes (k−1c˜, k−2p˜).6 As such rescaling cannot make a physical
difference, c˜ and p˜ cannot have a direct physical interpretation. Physical meaning is only
gained once new variables independent of the particular choice of the fiducial metric are
introduced. A convenient choice with the required independence is
c = V
1
3
0 c˜ and p = V
2
3
0 p˜, (7.3)
5The Euclidean group E(n) is the symmetry group of the n-dimensional Euclidean space. It is a subgroup
of the affine group, and has as subgroups the group of translations T and the orthonormal group O(n). Each
element of E(n) can be represented as a combination of translations and orthonormal transformations, i.e.
of rotations and rotoinversions.
6Because of (7.2) and 0qab = 0ωia
0ωjbδij and
0qab = 0eai
0ebjδ
ij respectively.
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where V0 is the volume of a “cell of space” in terms of the fiducial metric. For reasons of
simplicity, this cell is typically assumed to be cubical with respect to 0qab. The symplectic
structure of the gravitational symmetric phase space defined by (7.2) can then be expressed
without recourse to the fiducial metric (or the unit cell volume):
Ωsgrav ∝ dc ∧ dp. (7.4)
Finally, as the Gauss and the spatial diffeomorphism constraint equations have already
been solved, the only remaining constraint equation is the Hamiltonian constraint, which
corresponds to a lapse constant across Σ, analogous to the N of the ADM formulation.
Re-expressed in terms of (c, p), it becomes
−6β−2 c2 sgnp
√
|p| (+8piGCmatter) = 0, (7.5)
where β designates the Immirzi parameter, sgn the signum function, and Cmatter stands for
the additional term in the constraint which would arise from a matter Hamiltonian. This
completes the construction of the phase space for LQC.
7.2 THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE CURVATURE SINGULARITY
What are the elementary functions of the basic canonical variables on the classical phase
space which will translate unambiguously into quantum analogues? In full LQG, this role is
played by functions of the SU(2)-connections A—the holonomies—and the smeared triads.
In the symmetry-reduced case of LQC, the almost periodic functions g(c) of c make up the
configuration variables,7 and the momentum variables are essentially given by p. The vector
space of g(c) corresponds to the space of cylindrical functions on the configuration space
of the full theory and is called the space of cylindrical functions of symmetric connections
in Ashtekar, Bojowald, and Lewandowski (2003a), denoted by CylS. In terms of classical
geometry, the momentum variable p determines the physical volume of an elementary cell
via V = |p|3/2. As LQC assumes homogeneity and isotropy, volume scales and length scales
can be used interchangeably. Thus,
√|p| can naturally be interpreted as a length. Together,
the configuration and momentum variables g(c) and p build the holonomy-flux algebra such
that the only non-vanishing Poisson bracket between these elementary functions is given by
{g(c), p} = 8piβG
6
∑
j
(iµjξj)e
i
µjc
2 , (7.6)
7And not the c’s themselves, as no operator directly corresponding to c can be defined on KS .
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where µj ∈ R, ξj ∈ C and the j’s are labelling edges and run over a finite number of integers.
As a matter of fact, the right-hand side of (7.6) is again a function in CylS and the algebra
of elementary variables is thus closed. As the canonical momenta are all proportional to p,
they commute with one another. As a consequence, the momentum (or triad) representation
conveniently exists.
As mentioned in the previous paragraph 7.1, the symmetric quantum states in the kine-
matic Hilbert space K form a Hilbert space themselves, symbolized by KS. The Hilbert
space KS is not separable, i.e. it does not have a countable basis. This misfortune compli-
cates the concept of discreteness, as will become clear immediately.8 The canonical variables
turned quantum operators work in analogy to the full theory: ĝ corresponds to the configu-
ration operator and p̂ to the triad operator of the full theory. The almost periodic functions
〈c|µ〉 = eiµc/2 constitute a complete orthonormal basis in KS.9 Both orthogonality and nor-
malizability lead to important conceptual consequences, as to be discussed below. It turns
out that these basis vectors are eigenstates of the momentum operator p̂ and that we have
p̂ |µ〉 = 8piβµ
6
|µ〉 .= pµ |µ〉. (7.7)
This is the promised momentum representation.10 In order to attain a physical interpretation
of µ, we can use the relation V = |p|3/2 and rewrite (7.7) as
V̂ |µ〉 =
(
8piβ|µ|
6
)3/2
|µ〉 .= Vµ |µ〉. (7.8)
8However, there is also an important sense in which the non-separability of the Hilbert space enables
discreteness. A Hilbert space representation which disallows operators that could be associated with a smooth
spacetime geometry, such as a connection operator, only seems possible in a non-separable (kinematical)
Hilbert space. I will return to this issue in Section 9.1 when I discuss the polymer representation proposed
by Ashtekar et al. (2003b).
9 The orthogonality follows from the construction of these functions as almost periodic functions on
the Bohr-compactification on R. While the details are somewhat too technical to review here, the in-
tegrator can be simplified by the following formula:
∫
f(c)dµ(c) = limT→∞(2T )−1
∫ T
−T f(c)dc (courtesy
of Martin Bojowald, 8 December 2005). Thus, 〈µ(c)|µ′(c)〉 = limT→∞(2T )−1
∫ T
−T exp(i(µ
′ − µ)c/2)dc =
2/(µ′ − µ) limT→∞ T−1 sin((µ′ − µ)T/2) = 0. The normalizability is a straightforward calculation. In total,
we thus obtain 〈µ|µ′〉 = δµµ′ , where δµµ′ is the Kronecker delta rather than a distribution.
10In the reduced model of LQC, this representation can be shown to be unitarily equivalent to any one
making reference to V0 but it has the advantage that the symplectic structure to be quantized does not
involve V0 and that V0 does thus not have to be fixed prior to quantization. As a result of this unitary
equivalence, quantum physics is interpreted to be independent of the choice of V0. Hence, it makes sense to
eliminate references to V0. In the full theory, the situation is more complicated, cf. Ashtekar et al. (2003a,
p. 243).
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Hence, for a universe in the quantum state |µ〉, the physical volume of a cell of space in
Planck units is given by |µ|3/2, up to a constant factor. For example, the physical volume of
the cell in the quantum state |µ = 1〉 is (8piβ/6)3/2 in terms of Planck units.11
What is the spectrum of p̂? Surprisingly, it is R rather than a discrete subset of R.
In the full theory, the spectrum of the momentum operator and other geometric operators
such as area and volume operators assume eigenvalues in a discrete subset of the real line.
Ashtekar, Bojowald, and Lewandowski (2003a) explain that the high degree of symmetry
imposed on the kinematic states leads to the collapse of the two quantum numbers of the
full theory—the continuous label e denoting the edges and the discrete label j on the edges
denoting their “spins”—into a single continuous label µ. But this does not imply that the
spectrum of the momentum operator is continuous: since its eigenstates are normalizable—
indeed the factor (2T )−1 in footnote 9 was chosen such that 〈µ|µ′〉 = δµµ′—the spectrum
of the operator is discrete by definition. Were the spectrum truly continuous, only distri-
butionally “normalizable” eigenstates would exist. For separable Hilbert spaces, the general
habit of calling a spectrum discrete in case the corresponding eigenstates are normalizable
implies the usual understanding of a discrete spectrum of eigenvalues. However, for non-
separable Hilbert spaces, i.e. for Hilbert spaces with non-denumerable bases, this habit can
lead to discrete spectra which take all values in R. Clearly, the present notion of discrete-
ness offers a counterintuitive analysis in this case. For instance, the fact that the kinematic
Hilbert space of LQC is non-separable together with the stated discreteness of the spectrum
of p̂—where “discreteness” is understood according to the present notion—, this has the
somewhat counterintuitive consequence that the identity operator on KS can be written as
a “continuous sum” Î =
∑
µ |µ〉〈µ| rather than as an integral. However, this account of
discreteness also has intuitive implications for the case at hand. Most importantly among
these, the discreteness of the spectrum of p̂ does not permit a straightforward introduction
of an inverse operator p̂−1 necessary for investigating the behaviour of the curvature in the
quantum regime, since this inverse is not densely defined around zero. This implication has
conceptually important consequences. Let me explain.
In order to investigate whether the curvature, or whatever corresponds to the classical
curvature in the quantum realm, suffers from a divergence at the big bang in the quantum
theory as well, one must introduce a “curvature” operator defined on KS. Equation (C.2)
illustrates that the curvature 3R of the three-spaces in FLRW models of classical cosmology
is inversely proportional to a2(t), where a(t) denotes the scale factor expressing the size of
the universe. Since p is related to the physical volume of the three-spaces, an obvious choice
11The Planck length is usually introduced as `Pl
.=
√
G~c−3. Sometimes, as in Ashtekar et al. (2003a), `Pl
is set to equal
√
8piG~c−3. I will use the first convention, which means that `Pl =
√
G in natural units.
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suggests a =
√|p|. In order to determine the curvature, one thus needs to obtain an inverse
operator of the scale factor operator. In general, given an eigenvalue problem X̂|x〉 = x|x〉,
it is straightforward to introduce powers of the operator X̂ by repeated applications of X̂
to |x〉 for positive powers and by (repeatedly) applying the inverse map X̂−1 to |x〉 for
negative powers. The eigenvalues will then occur in the same power as the operator and
we have X̂n|x〉 = (x)n|x〉 where n ∈ Q. If the spectrum of the eigenvalues x contains zero,
this generalization must obviously proceed more cautiously for negative powers on pain of a
divergent behaviour of the eigenvalues of the inverse operators. First, a necessary condition
for X̂ to be invertible, and thus for negative powers of X̂ to have a well-defined operation,
is that ker(X̂)
.
= {|φ〉 ∈ H; X̂|φ〉 = 0} = {|x = 0〉}, i.e. that the eigenvalue zero is non-
degenerate, which is the case for p̂. Second, and more problematically, the catastrophe of
divergence must be averted in some principled way. The most obvious strategy would be to
assign by choice an action to X̂ on |x = 0〉. Given, however, that the exact construction
of this inverse operator and particularly its action on |µ = 0〉 are of such crucial relevance
to whether the inverse operator is bounded and the models free of kinematic singularities,
this unsatisfactory ad hoc patchery would not be acceptable, since one would have little
confidence that such ad hoc mending would produce the correct—as opposed to desired—
behaviour for small volumes of the universe.
How, then, can the catastrophe for an inverse operator X̂−1 be avoided when zero is
an eigenvalue of X̂? We can apply X̂−1 on every state |Ψ〉 of the form |Ψ〉 = ∑x kx|x〉
as long as k0 = 0 and
∑
x |kx|2 exists. The operator X̂−1 would be densely defined if one
could write |x = 0〉 as a suitable limit of such states |Ψ〉. If |x = 0〉 is an element of a
Hilbert space basis, and thus a normalizable state, then it will be orthogonal on all other
eigenstates of X̂. In this case, then, we would find for every state |Ψ〉 = ∑x kx|x〉 that
〈x = 0|Ψ〉 = 0. However, we should have 〈x = 0|x = 0〉 = 1 in the limit. Since X̂−1 is not
defined on |x = 0〉 and cannot be given by superpositions of other basis states, X̂−1 is not
densely defined. This is exactly what happens if we are trying to introduce an operator p̂−1
in the present situation: since p̂ admits a normalizable eigenvector |µ = 0〉 with eigenvalue
µ = 0, the operator p̂−1 is not densely defined on KS. Thus, while the domain of p̂ is dense
in the Hilbert space with respect to the measure used, the domain of p̂−1 is not. Since the
Hilbert space contains all the states of the quantum system considered, a description relying
on operators which do not have a dense domain could not be used for all the states of the
system and would thus be incomplete. Ideally, operators should be capable of acting upon
all states. As experiments cannot be performed with arbitrary accuracy, dense domains are
sufficient. If an operator were not densely defined, there would be situations in which the
operator could not be applied, failing to predict a measurement outcome.
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Since a dense definition of the action of the inverse operator on KS is thus required for
quantization, one has to find a reformulation which avoids the gap, yet proceeds in a prin-
cipled manner. Such a principled way, and the only known principled way, of constructing
a densely defined operator can be found in Thiemann’s construction of a Hamiltonian op-
erator, which I will not review in detail here.12 The procedure, which is sometimes called
the commutator-technique, essentially consists of two steps: first, the problematic function
of phase space variables is re-expressed as an unproblematic function of elementary variables
as well as the volume function; second, the canonical quantization recipe is followed and the
elementary variables and the volume function are replaced by their well-defined quantum
counterparts. Without following the details of this construction, the procedure yields an
inverse operator, which is densely defined, contains both configuration and momentum op-
erators, and commutes with p̂ and thus has simultaneous eigenstates with p̂, at least in the
isotropic case. This inverse operator is called (fundamental) triad operator and can be writ-
ten informally as p̂−1, as opposed to p̂−1. More precisely, the procedure yields the eigenvalue
problem (compare with equation (26) in Ashtekar et al. (2003a)):
̂[
sgn(p)√|p|
]
|µ〉 =
√
6
8piβG
(√
|µ+ 1| −
√
|µ− 1|
)
|µ〉. (7.9)
There are a few remarkable things about this spectrum. First, the operator admits an
eigenstate |µ = 0〉 with zero eigenvalue. Coincidentally, the operator p̂ admitted the same
eigenstate also with an eigenvalue of zero. Classically, the spatial curvature is proportional
to a−2 and thus to p−1. In the quantum theory, therefore, the square of the eigenvalues as
given by (7.9) corresponds to the curvature, up to proportionality factors as specified by
(C.2). This means that a quantum universe of zero size has vanishing curvature.13 Second,
the spectrum of (7.9) has a maximum value for µ = 1, which is
√
3/2piβ in units of one
over Planck length or `−1Pl . The kinematical curvature of the quantum universe, therefore,
assumes a maximal value of 3/2piβ in units of `−2Pl . Incidentally, the kinematical curvature
would diverge if either β or `Pl would go to zero, i.e. if either G or ~ were zero, or c were
infinite. Figure 10 shows a plot of the kinematic curvature in dependence of µ in units of
`−2Pl , where it is assumed that β = 0.2375 in rounded agreement with Meissner (2004), who
determined β under the premise that the black hole entropy calculated from LQG yields the
same result as the classic calculations by Bekenstein (1973, 1974) and Hawking (1975).
The entire literature on LQC, including Ashtekar, Bojowald, and Lewandowski (2003a),
but with the notable exception of Brunnemann and Thiemann (2006a,b), interprets this
12Cf. Thiemann (1996, 1998a,b,c).
13This curvature will henceforth be termed kinematical, rather than spatial, curvature.
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Figure 10: Kinematic curvature as function of µ (in units of `−2Pl ).
result such that curvature no longer grows beyond all bounds as the big bang is approached
and that at least in this sense, the classical singularity is cured by quantum effects. Without
introducing a “regulator” or some artificial cut-off, without massaging the classical expression
into a suitable form or similar tricks, the advocates of LQC claim to have obtained the
physically relevant result that in their approach, the kinematic curvature does not yield
to singular behaviour in the Planck regime. To warrant this interpretation, we need to
rewind once again and reconsider the most crucial steps in how this physical interpretation
of equation (7.9) came to be.
The introduction of a quantum operator defined on KS which corresponds to the classical
three-curvature depended critically on the fact that the eigenstates of p̂ were normalizable
and that therefore the Hilbert space KS was spanned by a direct sum of the eigenstates
of p̂ rather than by a direct integral. That the spectrum of p̂ was discrete in this sense
implied that p̂−1 was not densely defined on KS and thus prevented a direct construction
of the triad, or inverse, operator. If this direct construction were permitted, the operator
would not have been bounded from above. The inapplicability of the direct construction
procedure meant that an alternative procedure had to be sought. At this point in the
formulation of LQC, a procedure developed by Thiemann when he attempted to define an
explicit Hamiltonian operator for the full theory of LQG comes into play. For this reason,
the entire construction of LQG-based cosmological models depends on whether the ambition
of Thiemann’s procedure to be a unique and privileged recipe for correctly constructing
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operators which cannot be directly built because they are not everywhere densely defined
in K or KS is fulfilled. Without going into technical details of a method I have not closely
studied, let me hasten to add a few remarks.
The first set of remarks lists the technical difficulties that Thiemann’s proposal faces.
The first problem, identified by Lewandowski and Marolf (1998) and Gambini, Lewandowski,
Marolf, and Pullin (1998), was that the Hamiltonian constraint operator as constructed by
Thiemann was not capable of mimicking the classical Dirac constraint algebra (4.24)-(4.28)
in a large class of models of the theory. Nicolai, Peeters, and Zamaklar (2005) discuss
whether the quantum constraint algebra arising from Thiemann’s proposal actually closes,
as it should, or not. The main difficulty here is that while it is clear what one means by a
“closure” of an algebra for any classical constrained system, this notion is ambiguous for the
quantized theory. The strongest version of closure, the so-called “off-shell” closure, which
would obtain if the algebra closed on a comparatively large “habitat” of the Hamiltonian
constraint operator which does not only contain diffeomorphically invariant states, has no
prayer of being satisfied in the context of Thiemann’s proposal. The constraint algebra of
LQG as it stands only closes for weaker notions of closure, such as “on-shell” closure which
holds inside K. Nicolai and collaborators argue that this spells bad news for Thiemann’s
construction: if the constraint algebra only closes on-shell, i.e. after some of the constraints
have already been “used,” but not off-shell, then one runs the risks of that the symmetries are
anomalously implemented in the quantum constraints. The correct procedure, they insist, is
to move ahead with solving the constraints only once the closure (and the anomaly-freeness)
of the quantum constraint algebra is secured. They conclude by proposing off-shell closure of
the algebra as a means to reducing the large number of ambiguities, and more importantly
even, as the most promising way of imposing full spacetime covariance. It should be stressed,
however, that these issues are technically subtle and no consensus has been reached so far.
The jury, as it were, is still out on whether Thiemann’s construction is flawed or not.
Quite apart from these technically involved considerations, a necessary condition for
the physical viability of the construction is its correct behaviour in the classical limit. Let
us calculate the |µ|  1 limit then. The eigenvalue in (7.9) then undergoes the following
modification:
√
6
8piβG
[√
|µ+ 1| −
√
|µ− 1|
]
=
√
6|µ|
8piβG
[√
1 +
1
µ
−
√
1− 1
µ
]
= sgn(µ)
√
6
8piβG|µ| +O(µ
−3/2).
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Thus, up to terms O(µ−3/2), the eigenvalue for large |µ| is precisely equal to sgn(pµ)/
√|pµ|
where pµ is the eigenvalue of p̂ as given by (7.7). First, this justifies the somewhat ex-
cessive way of writing down the inverse operator in (7.9). Second, it agrees approxi-
mately with the classical relation between the momentum and the triad coefficient, given by
p× (sgn(p)/√|p|)2 = 1, which is another way of expressing the classical relation between the
scale factor and the spatial curvature, essentially given by (C.2). The agreement is of course
only valid in the limit for large universes, just where one expects the classical description to
apply. Significant violations may only occur for sufficiently small |µ| and it turns out that
they only transpire in the deep quantum regime of scales of less than a few Planck lengths.14
7.3 EVOLVING THROUGH THE BIG BANG
In order to complete the symmetry-reduced theory, the classical constraint (7.5) must be
quantized and solved. This final step will or would yield the physical Hilbert space of
LQC, denoted by HS. Without going into the details of the construction of the quantum
Hamiltonian operator, which is intricate and surely not unique, a few brief remarks about
the leading ideas behind the construction shall suffice.15 As was argued at the end of the
foregoing section, the classical limit will provide an important constraint on how any such
construction may proceed. The classical and quantum evolution are required to coincide for
timelike infinity i+ (and for i−), but are expected to offer radically distinct pictures around
the big bang. We will see in this section that LQC indeed satisfies—in fact: is constructed
to satisfy—this requirement.
As in the full theory, the symmetry-reduced theory uses holonomies rather than the con-
nection variables themselves as basic configuration variables. Because the classical constraint
(7.5) is cast in terms of the connections c, it cannot directly be used to build the quantum
Hamiltonian operator. One strategy to circumvent this obstacle would be to recast (7.5) in
terms of holonomies in order to offer a vantage point for constructing the Hamiltonian oper-
14Bojowald (2001c) offers numerical calculations that estimate to which scale the classical geometry pro-
vides an adequate description. These numerical estimates in the symmetry-reduced models have to be taken
with a grain of salt, numerically fully reliable results can, of course, only be expected from the full theory.
These calculations, as all calculations in these simplified models, are nevertheless expected to offer insights
into qualitative features and orders of magnitudes as they are built to concur with the full theory in these
respects. Recently, physicists have started to more seriously study anisotropies and inhomogeneities in their
cosmological models based on LQG. For the most up-to-date review of these efforts, see Bojowald (2005),
who offers extensive discussions of how anisotropies and inhomogeneities are modifying the behaviour of the
models.
15For the details, see Ashtekar et al. (2003a, Sec. 4).
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ator of isotropic and homogeneous models in LQC. Ashtekar, Bojowald, and Lewandowski
(2003a), however, choose a different approach in that they start out from the Hamiltonian
of the full theory and simplify it by imposing isotropy and homogeneity. In principle, both
procedures should yield the same result, but the second path has the advantage that it brings
out the similarities with the full theory more closely. The pursued procedure parallels the
one proposed by Thiemann (1996, 1998a,b,c,d,e,f) for the full theory. Thus, it inherits all
the problems of Thiemann’s approach discussed above. On the up side, to repeat, this ap-
proach is the only known principled construction and is closely related to similar procedures
followed in lattice gauge theories (Ashtekar et al. 2003a). The most important technical
choices to be made concern quantization ambiguities related to the (continuous) length µ0 of
the sides of the triad in terms of the fiducial metric 0qab, which no longer drops out as it did
in section 7.2. In addition to quantization ambiguities as they also arise in the full theory,
LQC is confronted with the problem that the regulator can no longer be removed as a conse-
quence. This difficulty is directly related to the fact that imposing homogeneity breaks the
diffeomorphism invariance of the full theory.16 Within the context of the symmetry-reduced
theory, the quantization ambiguity cannot be resolved in a natural way. The quantization
ambiguity can be eliminated, however, by adopting considerations based on the full theory.
The full theory, as discussed in chapter 5, predicts that space comes in small, indivisible
chunks and that, therefore, it would be physically meaningless to consider scales µ0 of arbi-
trary smallness. Assuming that µ0 must be of the order of the minimum scale as predicted
by the full theory, the quantization ambiguity can be removed. In consequence, while it
would not be prohibited in the reduced theory to deal with arbitrarily small surface areas, a
minimum area as suggested by the full theory is introduced in LQC.
With such a minimum scale at hand, the resulting “fundamental” vacuum Hamiltonian
constraint operator for spatially flat17 models is given by
Ĉgrav =
96i
β3
(
4√
3
)3
sin2
√
3c
8
cos2
√
3c
8
[
sin
√
3c
8
V̂ cos
√
3c
8
− cos
√
3c
8
V̂ sin
√
3c
8
]
(7.10)
16The difficulty stems from the fact that triangulation of the manifold with tetrahedra of coordinate volume
will no longer possess a well-behaved limit in homogeneous models, where an infinite number of tetrahedra
equally contribute to the sum which replaced the integral of the (smeared) constraint function. Hence the
sum diverges and the regulator cannot be eliminated. Cf. Ashtekar et al. (2003a).
17These are asymptotically open universes with spatial curvature k = 0. The formula becomes slightly,
but insignificantly, more complicated for positive curvature, i.e. for closed universes. It does not apply for
open universes with negative curvature, where a different method must be used (Bojowald 2005, p. 43). For
further discussion of closed models, see Section 8.2.
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in units of `−2Pl .
18 Its action on the eigenstates of p̂, which are also eigenstates of Ĉgrav, is as
follows:
Ĉgrav|µ〉 = 64√
3β3
(
Vµ+
√
3/4 − Vµ−√3/4
)(
|µ+
√
3〉 − 2|µ〉+ |µ−
√
3〉
)
, (7.11)
again in units of `−2Pl . LQC assumes the viewpoint that (7.11) correctly describes the grav-
itational part of the fundamental Hamiltonian constraint equation and that therefore its
solutions will give us HS. This contribution together with the contribution from the matter
Hamiltonian must add up to zero in order to satisfy the total Hamiltonian constraint19
Ĉ|Ψ〉 = (Ĉgrav + Ĉmatter)|Ψ〉 = 0. (7.12)
Those states |Ψ〉 which solve this constraint equation are the physical states of the symmetry-
reduced theory. As this reduced theory was intended to produce cosmological models based
on LQG, each state |Ψ〉 which solves (7.12) can be considered as an admissible quantum
cosmological model with the global symmetries “isotropy” and “homogeneity.” Obviously,
these models will be constrained by the matter Hamiltonian Ĉmatter and potential coupling
terms if matter is not minimally coupled to gravity. Typically in LQC, matter is assumed
to have no curvature couplings.
As there exists a momentum representation, the physical states can be expanded in terms
of this basis as
|Ψ〉 =
∑
µ
ψ(φ, µ)|µ〉, (7.13)
where φ indicates the dependence of the coefficients ψ on the matter fields.20 Since we
know, courtesy of (7.11), how the gravitational constraint operator acts on eigenstates of
18According to Abhay Ashtekar (personal communication, 12 March 2005), this Hamiltonian is not self-
adjoint, i.e. Ĉgrav 6= (Ĉgrav)†. At the very least, because candidate physical states |Ψ〉 are really not
necessarily normalizable states in the dual space of CylS , this may have implications for picking the physical
states and leads to complications in finding an inner product on the space of solutions of (7.14). See
also footnote 20. On the occasion of the above mentioned conversation, Ashtekar promised that he and
a collaborator were in the final steps of writing a paper giving a recipe for constructing a self-adjoint
Hamiltonian operator for LQC. As far as I know, he has not yet archived or published such an article
electronically or otherwise. There exist self-adjoint Hamiltonian operators for simplified models, cf. Section
8.2.
19Here, a constant factor has been absorbed into Ĉmatter, which is either 8piG in natural units or 8pi in
units of `−2Pl , as in the following calculation.
20 In fact, the states |Ψ〉 live in Cyl?S , the space which is algebraically dual to the space CylS of cylindrical
functions of symmetric connections. Elements of this space need not be normalizable, a circumstance which
can also be gleaned from the fact that the summation in (7.13) is over a continuous variable µ. Sometimes,
as in Ashtekar et al. (2003a), states which may not be normalizable are written as |Ψ) rather than |Ψ〉. I
will desist from introducing this notational subtlety.
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the triad operator p̂, we can compute the total Hamiltonian constraint equation. This direct
calculation will give
∑
µ
[
ψ(φ, µ)
(
Vµ+
√
3/4 − Vµ−√3/4
)(
|µ+
√
3〉 − 2|µ〉+ |µ−
√
3〉
)
+
√
3β3
64
Ĉmatterψ(φ, µ)|µ〉
]
= 0.
There are obviously (sub-)terms within each term of this sum where the eigenstates have
been shifted by
√
3, which results in this rather awkward way of writing down the sum. This
can be rectified by regrouping the terms considering that the “contribution” of the (µ±√3)-
th term of the sum to the µ-th term is ψ(φ, µ±√3)
(
Vµ±5√3/4 − Vµ±3√3/4
)
|µ〉. Rearranging
the sum with this mind yields a sum—the same sum of course—with each (sub-)term of the
µ-th term ending in |µ〉. A sufficient condition for this rewritten sum to vanish, and thus to
accord with (7.12), is that each term vanishes by itself:
(
Vµ+5
√
3/4 − Vµ+3√3/4
)
ψ(φ, µ+
√
3)− 2
(
Vµ+
√
3/4 − Vµ−√3/4
)
ψ(φ, µ)
+
(
Vµ−3√3/4 − Vµ−5√3/4
)
ψ(φ, µ−
√
3) = −
√
3β3
64
Ĉmatter(µ)ψ(φ, µ) (7.14)
In my opinion, this equation is not a necessary condition for the constraint (7.12) to be sat-
isfied, just because it is not necessary for every term in a sum to individually vanish in order
for the total sum to add up to zero. However, in Ashtekar, Bojowald, and Lewandowski
(2003a), just as well as in the rest of the literature, the impression is given that (7.14) is
both sufficient and necessary for (7.12) to obtain. Be this as it may, I should remind the
reader that the V ’s in (7.14) are the eigenvalues of the volume operator and are just known
real numbers. The matter Hamiltonian Ĉmatter only acts on the matter fields (encoded by
φ) and is a function of µ insofar as metric components will generally arise in its expres-
sion. Importantly, equation (7.14) is not a differential equation, as would traditionally be
expected, but a difference equation in the parameter µ, which is nevertheless continuous.
According to Ashtekar, Bojowald, and Lewandowski (2003a), this is a direct consequence of
the discreteness of the quantum geometry. As I have not followed the construction of the
Hamiltonian constraint operator explicitly, I cannot authoritatively judge what the origin of
this is, despite the plausibility of the explanation that it is intimately connected with the
discreteness of the quantum geometry. The tandem fact that (7.14) is a difference equation
together with the discreteness of µ will have a bearing on the interpretation of equation
(7.14) qua codification of the dynamical evolution, to be discussed in section 8.1.
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Let me restate the strict significance of (7.14): it is not primarily an evolution equation,
but it constrains the coefficients ψ(φ, µ) in the expansion of the triad basis |µ〉 of any state
|Ψ〉 which wishes to qualify as a physical state of the symmetry-reduced theory. States |Ψ〉
whose components in terms of the triad basis conform with (7.14) are the physical states
sought and constitute the physical Hilbert space of the theory. This means that the situation
should best be interpreted such that physical states do not undergo a dynamical evolution
through the values of µ to be summed over, but rather as a superposition of kinematical
states corresponding to spatial universes of different sizes, where the manner how these
kinematic state superpose is constrained by (7.14). Agreed, (7.14) is as close as it gets to
temporal evolution in the present setting in that a partial observable, encoded by the inverse
scale factor operator, which is used as a cosmological clock and with respect to which an
“evolution” can be determined. I urge, however, the need to be chary of this interpretation
because the “evolution” governed by (7.14) fails to be deterministic. I will come back to this
point in Section 8.1.
In order to finalize the construction of the physical Hilbert space HS, one would also
have to introduce an inner product and thus select those states |Ψ〉 with finite norm. The
physical Hilbert space, then, is spanned by those states of finite norm which satisfy the
Hamiltonian constraint equation (7.14). The construction of the general physical Hilbert
space of LQC including the physical inner product has not been achieved so far and remains
and open issue. For some simplified models, the construction has been executed and led to
the surprising result that the physical Hilbert space consists of only one single state, leaving
us with just one cosmological model! I will return to this issue in section 8.2.1.
Another important feature of the constraint equation (7.14) is the fact that it will also
impose conditions on coefficients ψ(φ, µ) with negative µ. These coefficients accompany base
states of negative µ in the construction of Ψ. Of course, they do not correspond to kinematic
universes with negative volumes, but to universes of volume of the respective absolute values.
As triad operator eigenstates and their corresponding coefficients of negative and positive
µ are interlinked via (7.14), the states of negative µ are not only admissible kinematically,
but will also participate in the construction of the physical states |Ψ〉. So in a sense, the
radically distinct dynamical behaviour around the classical singularity suffices to open up
the formerly closed and locked door to a mirror world, as can be seen in Figure 11. Thus,
a second domain, call it region II, emerges as a result of evolving through the big bang
and represents the mirror universe “of negative times.” In Figure 11, region I with µ > 0
corresponds to the usual classical domain of a FLRW model. Unlike in the classical case,
however, it also contains the big bang (µ = 0) and the mirror region II where µ < 0. Does the
emergence of this mirror world imply that the denizens of region II experience their universe
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Figure 11: Conformal diagram of a FLRW model in LQC.
to collapse towards a non-singular big crunch? Not necessarily. It is perfectly possible that
the direction of the physical time does not coincide with the direction of increasing values
of µ, but opposes it. This would be the case, say, if the direction of physical time rests on
a thermodynamical asymmetry which points in the direction of increasing absolute values
of the scale factor. In this case, the citizens of II would also experience a universe evolving
from a non-singular big bang. In this case, the scenario would resemble the birth of two
twin universes rather than one single universe contracting and then expanding again. These
remarks are highly speculative and should be taken with a grain of salt: their final validity
must await the completion of the construction of the physical Hilbert space.
Two more remarks, both equally preliminary. First, while many members of the guild
expected a quantization to wash away the singularities of the classical theory, the fact that
LQC seems to predict an inflationary phase in the evolution of the early universe came as
a surprise. The expansion follows a non-Friedmannian regime for small µ. Instead of a
decelerating expansion from an initial singularity, this quantum regime imposes a rapidly
accelerating expansion on the young universe.21 Unlike in inflationary scenarios, however,
21In fact, the expansion is powered by a12 instead of a−3 as in the Friedmann case! Cf. Rovelli (2004,
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this inflation is not driven by an inflaton field or similar auxiliary constructions to account
for the rapid expansion. In LQC, inflation seems to be generated merely by the quantum
modifications of the dynamical equations of the gravitational field in the homogeneous and
isotropic case (Bojowald 2002a; Bojowald et al. 2004a; Bojowald and Vandersloot 2003).
Second, recent results in Ashtekar and Bojowald (2006) show that the same technique
applied to Schwarzschild spacetime leads to a similar resolution of the singularity there.
Ashtekar and Bojowald (2005) have taken these results to indicate that perhaps all spacelike
singularities of the classical theory might vanish in LQC. It may be preemptive to condense
these findings to a claim that cosmology based on LQG, unlike the one based on classical
GTR, is not tainted by the occurrence of singularities at all. But there have appeared by
now clear indications that the quantum nature of LQC inoculates important cosmological
models against incurring singularities.
In sum, then, in isotropic and homogeneous models of loop quantum cosmology the
initial singularity of the classical model seems to disappear in two different senses: first, the
curvature does not increase without bound for arbitrarily small scale factors; and second,
there exists a principled—though perhaps not correct—way of extending the models through
the initial singularity into a mirror world, thereby circumventing, to some extent at least,
the classical singularity. Na¨ıvely, interpreting the dynamical evolution of these models leads
to a contracting and subsequently expanding universe. The classical and quantum evolution
coincide for the timelike infinity i+ (and for i−), but offer radically distinct pictures around
the big bang. Numerical analyses of very simple cases show that the classical and the
quantum Friedmann models evolve indistinguishably, except in a very small region around
the classical singularity where no corresponding semi-classical states seem to be available.
The fact that the state vector becomes indeterminate for µ = 0, as will be discussed in
Section 8.1, suggests that the dynamical evolution around the classical big bang cannot
be straightforwardly deterministic despite its regularity. This, and the general problem
of entering a sector of the Hilbert space whose states do not afford corresponding semi-
classical states and thus elude a classical interpretation, leads us to believe that a number
of subtleties need to be clarified before we can meaningfully speak about what happened
“before the big bang.” More than a mere subtlety is the fact that the operators p̂−1 and
p̂−1 do not correspond to Dirac observables. This seriously undercuts their interpretation as
physically relevant magnitudes, as will be pursued in Chapter 8.
pp. 216f).
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8.0 EINSTEIN’S NEMESIS CONQUERED AT LAST?
8.1 PHYSICAL CURVATURE AND EPICYCLES OF DETERMINISM
Let us now take a more critical look at the issue of whether, and if so to what extent, the
kinematic as well as the dynamical singularity indeed vanish in cosmological models based on
LQG. As I have explicated in the previous section, the strategy pursued by LQC to solve the
Hamiltonian constraint equation is to assume an arbitrary superposition of kinematical states
(7.13), more specifically eigenstates of p̂, and then obtain a difference equation of components
ψ(φ, µ) (7.14), which can be recursively solved for a given set of “initial conditions.” The
standard interpretation of this difference equation, to repeat, is that of an evolution equation
like the Schro¨dinger equation in ordinary quantum mechanics where the evolution is powered
by the Hamiltonian constraint operator Ĉ. To be sure, the physical states |Ψ〉 correspond
to four-dimensional spacetimes. Trivially, therefore, these physical states do not undergo a
dynamical evolution. The states whose evolution is governed by (7.14) are the kinematical
states |µ〉, via their components ψ(φ, µ). The “four-dimensional” physical quantum states
will then be constructed as a superposition of kinematical states, using the components
constrained by (7.14). If this constraint equation is interpreted as an equation of dynamical
evolution, as a “quantum Friedmann equation” as it were, then the scale parameter µ must
be interpreted as a time variable with respect to which this evolution occurs. The scale
operator, defined on the kinematical Hilbert space KS, does not correspond to a Dirac
observable. Dirac observables must commute with all the first-class constraints generating
gauge transformations, and hence with the Hamiltonian constraint as well. For a candidate
operator Ô, we must thus have
[Ô, Ĉ] |Ψ〉 = 0 (8.1)
for Ô to qualify as a physical operator, i.e. an operator corresponding to a Dirac observable.
As computed in appendix D, the commutator of the inverse scale factor operator and the
Hamiltonian constraint operator does not vanish, except perhaps for very special choices of
Ĉmatter. But this seems hardly acceptable: whether Ô corresponds to a physical observable
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depends on the matter content of the universe. Be this as it may, the inverse scale factor
operator p̂−1 is not a physical operator and its spectrum can thus not be considered as an
indication of possible measurements of the spatial curvature. Consequently, the fact that
this spectrum is bounded from above does not issue a physically relevant warrant that the
kinematical singularity is indeed avoided.1 In order for this conclusion to be legitimately
drawn, a physical operator corresponding to an observable encoding spatial curvature would
be necessary.
The intuitive physical reason as to why both the inverse scale factor operator as well as
the volume operator are not Dirac observables is that in order to obtain a volume of a three-
dimensional universe from a four-dimensional cosmological model, one needs to introduce a
particular gauge. The volume, and the curvature, of the three-dimensional slices will depend
on the particular foliation introduced. There are good, but not compelling, reasons for
defending a notion of privileged cosmological time at the level of the classical theory.2 It is
not so obvious, however, whether such a preferred spacetime foliation of cosmological models
can be incorporated into models in quantum cosmology. Perhaps the so-called “group-
averaging” technique can be used to introduce a coordinate time into the quantum theory,
which, according to an analysis by Bojowald, Singh, and Skirzewski (2004b), is well-suited
to emulate an evolution at least in the semi-classical regime. Around what corresponds to
the initial singularity of classical models, the method does not yield a useful notion of time.
Furthermore, it is unclear whether this coordinate time has any claim to offer a preferred
notion of time. If it does not, then it seems as if there might be no justification for singling out
the volume (and the inverse scale factor) operator as defined above as physically privileged.
Revisiting Rovelli’s idea of partial observables with a more mathematical bent, Dittrich
(2004) has shown that for classical theories, if we have a phase space function which is invari-
ant under a subalgebra C1 := {Cm+1, ..., Cn} of n −m constraints of the constraint algebra
C containing a total of n constraints, then these functions form partial observables in the
sense of Rovelli (2002d), i.e. they are physical quantities with an associated measuring opera-
tion resulting in a numerical outcome. Dittrich commences by assuming that any function in
phase space represents such a physical quantity. Following Rovelli’s suggested procedure, she
shows how these partial observables can be transformed into so-called complete observables
with respect to the subalgebra C2 := {C1, ..., Cm} of the remaining m constraints. Complete
observables in Rovelli’s sense are magnitudes which can be gained in some principled way
from the (classical or quantum) theory at stake. Dittrich further proves two theorems (The-
1The same point is made by Brunnemann and Thiemann (2006a), cf. Section 8.2.4 below.
2Belot (2005) has argued that two important arguments against such a preferred spacetime foliation of
cosmological models in classical GTR fail to establish their purported conclusion.
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orem 3.1 for a system with one constraint and Theorem 4.1 for a system with n constraints)
which establish that, under some technical assumptions, complete observables as defined by
Rovelli must be Dirac observables. The reader should be reminded at this point that the
invariance group of these observables is not Diff(M), but Diff(Σ) combined with deforma-
tions in the direction normal to Σ (and rotations of the tetrads). In sum, Dittrich offers a
detailed procedure how to construct Dirac observables from phase space functions which are
invariant under a subalgebra C1 of the constraint algebra.
Once one has the Poisson algebra of the Dirac observables, canonical quantization re-
quires a representation of this Poisson algebra on a physical Hilbert space. This procedure
turns the classical Dirac observables—if they have been identified—into operators of the
quantum theory. As it is technically difficult to straightforwardly implement this strategy,
LQG proceeds by first finding a representation of the algebra of partial observables on a
kinematical Hilbert space, as explained in detail in Chapter 5 and as criticized by Nicolai,
Peeters, and Zamaklar (2005). These partial observables are invariant under both rotations
of the tetrads as well as spatial diffeomorphisms, as the Gauss and vector constraints have
been solved in the construction of the kinematical theory. These partially invariant partial
observables thus lead to the construction of non-physical operators defined on the kinemat-
ical Hilbert space K. Examples of these non-physical operators are exactly the geometric
operators such as the area and the volume operators in full LQG as well as the scale factor
and the inverse scale factor operators in LQC.
Although the inverse scale factor operator does not commute with the Hamiltonian con-
straint and does therefore not correspond to a Dirac observable, its commutator with both
the SU(2) and the spatial diffeomorphism constraints vanishes. Thus, it constitutes an
operator corresponding to a partially invariant partial observable as discussed by Dittrich
(2004). As explained above, one can turn such a partial observable into a Dirac observable
invariant under all constraints. The problem, however, Brunnemann and Thiemann (2006a)
warn, is that the spectrum of the operator corresponding to the Dirac observable will in
general differ from the kinematical spectrum, and sometimes drastically so. This means that
the fact that the kinematical spectrum of the inverse scale factor operator is bounded from
above cannot be used to produce reliable statements concerning the quantum fate of the
classically divergent curvature. This would only be possible if the spectrum of the pertinent
physical operator were known. For this, however, the physical Hilbert space would have
to be known. The fact that the inverse scale factor is not a Dirac observable poses a real
problem as it is unclear whether one can legitimately infer from the fact that the spectrum
of the corresponding operator is bounded that the kinematical singularity is resolved. I will
return to this point in Section 8.2.4 when I discuss Brunnemann and Thiemann’s argument.
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What about the dynamical singularity? In order to evaluate the claim made in LQC that
the dynamical singularity is completely eliminated, closer scrutiny must be applied to the
quantum equations encoding the dynamical evolution, the “quantum Einstein equations” as
it were. The role analogous to the Schro¨dinger equation in ordinary quantum mechanics, to
repeat, is played by the Hamiltonian constraint equation. This equation is interpreted as a
difference equation for the coefficients of the kinematical states in the superposition as which
the physical state is assumed to be. This difference equation effectively offers a recursive
relation for the coefficients. In order for such an equation to qualify as a dynamical equation,
the label of these coefficients must play the role of a temporal parameter with respect to
which the evolution of the system through the consecutive kinematical states occurs. Since
the kinematical states used in LQC are the eigenstates |µ〉 of the triad operator p̂, which is
simultaneously an eigenstate of the inverse scale factor operator, the dynamical label is µ.
However, for the same reasons as above, this label is unphysical as the scale factor is not a
Dirac observable. Hence, we have a dynamical evolution which covers the full range of the
unphysical parameter µ.
In order to determine whether the singularity in the dynamical evolution with respect
to µ evaporates in LQC, a brief reminder how the dynamical singularity came about in the
classical theory is in order. In appendix C, I noted that Laplacean determinism breaks down
at the big bang in the sense that the Friedmann equation (C.5) breaks down at a = 0. That’s
why it turned out to be classically impossible to evolve the universe back to cosmological
times before the big bang. Thus, determinism played a critical role in evaluating whether the
dynamical behaviour of the universe was singular or not. The idea of testing for the remnants
of a dynamical singularity in the context of the proposed models of LQC thus focuses on
whether, given a post-big-bang “initial state” of the universe, the difference equation (7.14)
permits the deterministic evolution past the kinematical state |µ = 0〉 to earlier times.
Specifying an initial state to be fed into a differential equation only requires the spec-
ification of the physical system whose dynamical evolution is governed by the differential
equation at one particular instant in time. This information suffices to determine the state
of the system at all other times for which the system enjoys a deterministic evolution. For a
difference equation, such as (7.14), obviously, specifying the state of the universe at only one
“instant” in the unphysical time parameter does not suffice to even get started: at least two
of the coefficients must be known in order to calculate the coefficients for the other µ’s via
(7.14). The eigenvalues Vµ of the volume operators are given real numbers, but the action
of Ĉmatter on |µ〉 will depend on what kind of matter is supplied. For present purposes, it
must only be assumed that |µ〉 are also eigenstates of Ĉmatter. If Ĉmatter is self-adjoint, then
its eigenvalues will be real numbers as well.
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Without loss of generality, let us position the two fixed coefficients ψ corresponding to
the two “initial” “states” in the epoch a “long” “time” “before the big bang” and evolve the
universe in the “forward” direction to “later” “times” closer and closer to the big bang. Let
me briefly recall the reasons for the various quotation marks in the previous sentence: the
“initial” “states” are of course by no means “initial,” there are infinitely many more both
“before” and “after,” nor are they physical states, but only kinematical ones; furthermore,
“long” is only long in terms of Planck units as the asymptotic region starts at |µ|  10
Planck times; also, the “time” parameter does not correspond to a physical notion of time,
nor is there a physically justified direction of time in the world to the other side of the big
bang. The last point was discussed above when I insisted that the model might just as
well represent the birth of a twin universe rather than a contracting and then re-expanding
universe. But I will drop the distracting quotation marks for the remainder of the section and
only point out the time-reversal invariance of equation (7.14) before the argument proceeds.
Thus, we start evolving the universe at µ = −N√3 for any large N ∈ R+. We need to fix
the two coefficients ψ(φ,−N√3) and ψ(φ, (−N+1)√3) in order to recursively determine the
coefficients ψ(φ, (−N + n)√3) via (7.14) for all natural numbers n > 1 (and really ∀n ∈ Z).
In general, no difficulties will be encountered in this procedure because the discrete iterative
steps one takes in evolving the universe in this manner generically step over the potential
singularity at µ = 0. Figure 12 schematically shows how this iterative determination of the
coefficients ψ(φ, µ) works, and how two legs to stand on (marked by a bar) are required to
calculate the next step to be taken (marked by a cross). The gap between adjacent steps is√
3 in fundamental units. It is clear, however, that the two coefficients which were given to us
do not suffice to determine the full evolution across all values of µ ∈ R. Equivalently, the two
coefficients are insufficient to fully specify the physical states |Ψ〉 ∈ HS, they only determine
a discrete subset of Lebesgue-measure zero. For the full specification, an entire half-open
interval µ ∈ [−N√3, (−N + 2)√3[ of coefficients ψ(φ, µ) must be fixed beforehand, i.e. we
must know the state of the kinematical universe over the period of 2
√
3 Planck times in
order to be in the position to fully determine its evolution for all times.
When we run the recursive relation (7.14) for all values of µ in this half-open interval,
we realize that for one choice, and for one choice only, we will encounter the presumed
singularity at µ = 0 “head-on.” If and only if N is a natural number, the evolution will step
into the sink of the µ = 0 singularity in the sense that there will be a ψ(φ, (−N + n)√3)
such that the combination of Vµ’s vanishes. In general, this combination of volume operator
eigenvalues is
V(−N+n+ 14)
√
3 − V(−N+n− 14)√3
for the coefficient ψ(φ, (−N +n)√3) to be determined in the (n−1)-th step of the iteration.
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Figure 12: Recursive determination of the coefficients ψ(φ, µ).
This combination is zero just in case N = n, i.e. iff N ∈ N, since Vµ = V−µ. When this
happens, the corresponding coefficient just drops out of equation (7.14), which in this case
just becomes an additional constraint on ψ(φ,−√3) and ψ(φ,−2√3):[√
3β3
64
Ĉmatter(−
√
3)− 2V−3√3/4 + 2V−5√3/4
]
ψ(φ,−√3)
+
(
V−7√3/4 − V−9√3/4
)
ψ(φ,−2√3) = 0. (8.2)
The attentive reader may argue that while the Hamiltonian constraint equation for µ =
(−N +n− 1)√3 (or, equivalently, the (n− 1)-th step in the iteration) may fail to determine
the coefficient ψ(φ, 0) in the same manner as it did for all other coefficients, the Hamiltonian
constraint equation for µ = (−N+n)√3 = 0 (or, equivalently, the n-th step of the iteration)
will do so. The difference is illustrated in Figure 13: while up to this point, I have only
described how states have been determined, as in (a), by two earlier states, the constraint
equation may also be used to specify the “sandwich state” at equal distances from two input
states, an earlier and a later one, as shown in (b). Let me call the technique used in (a)
tripod technique and the one in (b) the sandwich technique.
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Figure 13: Two different ways of determining a third state from two given states.
The Hamiltonian constraint equation for µ = (−N + n)√3 = 0 reads
(
V5
√
3/4 − V3√3/4
)
ψ(φ,
√
3) +
√
3β3
64
Ĉmatter(0) ψ(φ, 0)
+
(
V−3√3/4 − V−5√3/4
)
ψ(φ,−
√
3) = 0. (8.3)
Unless Ĉmatter(0) vanishes as well, it seems as if one might have an equation which determines
ψ(φ, 0), using the sandwich technique if the tripod technique fails. Alas, this is not the case:
an argument by Bojowald (2002b, Sec. 4.2) claims that generically for quantum matter,
we have Ĉmatter(0) = 0, implying, of course, the impossibility in LQC of determining the
kinematical state of the universe at the big bang. This argument is either sound and we
have Ĉmatter(0) = 0 (call this situation I) or it is not and Ĉmatter(0) 6= 0 (situation II),3 in
both cases the state ψ(φ, 0) cannot be determined, neither by the tripod nor by the sandwich
technique, for the following reason.
If Bojowald’s argument is sound, then (8.3) will determine the heretofore undetermined
coefficient ψ(φ,
√
3) by the tripod technique with no entry from the second “foot” and the
deterministic evolution can continue through the big bang. In this case, all coefficients
ψ(φ, µ) will be determined by the half-open interval of initial conditions except the singularity
ψ(φ, 0), which decouples. In this situation, we have an additional constraint (8.2), but also an
additional freedom in choosing the decoupled coefficient ψ(φ, 0). The first restriction makes
the solution space smaller than it would be otherwise, while the latter freedom enlarges it
just as much. So in situation I, the full physical state |Ψ〉 is determined by the half-open
interval of initial conditions, except for the kinematical state at the big bang, which can be
chosen arbitrarily.
3I am neglecting here the logical possibility that the argument is not sound, but Ĉmatter(0) nevertheless
vanishes. What is really of interest here is whether Ĉmatter(0) is zero or not.
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If the argument is not sound, however, and it may be the case that Ĉmatter(0) 6= 0, then
(8.3) turns into an equation with two unknowns (ψ(φ, 0) and ψ(φ,
√
3)) and both the tripod
as well as the sandwich technique strand. Thus, equation (8.3) fails to offer a deterministic
evolution beyond the big bang. As ψ(φ, 0) and ψ(φ,
√
3) are both not determined then,
no ψ(φ, n
√
3) for n > N can be determined anymore, as one would have to use the tripod
method, without any legs to stand on. To answer the attentive reader from a few paragraphs
ago, the plan to apply the sandwich method for determining ψ(φ, 0) miscarries as there is
no possibility at all to obtain ψ(φ,
√
3) from the initial data. The evolution thus grinds to
a halt at the singularity, at least for appropriately chosen initial conditions. What could
save the situation II is an additional choice to fix one of the two unknowns ψ(φ, 0) or
ψ(φ,
√
3), thus enabling (8.3) to determine the other unknown by the tripod technique if
ψ(φ, 0) is additionally fixed or by the sandwich method if ψ(φ,
√
3) is given in addition.
Thus, an additional choice of one coefficient allows the iteration to continue.4 Given such an
additional choice, all the coefficients would be determined by the usual half-open interval of
initial conditions, without exception, and the state |µ = 0〉 would not decouple from the rest.
Because we have such an additional freedom, the space of solutions would be larger than
originally presumed.5 If such an enlargement is not tolerated, or, equivalently, no additional
choice is made, the evolution runs aground at the big bang. In situation II, therefore, the
half-open interval of initial conditions determines the physical state |Ψ〉 only up to a discrete
subset of coefficients ψ(φ, n
√
3) (where N 3 n ≥ N).
Situation II could be remedied, as mentioned, by adding another initially fixed coefficient.
It would have to be one of the ψ(φ, n
√
3) for n ≥ N . But what a weird package of initial
conditions: a set of kinematical states of the universe during a half-open interval of time
long before the big bang plus a single kinematical state much later, either at the big bang
or sometime thereafter. In this odd case, the total set of initial conditions required to
determine the state of the physical system for all times would be topologically unconnected.
The necessity to know the state of a system over some finite amount of time, as opposed to
just one instant in time, may already appear unfamiliar from the usual deterministic laws
of motion, which are typically differential equations. But at least we are still dealing with a
connected set, which in principle corresponds to the situation in a physics laboratory, where
today’s state of a system, albeit over a finite period of time, is measured in order to make
predictions of the system’s state at one point in time tomorrow. Why, however, should it be
necessary to know the system’s state over a finite period of time today, plus its state at one
4In fact, it suffices to fix any one of the ψ(φ, n
√
3) for n ≥ N to render the evolution fully deterministic.
5Of course, there still is the extra constraint (8.2), which diminishes the solution space accordingly. But
this constraint exists quite independently of the other considerations.
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moment in time next week in order to be in the position to predict its state at a particular
time in two weeks’ time? The question is rhetorical, as any attempt to insist on such a
disconnected set of initial data appears grotesquely ad hoc.
Of course, the situation can be repaired by placing the half-open interval such that it
contains the moment of the big bang. Here, the point µ = 0 must be contained in the
half-open interval of Lebesgue-measure 2
√
3 in natural units. In this case, equation (8.2)
no longer represents an additional constraint diminishing the space of physical states |Ψ〉,
but a recursive relation helping in determining the coefficients backwards in time. If ψ(φ, 0)
is given as initial data, then either ψ(φ,−√3) is also given or it is not, depending on how
exactly the half-open interval of initial data is chosen. If it isn’t, then ψ(φ,
√
3) must be given
and ψ(φ,−√3) can be obtained via (8.3), quite independently of whether Ĉmatter(0) vanishes
or not. In any case, then, ψ(φ,−√3) is given or can be obtained. With this information,
(8.2) will be used to calculate ψ(φ,−2√3), applying the tripod technique.
Regardless of whether Ĉmatter(0) is zero or not and of how the exact interval of initial data
is chosen, all the coefficients ψ(φ, µ) can be determined once the state of the universe at the
big bang is among the initially known kinematical states. Under these circumstances, then,
the dynamical singularity disappears. It does not, however, fully evaporate when ψ(φ, 0) is
not initially fixed.
Despite the appealing consequence that the dynamical singularity is lost once one elects
to include the kinematical state of the universe at the big bang, I maintain that this case
should be excluded from serious considerations. We are essentially interested in finding out
whether in the context of LQC, the dynamical singularity vanishes in the sense that one can
deterministically evolve through the big bang. If it turns out that the only case in which
determinism is fully valid for all values of µ occurs when the kinematical state of the universe
at what corresponds to the classical singularity is fixed in advance, when, in other words,
the delicate situation is taken care of by hand, then the case for the full dynamical regularity
of the models of LQC is indeed very weak. For the remainder of the section, I shall assume
that the set of initial conditions does not contain the state at µ = 0.
Early in this chapter, I have proposed to use the criterion of whether the dynamical
evolution occurs deterministically as the benchmark for whether or not it could be declared
that there is an important sense in which the singularity disappears in the context of LQC. To
be sure, the concept of deterministic evolution is already weakened in any quantum theory,
but the Schro¨dinger evolution of an initial quantum state can nevertheless be considered
fully deterministic, at least as long as the Hamiltonian is essentially self-adjoint, as defined
in footnote 15.6
6For a more thorough discussion of the fate of determinism in quantum theories, cf. Earman (2004, Sec. 5)
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Let me analyze to what extent this evolution can be considered regular, now that I have
explicated in detail how models in LQC can be considered as dynamically evolving. To this
end, let me cast the notion of Laplacean determinism in a more precise definition:
Definition 6 (Laplacean determinism). The evolution of a physical system is (Laplace-)
deterministic iff the state of the system at a time t together with the laws of nature that
govern its dynamical evolution fix the state of the system at all times.
Obviously, I assume the unproblematic existence of an external (physical) time in which
the evolution of the physical system at stake occurs. To repeat, this is not the case for
classical GTR, nor for LQG, nor for LQC. Definition 6, therefore, would really have to be
appropriated for the generally covariant case in order to yield fully adequate categories for
the situation that we are interested in. Let us, for the argument’s sake, join most proponents
of LQC in admitting the scale factor µ as a surrogate time as explicated above. In this case,
Definition 6 is sufficient to frame the ensuing discussion.
Another deficiency of Definition 6, however, is immediately obvious. As explicated above
at some length, the dynamical equation of interest is a difference rather than a differential
equation. Offering the state of the system at only one point in time, therefore, will not
suffice to get the evolution going. Not only must a half-open interval of initial data be
specified, but the dynamical mechanism seems to be rather different: instead of seeking
differentiable functions solving differential equations, one must drudge through uncountably
many recursive relations for infinitely many iterations in order to evolve the system. It seems
warranted, therefore, to denote the latter type of evolution by evolution? in order to draw the
distinction notationally. Let us customize the definition of determinism for present purposes
as follows:
Definition 7 (Laplacean determinism for systems governed by difference equa-
tions). The evolution? of a physical system is (Laplace-) deterministic iff the states of a
system over a finite period of time together with the difference equation(s) that govern(s) its
dynamical evolution? fix the state of the system at all times.
Assuming, as I have, that initial conditions do not already specify the state of the universe
at the big bang, determinism thus defined is violated in LQC for both situations (I) and (II).
In situation (I), with Ĉmatter(0) = 0, the coefficient ψ(φ, 0) decouples from the rest and
cannot be determined by the Hamiltonian constraint equation (7.14). In situation (II), with
Ĉmatter(0) 6= 0 and not allowing the set of initial conditions to consist of several disjoint
pieces, not only does (7.14) not determine the coefficient ψ(φ, 0), but leaves undetermined
any ψ(φ, n
√
3) for n ≥ N with N ∈ N. Clearly, therefore, the unphysical evolution? typically
and Earman (2006b).
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present in LQC does not obey Laplacean determinism as introduced in Definition 7. It
becomes also clear that what is responsible for the breakdown of determinism is still what
corresponds to the classical singularity. In conclusion, the initial singularity of the classical
theory has not completely been washed out by the quantum theory.
Having said that, however, the situation is not quite as bleak as this melancholy con-
clusion might suggest. Despite the failure of strict determinism, there is a weakened form
of determinism which is realized in LQC. An appealing aspect of this weakening is that it
is mathematically well-defined, and not just an ad hoc concept introduced to satisfy the
philosophers’ fancy.
Definition 8 (Quasi-determinism (for systems governed by difference equations)).
The evolution? of a physical system is quasi-deterministic iff the states of a system over a
finite interval of time together with the difference equation(s) that govern(s) its dynamical
evolution? fix the state of the system at almost all times, i.e. they fix the state for all points
in time except for a subset of points in time of Lebesgue-measure zero.
Since the states undetermined by the initial data combined with the Hamiltonian con-
straint equation (7.14) are either just those of one moment in time (µ = 0)—as in situation
(I)—or of a discrete subset of the real number (µ = n
√
3,∀n ≥ N)—as in situation (II)—,
the undetermined states form a subset of all kinematical states through which the system
evolves? with Lebesgue-measure zero. Thus, the dynamical evolution? of the universe as
understood in LQC proceeds quasi-deterministically, even through the big bang.
Together with the above mentioned fact that the quantum states around the big bang
have no semi-classical analogues and that it may thus be impossible to introduce a notion
of physical time in the very early universe, the failure of strict determinism at the big bang
may be taken as an indication that it was wrong-headed all along to insist on the pervasive
rhetoric of evolution and determinism. In order to be able to meaningfully talk about how
the universe looked like before the big bang, it seems, a globally applicable physical time
would have to be introduced. I have observed with some satisfaction that proponents of
LQC have considerably toned down their rhetoric of dynamical evolution over the last few
months. At the Seventh International Conference on the History of General Relativity which
took place on La Tenerife from 9-15 March 2005, Abhay Ashtekar has informed me that he
and his collaborators have independently come to the conclusion that thinking about LQC
in terms of dynamical systems evolving deterministically is problematic and that they are
planning to drop, or at least significantly attenuate this language. In December 2005, Martin
Bojowald has published a review on LQC including a brief section on determinism (Bojowald
2005, Sec. 7.3), which draws on exchanges we have had.
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Of course, all these difficulties ultimately stem from the fact that we are dealing here
with a generally covariant theory which does not admit an external time against which a
dynamical evolution can be determined. Time, just like space, was part of the physical
system which LQG originally set out to quantize!
8.2 THE INFIDELS: RECENT CRITIQUES OF LOOP QUANTUM
COSMOLOGY
In this section, I investigate and discuss the most important objections which have been put
forth against LQC. There are four, and they are ordered according to what I take to be their
graveness, from mild to devastating. Some of them, discussed in Subsections 8.2.1-8.2.3,
make a particular choice of matter and thus of Ĉmatter and then derive some problematic
features. Others, such as Brunnemann and Thiemann, question the very ambition of LQC
to represent the cosmological sector of LQG.
8.2.1 Noui, Perez, and Vandersloot: separable but small physical Hilbert space
Noui, Perez, and Vandersloot (2005) follow, like LQC, the recipe of imposing symmetry
reduction in order to successfully construct the physical Hilbert space of the theory. As
a classical vantage point, they use the self-dual Plebanski action rather than the standard
Einstein-Hilbert action.7 The Plebanski action is a low-energy effective action for classi-
cal general relativity. The advantage of this approach is a simple Hamiltonian constraint
function, whose quantum operator turns out to be self-adjoint—unlike the typical Hamil-
tonian constraint operators encountered in LQC. It is the self-adjointness of the Hamilto-
nian constraint operator which allows the application of a technique called refined algebraic
quantization (Ashtekar et al. 1995) using “group averaging methods” in order to solve the
quantum constraint equations and thus to find the physical Hilbert space. Noui, Perez,
and Vandersloot show how this approach can be brought to bear fruit in the context of
homogeneous and isotropic cosmological models based on canonical quantum gravity. Their
approach, however, also comes at a price: it is only well-defined in the Riemannian sector of
the theory, but not in the physically relevant Lorentzian sector.8
7For how the different actions for GTR in (3 + 1) dimensions relate to one another and the constraints
look like in each case, see Pelda´n (1994).
8By Lorentzian quantum gravity, one usually denotes a quantum theory of gravity whose partition function
is given by an expression of the type
∫
eiS[gµν ], where S[gµν ] is the Einstein-Hilbert (or the Plebanski) action
for a Lorentzian metric gµν . A theory with the same partition function is called Riemannian quantum gravity
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The model Noui, Perez, and Vandersloot (2005) present shares the kinematical Hilbert
space with LQC as described above, but takes a different route in the construction of a
Hamiltonian constraint operator. This operator, to repeat, is self-adjoint in their approach
but not in standard LQC.9 This enables them to adopt the inner product of the kinematical
Hilbert space and project it unto the physical Hilbert space. The states in physical Hilbert
space are now those states which satisfy the quantum Hamiltonian constraint equation, i.e.
those states which are annihilated by the Hamiltonian operator. Noui and collaborators
find that in the case of a non-vanishing cosmological constant, the physical Hilbert space is
reduced to one dimension. Physical states, as a result of the requirement that they must
satisfy the Hamiltonian constraint equation, are exactly those states with a vanishing norm.
Noui, Perez, and Vandersloot (2005) claim that their main results transcribe into the
Lorentzian sector of the theory and should therefore be taken seriously. Because of the
symmetry relations of isotropy and homogeneity imposed, the relationship between the Rie-
mannian and the Lorentzian sector of the theory become tractable. They then explicate
how their approach and standard LQC share the same semi-classical limits. All this is quite
unproblematic. But it does not suffice to make their point, as the regime at interest here
is the irreducibly quantum regime around the big bang, where the differences between the
self-adjoint Hamiltonian operator constructed from the self-dual Plebanski action and the
non-self-adjoint Hamiltonian operator constructed from the Einstein-Hilbert action, both ap-
propriately restricted to isotropic and homogeneous spacetimes, show up most prominently.
This does not come as a surprise, given that the Plebanski action most closely mimics the
Einstein-Hilbert action in the low energy limit of an effective field theory of gravity. In
this sense, the Plebanski action does not seem adequate for investigations into the quantum
regime governing the very early universe. Thus, I urge that the critique against LQC voiced
by Noui, Perez, and Vandersloot (2005) must be received with this important limitation in
mind.
in case gµν is a Riemannian metric with signature (++++). Riemannian quantum gravity is easily confused
with another term often found in the pertinent literature, Euclidean quantum gravity. The latter name
refers to quantum theories of gravity which also use the Einstein-Hilbert (or Plebanski) action S[gµν ] for a
Riemannian metric, but have a different partition function, given by
∫
e−S[gµν ].
9However, self-adjoint Hamiltonian operators have been proposed in the context of standard LQC, e.g. by
Bojowald et al. (2004b). While it is possible to define a group averaging procedure even for non-self-adjoint
Hamiltonian operators, this may be unattractive from the numerical point of view as non-real eigenvalues
may lead to numerical instabilities (ibid.).
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8.2.2 Cartin and Khanna: Bianchi I model
A similar study by Cartin and Khanna (2005) investigates whether LQC produces reasonable
results for “late times” in the Bianchi I model, a simple anisotropic cosmological model.
They argue that at a safe distance from the classical singularity, i.e. for “late times” in the
proposed sense of evolution, the models of LQC must satisfy certain restrictions in order to
exhibit the expected classical behaviour in this regime and they show that this is not the
case for the Bianchi I case. Cartin and Khanna conclude from this that either the method
of quantization used in LQC does not yield useful results or else the conditions imposed
in order to obtain the correct classical behaviour were overly restrictive. However, it could
also be the case that the homogeneous and spatially flat Bianchi I model fails to represent
the adequate model for early anisotropic perturbations of an increasingly isotropic universe.
The second and third leg of this trilemma do not threaten the enterprise of LQC. It is an
open question, therefore, whether Cartin and Khanna’s study poses a damaging challenge
to LQC, and if so to what extent.
8.2.3 Green and Unruh: closed model
The presentation and discussion of LQC in Section 7.3 focused on quantum models of the
flat FLRW-model with k = 0 and largely ignored the closed model with k = 1.10 Green and
Unruh (2004) fill the gap by offering an analysis of the closed model, focusing on the case of
a universe which is empty except for a massless scalar field. They find two difficulties with
the description of the closed model as given by LQC.
First, for the closed model in particular, it turns out that the scale factor cannot serve
as an adequate cosmological time parameter. Motivated by the classical analogy, advocates
of LQC have taken the scale factor as a surrogate cosmological time, as there was no longer
an explicit time dependence in the dynamical Hamiltonian constraint equation. Their idea
was to then study the dynamical evolution of the remaining degrees of freedom with respect
to this one. An immediate difficulty arises when one attempts to adopt this approach for
recollapsing closed models: the scale factor will assume the same numerical value twice
in the course of the history of the universe, whereas one would want to assign a different
time to both instances of the same scale factor. Generally, the same volume of the universe
would correspond to different times in its evolution. Thus, for recollapsing models, a bijective
mapping between scales of the universe and cosmological times in its evolution is not possible.
10To repeat from footnote 17, the derivation as given in Section 7.3 does not cover the FLRW-models with
negative curvature k = −1.
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An advocate of LQC could, of course, rejoin to this objection that a bijective mapping
will only be required for either the expansive or the collapsing epoch, but not for both.
Whichever epoch will not be covered by the bijective mapping, can be described by a kind of
“mirroring”: the covered epoch is just duplicated and both phases are then joined such as to
complete the closed model. At the heart of the construction, of course, lies the assumption
that both epochs are perfectly symmetric insofar as one is just the time-reversal of the other,
including all physical processes within it. However, the fact that all physical processes will
be time-reversed by the mirroring implies that physical time too will be time-reversed! This
result stands independently of how a physical time might be defined, just as long as one
accepts that the construction of a physical time can solely rely on some physical processes
within the universe, adequately chosen for the purposes of introducing a physical time with
a consistent direction. But it is exactly that a globally consistent direction can no longer be
assigned for the entire closed model consisting of an expansive as well as a recollapsing epoch
as the temporal direction will be opposite in both epochs to be conjoined. A way out of the
quandary can only be found at the price of admitting that the construction of a physical time
must proceed differently in both epochs in order to achieve a globally consistent direction of
time. This move, I believe, belies the principles of a scientific endeavour which forgoes the
services of ad-hoc reasoning.
However, the defender of LQC may retort by biting the bullet and admitting that if the
“mirroring” technique is used to construct a closed quantum FLRWmodel, physical time and
all physical processes will indeed be time-reversed in this approach. This may not be overly
disquieting as LQC present a rather simple, reduced theory which cannot accommodate
complex physical processes anyway, and which, in fact, was not built to accommodate them.
So this may just be taken as an indication of the limits of LQC to offer a fundamental theory,
rather than as a proof of its failure to capture important aspects of a quantum cosmological
model based on GTR.
The second difficulty identified by Green and Unruh (2004) concerns the fact that a closed
universe reaches a maximum size. Thus, any model capturing a closed universe, regardless of
whether it is classical or quantum, should not permit sizes larger than this maximum. In the
case of a quantum model, this means that whichever operators of the quantum theory contain
the scale information must be bounded from above. For the models of LQC, more precisely,
the scale or fundamental triad operator (7.9) must have in its spectrum an eigenvalue µmax
such that all µ > µmax vanish, or at least quickly converge to zero. If this is the case, then
the expectation value of the scale operator will not exceed this maximum value. The second
difficulty is just that: this convergence does not take place; quite the contrary, Green and
Unruh have discovered some wildly diverging behaviour for large scales.
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Essentially, Green and Unruh (2004) study the dependence of the state coefficients
ψ(φ, µ) of equation (7.13) on the scale µ. Instead of a rapidly decaying behaviour for
µ > µmax, they find that the ψ(φ, µ) grow exponentially, or show otherwise divergent be-
haviour for large µ for a wide variety of secondary parameters. They also explore different
ansa¨tze to quantize the closed model in the context of loop quantum gravity but conclude
that at least the obvious ones fail. In sum, they argue, the closed model of classical cosmology
cannot be accounted for in the framework of LQG.
Is this a problem? Green and Unruh (2004) insist that it is. They argue that although it
is perfectly acceptable for cosmologists, including those working in LQC, to focus on the flat
case as extant observations suggest that our Universe is very nearly flat, cosmology must be
able to understand the flat model as a limiting case of the closed model. Such understanding,
they continue, is necessary to adequately address the so-called “flatness problem,” according
to which the fact that our Universe’s density is very close to the critical value, i.e. the value
Ω = 1 which amounts to an expansion rate that asymptotically tends to zero, must be
explained by an acceptable cosmological theory.
The request for an explanation of the fact that our Universe is very nearly flat, however,
does not deliver a fatal blow to any theory incapable of fulfilling this demand. The flatness
problem is essentially a cosmological fine-tuning problem. Whether or not the flatness prob-
lem really requires, and affords, a scientific explanation, is an open question. If it does, there
are two possibilities: either physicists manage to find a mechanism which forces the Universe
to be nearly flat, or else one can attempt to acquit the explanatory debt by reference to a
systematic observation selection bias, such as an anthropic principle. In the first instance,
inflation can be constructed such as to be capable to sufficiently flatten any non-flat region
present before the inflationary period (Guth 1981). However, since LQC also seems to be im-
plying an inflationary phase, it can account for the observed flatness just as well as any other
inflationary cosmology, and demanding that LQC must be capable of adequately describing
the closed model in order to solve the flatness problem is unwarranted.
If these or similar explanations invoking some sort of physical mechanism eliminating
non-flatness are seen as deficient, accepting the explanatory debt seems to force a retreat
to invoking some kind of observation selection effects.11 One such systematic bias, usually
referred to in the literature as the weak anthropic principle, states that the observed values
of the physical parameters of cosmological models cannot assume arbitrary values but are
restricted by the requirements that there exist regions in the universe where carbon-based life
can evolve and that the universe is sufficiently old for it to have already done so. In other
11For a systematic account of observation selection effects, see Bostrom (2002); see Bostrom (2003) for a
recent summary.
150
words, the weak anthropic principle demands that our observations are restricted by the
necessary conditions for our existence.12 Such a weak form of anthropic reasoning, however,
while surely true, does not seem to do a lot of explanatory work.13 Requesting a scientific
explanation of the observation that our Universe is almost flat seems to ask for more than
being reminded of the fact that otherwise we would not be here to observe anything. The
anthropic principle can of course be strengthened by insisting that our observations are not
merely restricted by the necessary conditions for our existence, but that these conditions,
furthermore, are necessary or at least highly probable themselves. While such a strong form
of anthropic principle would certainly enjoy more explanatory potency, it seems scientifically
untenable unless it is amended by a satisfactory explanation as to why these conditions
should necessarily, or at least likely, obtain.
An explanation of this type would of course be susceptible to all criticisms against strong
forms of anthropic reasoning, including the recent ones by Smolin (2006). In this article,
Smolin offers a tentative explanation of why these life-enabling conditions are very likely
to prevail. His account involves what he dubs “cosmological natural selection.” Cosmolog-
ical natural selection is based on three premises, in close analogy to evolutionary biology,
which, according to Smolin, is the only science which has successfully managed to explain
the emergence and stability of complexity by offering a simple mechanism. These three as-
sumptions are: (i) there exists a physical process which produces a multiverse with a long
chain of descendants, (ii) for the space P of N dimensionless parameters pi, with i = 1, ..., N ,
of the standard models of particle physics and cosmology, there exists a “fitness function”
F (pi) on P which encodes the average number of descendants of a universe with parameters
pi, and (iii) the parameters pi for each universe differ from those of its immediate ancestor
universe, on average by a random change sufficiently small as not to significantly change
F (pi). If the multiverse, i.e. the population of universes, is sufficiently large, and is tested
on sufficiently many random runs, then the population of universes will be peaked around
local maxima of F (pi) after sufficiently many generations. These assumptions directly imply
that if the parameters pi are shifted around in P , i.e. changed in their values, then F (pi)
will be systematically decreased. Unlike other accounts of anthropic reasoning, cosmological
natural selection offers predictions, which are in principle testable. Moreover, like inflation,
it provides a mechanism which ascertains that our Universe exhibits the values of physical
parameters that it does.
So either one can find such a mechanism, or else we must appease our explanatory desire
12I have borrowed this definition from Smeenk (2003, Sec. 5.5).
13Bostrom has argued, and I tend to agree, that not anthropic principles per se are problematic, but that
whether or not they can play an explanatory role depends on the specific context to which they are applied.
According to Bostrom, even the weak anthropic principle thus affords an explanatory value in some contexts.
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by inviting anthropic reasoning. Depending on what one’s take on anthropic reasoning is—
and there seem to be significant differences, to say the least—, we have thereby gained a
satisfactory explanation of the flatness of the Universe or we must content ourselves with
acknowledging that we have reached the explanatory limits of scientific enquiry.
Let us return to Green and Unruh’s claim that solving the flatness problem requires an
understanding of how the flat model is a limiting case of the closed model, and that therefore
the ability to adequately accommodate the closed model is for any cosmological theory a
necessary precondition for solving the flatness problem. The last three paragraphs indicate,
in my opinion, that first, it is not entirely clear to what extent the request for an explanation
of flatness may be granted at all, and second, even in case it is, it seems as if the inflationary
phase discovered by Bojowald (2002a) when the matter Hamiltonian Ĉmatter of LQC contains
a massless scalar field can go at least some length toward producing the inflation required for
accounting for the flatness (Bojowald and Vandersloot 2003). In sum, then, although I do not
dispute Greens and Unruh’s result that LQC cannot adequately accommodate closed FLRW
models, I doubt that this failure presents an insurmountable and principled difficulty for it.
It may well be the case that the flatness problem does not admit of a scientific explanation
at all, or it may be that LQC yields an inflationary mechanism capable of accounting for the
flatness without recourse to the closed model as a limiting case of the flat one.
Finally, there is perhaps a sense in which it should not come as a surprise that LQC is
unable to properly handle closed FLRW models: after all, a closed model needs matter or
energy to generate a sufficiently strong gravitational pull to recollapse. But LQC is based on
LQG, which is a quantization of the vacuum sector of the phase space of Hamiltonian GTR
and as such, does not admit matter in the universe. This suggests that introducing matter
in LQC may be more subtle than just plugging a few matter fields into Ĉmatter. Obviously,
this is a delicate point for which nobody has a good answer for the time being. But it is
also a potentially disastrous point for LQC as one may react by exclaiming “so much the
worse for LQC.” Matter, including all its garden varieties as well as all versions of dark
and mysterious matter forms, is of paramount importance in cosmology in general and for
closed FLRW models in particular. Without the confidence that the coupling of matter to
gravity is correctly understood, it remains optimistic at best and na¨ıve at worst to believe
that the symmetry-reduced models of LQC adequately describe the cosmological sector of
the physical Hilbert space of the correct quantum theory of gravity. What LQC can teach
us about quantum cosmology, therefore, may be very limited indeed.
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8.2.4 Brunnemann and Thiemann: cosmology or not?
The advocate of LQC may still recover from these objections, but the points raised in Brun-
nemann and Thiemann (2006a) pose a more serious threat. Also, the first three objections
discussed cast doubt of the entire project of LQC, or of some particular aspects or mod-
els, but not specifically on its claim that the kinematical and the dynamical singularities
disappear. Thus, they only indirectly cast doubt on the claimed resolution of the initial sin-
gularity. The article by Brunnemann and Thiemann, however, does both. Their paper builds
on the important result obtained in Brunnemann and Thiemann (2006b) according to which
the argument in LQC leading to the boundedness of the spectrum of the inverse scale factor
operator does not translate into the full theory. More precisely, Brunnemann and Thiemann
ask whether it is indeed the case in the full theory that at the classical singularity, i.e. for
the kinematical quantum state corresponding to a universe of zero volume, the inverse of the
triad operator has a finite eigenvalue which would correspond to finite curvature. It turns
out that quite generically for a state of zero volume, the inverse scale factor is unbounded
from above in the full theory. According to Brunnemann and Thiemann, inhomogeneous
quantum excitations are responsible for the unboundedness of the inverse triad operator.
These inhomogeneous excitations are of course admissible in the full theory, but they are
precluded from making an appearance in the symmetry-reduced, strictly homogeneous LQC.
It is ironic, however, that it is the inhomogeneities which now endanger the extermination
at least of the kinematic singularity of the classical models of cosmology when the presence
of this singularity was first believed to be the artificial result of the only approximately
valid symmetry of homogeneity, as was discussed at the outset of Chapter 6. As cited on
page 103, Einstein initially believed that the occurrence of the big-bang singularity was an
artefact of the unrealistic assumption of a perfectly homogeneous and isotropic universe and
would vanish once small perturbations of these perfect symmetries were allowed to enter. Of
course, the singularity theorems of Penrose, Hawking, and Geroch conclusively deposed this
intuition. The calculation of Brunnemann and Thiemann (2006b) now suggests an intuition
diametrically opposed to the one Einstein expressed: the inhomogeneities are not the remedy
against, but the source of the singular behaviour, at least as far as the kinematical singularity
is concerned.
As Brunnemann and Thiemann (2006a) continue, however, the unboundedness of the
inverse triad operator should not be preemptively taken to imply that cosmological models
based on the full theory of LQG suffer from a kinematical singularity. The main reason for
this implication to fail is that although an operator may well be unbounded in general, it
may become bounded when the Hilbert space is restricted to a particular subspace. This
153
means that the boundedness of the inverse triad operator is not necessary for the elimination
of the kinematical singularity. Brunnemann and Thiemann argue that the restriction to the
appropriately chosen cosmological sector of the full theory does indeed lead to the bound-
edness of the inverse triad operator at the big bang. They define the cosmological sector
of the kinematical Hilbert space as the sector which describes a homogeneous and isotropic
universe at large scales, thus admitting for small inhomogeneous and anisotropic perturba-
tions. The idea then is to let the volume of the universe go to zero and check whether the
expectation value of the inverse scale factor operator grows beyond all bounds. Brunnemann
and Thiemann propose to regard the sector of the kinematical Hilbert space with those co-
herent states peaked at homogeneous and isotropic symmetries. If this proposal is accepted,
then inhomogeneous and anisotropic excitations of the largely homogeneous and isotropic
coherent states are still admissible, but confined to remain small.14 For such a coherent state
of zero volume corresponding to the universe at the big bang, Brunnemann and Thiemann
claim to have established that the expectation value of the inverse triad operator with re-
spect to this state is bound from above. This calculation, unlike both the standard approach
taken in LQC as well as the unboundedness of the inverse triad operator in the kinematical
Hilbert space of the full theory, they claim, suggests that the kinematical singularity at the
big bang is indeed avoided in cosmological models based on full LQG.
While this is promising, Brunnemann and Thiemann warn that it does not imply that
the kinematical singularity vanishes. In this sense, the boundedness of the expectation value
of the inverse triad operator with respect to a largely homogeneous and isotropic coherent
state at the big bang is also not a sufficient condition for the elimination of the kinematical
singularity. The reason for this is that the inverse scale factor—or the scale factor, for
that matter—is not a gauge-invariant quantity and consequently not a Dirac observable. It
is merely an operator defined on the kinematical Hilbert space which is used as a kind of
auxiliary magnitude in LQC to construct a cosmological model. In order to make meaningful
physical predictions, Brunnemann and Thiemann argue, one would need the full physical
Hilbert space HS of LQC and operators densely defined on this Hilbert space.
Also as far as the dynamical singularity avoidance is concerned, Brunnemann and Thie-
mann (2006a) continue, the issue is far from resolved. They argue that although it may be
the case either that kinematical states dynamically decouple and that additional constraints
thus arise or that a violation of Laplacean determinism occurs or both, as outlined in Section
8.1, the absence of both of these effect are neither sufficient nor necessary for the avoidance
of dynamical singularities. It is not necessary, they claim, because even in the presence
14The particular set of coherent states at use here has been constructed by Thiemann (2001a), Thiemann
and Winkler (2001a,b), and by Sahlmann et al. (2001).
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of both effects, the physical Hilbert space may be sufficiently large as to accommodate all
semi-classical cosmological models needed to emulate the classically relevant ones at large
scales. It is also not sufficient because even in the absence of both effects, it might turn
out that many of the dynamical states are not normalizable or have zero norm and thus not
eligible as members of the physical Hilbert space. If many of the candidate states have to be
excluded for these reasons, the physical Hilbert space may no longer be sufficiently large as
to accommodate the important semi-classical sector describing cosmologically relevant mod-
els. Thus, Brunnemann and Thiemann conclude, for determining the avoidance of both the
kinematical as well as the dynamical singularity, the issue must be cast in terms of physical
states and physical observables.
While I accept the argument establishing the insufficiency, I wish to take issue with the
one claiming non-necessity. Brunnemann and Thiemann argue that although there might
be indeterministic behaviour of the quantum Friedmann equation as described in Section
8.1, the dynamical singularity might vanish as long as the physical Hilbert space contains a
semi-classical cosmological sector. It appears as if they take the containment of such sector in
HS as a sufficient condition for the resolution of the dynamical singularity, for otherwise the
argument would not be valid. This interpretation is supported by a quote from much later
into the article: “[...] the [dynamical] singularity is avoided if and only if there are sufficiently
many semiclassical [physical states composed of spin network states that describe a sign flip
with respect to the expectation value of the triad orientation sign operator].” (p. 1421) The
particular states are required, according to Brunnemann and Thiemann, in order to correctly
describe quantum geometries including a pre-big-bang regime. I am willing to grant that it
may be a necessary condition, but because I insist that as long as only quasi-determinism,
but not determinism, is satisfied at the “big bang,” there survives a residue of the dynamical
singularity even if such a sector is present. The obedience to full determinism is also a
necessary condition for the complete quantum evaporation of dynamical singularities. So we
have (at least) two necessary conditions, none of which is individually sufficient.
According to Brunnemann and Thiemann (2006a, Sec. 5), the proper resolution of the
issue would involve the construction of Dirac observables from partial observables which
“evolve” with respect to another partial observable, a “clock” variable such as the scale
factor, following the scheme proposed by Dittrich (2004). Once the physical states and
some Dirac observables have been found, a semi-classical sector would have to be identified
which correctly approximates the classically relevant cosmological models, and a physical
Hamiltonian would have to be constructed in order to determine physical evolution, as
opposed to the evolution with respect to a non-gauge invariant quantity. This will permit
the resolution of the issue whether the dynamical singularity disappears: if the physical
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Hamiltonian is essentially self-adjoint, it will deliver a regular physical evolution. Once
all this is in place, one can take an operator defined on the physical Hilbert space and
representing a physical observable which corresponds to a classically singular quantity such
as curvature, density etc. Then, calculate the expectation value of this operator with respect
to semi-classical states peaked around what corresponds to classically singular initial data
and conclude that the kinematical singularity is avoided just in case this expectation value
is finite. While Brunnemann and Thiemann admit that this programme is highly ambitious,
they insist that it offers the only path to the full resolution of whether Einstein’s nemesis is
finally vanquished in the quantum theory.
This completes the part of my dissertation on the loop quantum avoidance of the initial
singularity. So does the singularity vanish? The short answer is, particularly in the light of
the discussion of Brunnemann and Thiemann (2006a), we do not know yet. There are many
things that can be said about the evaporation of singularities, and I have tried to say a few
in the preceding three chapters. But let me say one more thing: even if it will turn out that
the singularities of the classical theory are not all avoided in the quantum theory, this by no
means implies the failure of the quantum theory. In the classical theory, we have learnt that
singularities only become really problematic when they havoc global hyperbolicity. Penrose’s
cosmic censorship hypothesis, if true, protects physically reasonable classical scenarios from
breeding naked singularities, i.e. those singularities which wreck global hyperbolicity. It is
still an open issue, however, whether the hypothesis is, in fact, true. Suppose that the
hypothesis is not true. Does LQG command the resources to prevent the formation of naked
singularities in the deep quantum regime? According to Bojowald,15 the only article which
addresses this question is Goswami, Joshi, and Singh (2006). Goswami and collaborators
investigate the quantum gravitational collapse of a scalar field which classically forms a
naked singularity. They claim that a semi-classical analysis based on LQC shows that just
as a naked singularity tends to form, a very strong outward energy flux will prevent the
formation of such a singularity in LQG. One may wonder, of course, how it can be that LQG,
which was expressly based on globally hyperbolic classical spacetime, may offer a promising
investigation into how spacetimes hosting naked singularities might be modified by quantum
effects. The basic idea of Goswami, Joshi, and Singh (2006) is the following: model the
gravitational collapse by pasting together an interior and an exterior solution. The exterior
region is assumed to be classical, but the interior of a homogeneous scalar field collapse, which
15Personal communication, 9 March 2006.
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is classically described as an FLRW spacetime, can be treated by using techniques from LQC.
In this case, of course, the cosmological time of the FLRW model is reversed from its usual
direction such that we have classically a final singularity. In the classical model, this final
singularity will be naked for particular choices of physical parameters. Similar considerations
as those adduced above concerning the disappearance of singularities in LQC equally apply
here. The situation is insofar different, though, as a particular matter field is assumed.
With this in place, Goswami, Joshi, and Singh (2006) compute, using effective equations,
that strong outward energy fluxes occur “due to supernegative pressures in the late regime”
(p. 4) which prevent the collapse from completing and the singularity from forming. At least
for the case at hand, Goswami and collaborators conclude, loop quantum effects thus uphold
a quantum gravitational cosmic censorship. Some of the details of their argument have been
questioned.16 Be this as it may, the study of the fate of naked singularities is but a nascent
enterprise. It thus remains entirely open whether the formation of naked singularities is
avoided altogether in the picture of quantum spacetime as drawn by LQG.
16Martin Bojowald, personal communication, 9 March 2006.
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9.0 THE EMERGENCE OF SPACETIME
As we have seen in Chapter 5, the continuity of the classical spacetime is dissolved at the
fundamental level in LQG and replaced by the combinatorial structure of spin networks and
spinfoams. A relevant question then becomes how—and whether—the continuous spacetime
structure can be recovered in the classical limit. Answering this question must, by necessity,
remain speculative on the present occasion as the programme of constructing a complete
and consistent canonical theory of quantum gravity has not been brought to its successful
completion yet. But a few things, it seems, can still be said about the disappearance and
the re-emergence of spacetime.
So spacetime disappears. How this disappearance of spacetime is to be understood in the
present context will be clarified in Section 9.1. What is clearly not meant is the demise of
space and time qua Newtonian containers in which physics unfolds, wrought by the advent
of relativistic physics. This effect already appears at the classical level of relativistic physics
and has been widely addressed by the philosophical and scientific communities. There exists
a plethora of studies concerned with this consequence of GTR and the problem seems to
survive the transition from the classical to the quantum theory unmodified. Except for a brief
remark at the outset of Section 9.1, it shall not be covered here. More interestingly, Section
9.1 discusses a proposal due to Callender and Huggett (2001a). Callender and Huggett
characterize the disappearance of spacetime via a presumed unitary inequivalence of the
spin network basis with the basis of quantum three-metrics in quantum geometrodynamics.
But the sense in which spacetime disappears I shall be most concerned with is the dissolution
at the Planck scale of the smooth geometric structure of classical spacetime into the discrete
structures which replace it in the quantum theory.
Section 9.2 will first discuss what the most promising approaches to recovering the clas-
sical structure from the discrete quantum world given the persistent failure to find such a
semi-classical or classical limit so far are. Next, I shall issue a brief reminder of the most
widely used notions of reductive relations between theories or between different explanatory
levels in the contemporary literature on emergence and reduction in philosophy of science,
most notably Butterfield and Isham (2001). These philosophical accounts shall then be ana-
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lyzed with an eye toward which ones, if any, could be most fruitfully applied to the problem
of finding a semi-classical limit for LQG. Conversely, QG might offer some relevant lessons
for the philosophical literature. So the philosophical literature may serve as a toolbox for the
specific problem of disappearance and re-emergence of spacetime in the context of canonical
quantizations and may give guidance to physicists seeking to understand the classical limit
of LQG. It would be exaggerated if one expected the philosophers to do the heavy-lifting,
but it is encouraging to receive reassurances from physicists that philosophical guidance is
welcome.1 On the other hand, the present context may offer a case study which helps to
refine the philosophers’ toolbox.
Before I embark on the outlined programme, a couple of remarks. First, it may not
be necessary that GTR can be fully recovered in the sense that all its models ME have
to re-appear in a well-justified classical limit. There might be valid quantum reasons why
models with singular spacetimes do not re-appear when moving from the quantum to the
classical theory. Given the self-imposed restriction to models with spacetime of topology
R× Σ necessitated by the canonical formalism, one would surely expect to see only models
with spacetimes of this topology to re-emerge. This automatically precludes the possibility
that models with acausal structure emerge from the quantum theory. Second, to the extent
to which Hamiltonian GTR differs from GTR, one would expect to see a emergent theory
different from GTR. In particular, if it is the case that the symmetries of have been changed
in recasting GTR as a Hamiltonian system, the symmetries of the emergent classical theory
must be modified as well. Generally, it would be immensely interesting to see whether the set
of models of the emergent classical theory differs in any way from the set of models admitted
by Hamiltonian GTR.
9.1 DISAPPEARANCE OF SPACETIME
In modern physics, space and time have suffered the loss of their privileged role as inert
Newtonian background on which all physical phenomena must be understood.2 General
relativity has demanded that they give up their status as fixed stage for all physical processes
and become part of the dynamical interaction among physical entities themselves. Thus,
although there still exists a spacetime, it is no longer absolute, but it is demoted to being
1As a prominent example, such reassurance has been repeatedly issued to me by Carlo Rovelli.
2Of course, Newtonian spacetime can only be considered as “inert” insofar as it is not “acted upon” by
the matter content of the universe. The converse does not hold true as it acts upon the matter content by
determining the geodesics along which matter cruises.
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just another physical field. The fact that GTR has Diff(M) as gauge symmetry means, due
to the hole argument as discussed in Chapter 4, that the view which takes the spacetime
manifold to be a substance has come under pressure. So there is a sense in which space
and time have disappeared in the relativistic revolution, with its far-reaching philosophical
consequences. Some of those who have resisted these consequences put their hopes into
quantum physics. The idea behind this manoeuvre is to avoid bearing the consequences
of relativity on the grounds that it does not constitute a fundamental theory. Therefore,
the argument goes, the cataclysmic implications of GTR are merely tentative as all non-
fundamental physics is subject to revision. Insofar as LQG claims to be a fundamental
theory of gravity, its consequences can no longer be so lightly dismissed. LQG, just like
any canonical quantization of GTR, starts out from GTR as a constrained Hamiltonian
system, where the constraints encode the background independence and thus the generally
relativistic innovation here at stake. As has been seen in Chapter 5, the constraints carry
the background independence right through the quantization process over into the quantum
theory. Modulo the reservations discussed in Chapter 4, canonical quantizations of GTR
thus take the lack of an inert spacetime container very seriously. This means that LQG does
not alter the verdict of GTR with respect to the Newtonian container ex constructione. So
in this first sense of disappearance, spacetime no more and no less disappears in canonical
quantum gravity than it does already at the classical level.
The second and third senses in which the spacetime disappears, however, constitute true
innovations of quantum gravity. Let me start with the third reason for mourning the demise
of spacetime, the conjectured unitary inequivalence between the bases of spin networks and of
functionals of three-metrics in quantum geometrodynamics. Callender and Huggett (2001a,
p. 21) seem to suggest to use this criterion of unitary equivalence to determine whether or
not spacetime can still be regarded as fundamental in LQG. If the two bases were unitarily
equivalent, in Callender and Huggett’s view, they would represent two different codifications
of the same objects and it would not make sense to claim that one is more fundamental
than the other. If, however, they were unitarily inequivalent, one would infer their physical
inequivalence as unitary equivalence is considered a necessary condition for physical equiv-
alence. From the perspective of LQG, Callender and Huggett conclude, this inequivalence
implied that spin networks were the basic constituents and spacetime, encoded in the func-
tionals of the three-metrics and their conjugate momenta, merely emergent or supervenient.
More precisely, it is not spacetime which would be emergent in this case, but space tout
court. If the three-metrics, and perhaps the spin networks, encode any aspect of classical
spacetime, it will be its three-dimensional, “spatial” part and not the entire four-dimensional
spacetime structure. Let me dismantle what I take to be Callender and Huggett’s idea.
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The setting, of course, to introduce the notion of unitary equivalence vital to Callender
and Huggett’s argument is a Hilbert space theory.3 Typically, the concept is introduced in the
context of operator representations of the canonical commutation relations. A representation
of the canonical commutation relations is a pair (H, {Ôi}) consisting of a Hilbert space H
and a set {Ôi} of bounded, essentially self-adjoint operators Ôi ∈ Besa(H) acting on H and
satisfying the canonical commutation relations. These commutation relations typically arise
from the Poisson bracket structure of the corresponding classical theory. Two representations
(H, {Ôi}) and (H′, {Ô′i}) are said to be unitarily equivalent just in case there exists a bijective,
linear, norm-preserving transformation, i.e. a unitary map, U : H → H′ such that U−1Ô′iU =
Ôi for all i. If one takes the operators to represent the observables of the quantum theory,
then the physical content of this quantum theory is exhausted by the matrix elements of
these operators. Thus, if (H, {Ôi}) and (H′, {Ô′i}) are unitarily equivalent, then the two
representations are physically equivalent in the sense that for any |Ψ〉 ∈ H, the state U |Ψ〉 ∈
H′ will have the same physical properties as does the state |Ψ〉.
This characterization of unitary equivalence involving representations of the canonical
commutation relations, although predominant in the literature, is of no direct help for as-
sessing Callender and Huggett’s argument, which instead invokes the concept of unitary
equivalence between different bases in different Hilbert spaces. But the concept can easily
be translated to the case at hand: two bases {|a(k)〉} and {|b(l)〉} of two Hilbert spaces H and
H′ respectively are unitarily equivalent just in case there is a unitary map U : H → H′ such
that U |a(k)〉 = |b(k)〉 for all k. It can be shown that one can easily construct such a unitary
map using the orthonormality and the completeness of the bases: just use U =
∑
k |b(k)〉〈a(k)|
and show by using orthonormality and completeness that U is indeed unitary.
Let me state this somewhat more rigorously. A complete inner product space is called
a Hilbert space, denoted H.4 Perhaps the most important example of a Hilbert space is
the space l2 of all sequences (x1, x2, x3, ...) of complex numbers such that
∑∞
k=1 |xk|2 < ∞
and with an inner product of two sequences x = (x1, ...) and y = (y1, ...) in l
2 defined
by 〈x, y〉 = ∑∞k=1 xky¯k. A sequence of vectors in a Hilbert space H which constitute an
orthonormal system of vectors is termed an orthonormal sequence. A Hilbert space is said
to be separable just in case it contains a complete orthonormal sequence, i.e. just if it admits
a countable orthonormal basis. For example, l2 is separable. Two Hilbert spaces H and H′
3For a presentation of the relevant concepts, see Ruetsche (2003, Sec. 2).
4A vector space E with a norm is called complete just in case every Cauchy sequence converges in E. A
complex vector space E is called an inner product space iff it is equipped with a mapping 〈·, ·〉 : E ×E → C,
a so-called inner product in E, which satisfies the following conditions for all x, y, z ∈ E and α, β ∈ C: (i)
〈x, y〉 = 〈y, x〉 where the overbar denotes the complex conjugate, (ii) 〈αx + βy, z〉 = α〈x, z〉 + β〈y, z〉, and
(iii) 〈x, x〉 ≥ 0, where 〈x, x〉 = 0 implies x = 0. For a great textbook on Hilbert spaces, from which this
paragraph has borrowed, see Debnath and Mikusin´ski (1999).
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are isomorphic if and only if there exists a bijective, linear mapping T : H → H′ such that
〈T (x), T (y)〉 = 〈x, y〉 for every x and y in H. A mapping which satisfies these conditions
is called unitary, as introduced above. It can be shown (Debnath and Mikusin´ski 1999,
Theorem 3.11.3(a)) that if H is an infinite-dimensional separable Hilbert space, then it is
isomorphic to l2. Isomorphisms among Hilbert spaces are an equivalence relation. Since it is
therefore a transitive relation and since any infinite-dimensional separable Hilbert space is
isomorphic to l2, any two infinite-dimensional separable Hilbert spaces must be isomorphic.
As isomorphic Hilbert spaces by definition afford a unitary transformation among their
elements, two bases in infinite-dimensional separable Hilbert spaces will always be unitarily
equivalent.5 More generally even, it can be shown that two Hilbert spaces H and H′ are
isomorphic if and only if dim(H) = dim(H′), where dim(H), the dimension of H, is defined
as the cardinality of the bases of H.6 It is thus a necessary and sufficient condition for H to
be separable that dim(H) is no greater than ℵ0, the cardinality of the natural numbers.
Let us return to the considerations offered by Callender and Huggett (2001a). To re-
peat, their idea was that if LQG turned out to be the correct theory of QG and if its
kinematical base of spin networks is unitarily inequivalent to the geometrodynamical base
of three-metrics, then spacetime cannot be considered as fundamental. Presumably, if the
two bases were unitarily equivalent, the bases should be regarded as equivalent codifications
of the same physical circumstances and spacetime would not loose its claim to fundamen-
tality. This proposal is misguided in several respects. First, in order to establish unitary
(in)equivalence between the spin network and three-metric bases, the physical Hilbert spaces
of both quantum geometrodynamics and LQG would have to be given. On the one hand,
thus, the construction of the Hilbert space of quantum geometrodynamics, i.e. the space of
functionals of three-metrics which solve the diffeomorphism constraints, would be required.
So far, no one has offered such a construction. The major roadblock for this approach seems
to be the intractably difficult form of the constraints, which are non-polynomial. In all fair-
ness, as was already lamented in Chapter 5, loop quantum gravitists have also failed so far
to produce the physical Hilbert space of their theory. No Hilbert space, no basis. No basis,
no checking for unitary equivalence.
But let us, for the argument’s sake, assume that we have such physical Hilbert spaces
of geometrodynamics and of LQG at our disposal. The construction of these Hilbert spaces
5But in the infinite-dimensional case, i.e. when an infinite number of degrees of freedom are considered,
the Hilbert space may nevertheless carry unitarily inequivalent representations of the canonical commuta-
tion relations. The Stone-von Neumann theorem, which establishes the unitary equivalence of all (regular,
irreducible) representations for finitely many degrees of freedom, does not apply to field theories with an
infinite number of degrees of freedom.
6This is Theorem 3 in Halmos (1951, §16).
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is only a necessary, but certainly not a sufficient condition to determine whether the bases
are unitarily equivalent. So even if this construction would—unexpectedly—be achieved, it
would be far from obvious that spacetime remained fundamental in case of unitary equiva-
lence and emergent in case of unitary inequivalence. Let me elaborate.
The Callender and Huggett stance is faced with a quandary: either (i) the physical Hilbert
spaces of quantum geometrodynamics and LQG are both separable, then their criterion is
trivially satisfied; or (ii) one of the physical Hilbert spaces is separable, but the other is not,
which implies that their criterion will not be satisfied; or (iii) the physical Hilbert spaces
of both are non-separable, in which case the bases either (a) have the same cardinality or
(b) they do not. In case (iii)(a), the Hilbert spaces are isomorphic and we are essentially
back to situation (i). In case (iii)(b), the Hilbert spaces are not isomorphic and we are back
to situation (ii). In reaction to (i), one could impose the additional requirement that the
unitary transformation connecting the two bases must also preserve some set of algebraic
relations characteristic of quantum geometrodynamics and also some set of algebraic relations
characteristic of LQG. Characteristic algebraic relations would surely include, but need not
be limited to, the canonical commutation relations. If the criterion would be thus amended, it
would no longer be a foregone conclusion that there will exist such a unitary transformation.
Thus, it turns out that the question of whether bases of different Hilbert spaces are uni-
tarily equivalent or not is not only not terribly exciting, but is also ill-suited to constitute
a decisive criterion as to whether spacetime was fundamental or not. The imposition of the
additional (or alternative) requirement demanding unitary equivalence of Hilbert space rep-
resentations of the canonical commutation relations or some relevant algebras of observables
at least renders the issue of whether spacetime is fundamental or not contingent and thus
more interesting. Halvorson (2004), in an attempt to offer a rigorous formulation of Bohr’s
notion of complementarity, studies representations of the canonical commutation relations7
for the one-dimensional particle. He constructs two representations, the “position” and the
“momentum” representation. These representations, which are both set in a non-separable
Hilbert space, are not unitarily equivalent to one another or to the regular Schro¨dinger rep-
resentation. The position representation, for instance, contains exact position eigenstates,
of which there are as many as there exist real numbers. Hence, the Hilbert space is not
separable. This representation does not entertain a momentum operator, and in the anal-
ogous momentum representation, there exists no position operator.8 Although these two
representations are empirically equivalent in that they command sufficient resources to fully
7More precisely: he investigates representations of the Weyl algebra arising from the canonical commu-
tation relations.
8This is Theorem 1 in Halvorson (2004, p. 51).
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capture any physical measurement procedure, Halvorson argues, the further claim that they
must also be physically equivalent is not implied as the theoretical explanations they offer
may differ significantly. Be this as it may, the issue of whether two different representations
are unitarily equivalent is a contingent matter.
The matter would also be contingent, albeit for a very different reason, as long as the
debate about separability in LQG lingers on and it thus remains an open question whether
case (i) or (ii) applies. Nothing can be said about whether the Hilbert space of quantum
geometrodynamics will be separable or not, and for this reason alone, the question must
remain open. But let us look at least at the LQG side. In LQG, there exists an important
controversy about the separability not of the yet to be found physical Hilbert space, but of
the kinematical Hilbert space which admits a basis of spin network states, as explicated in
Chapter 5. An influential discussion of the issue of separability has been offered in Streater
and Wightman (1964, Sec. 2.6), who argue that the assumption that if one works in a field
theory, one must only consider non-separable Hilbert spaces, is erroneous. In fact, they
give strong motivations that most physically relevant circumstances will be described in
separable Hilbert spaces, even in field theories. They mention two relevant situations when
non-separability emerges. The first arises when one is faced with an infinite tensor product
of Hilbert spaces, which is always non-separable. The second example, from statistical
mechanics, concerns the expansion of a rigid box containing the physical system at stake
such as to make the box arbitrarily large while maintaining the density. Both cases involve
non-separable Hilbert spaces only because one considers actual infinities, which, according
to Streater and Wightman, makes the systems difficult to deal with anyway. In these cases,
one can only make sensible physical predictions if one restricts one’s attention to separable
subspaces. Therefore, they conclude, Hilbert spaces, as far as they are physically relevant,
should really be separable.
The conviction that any physically relevant representation must be set in separable
Hilbert spaces is not universally shared. In a close formal analogy to the position repre-
sentation formulated in Halvorson (2004), Ashtekar, Fairhurst, and Willis (2003b) consider
a so-called polymer particle representation of LQG, which also starts out from the usual Weyl
algebra of exponentiated position and momentum operators. In this representation, states
can be interpreted as polymer-like excitations of quantum geometry, hence the name. The
polymer representation is set in a non-separable Hilbert space and is unitarily inequivalent
to the regular Schro¨dinger representation. The basic variables of LQG are the holonomies of
the gravitational connection A along one-dimensional curves and the fluxes of the conjugate
momenta E through two-dimensional surfaces. It turns out that, similar to the example
discussed by Halvorson, there exists a holonomy operator in the polymer representation,
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but not a connection operator. Ashtekar and collaborators argue that this fact is welcome
since it shows how well the mathematical structure of the representation captures essential
features of quantum geometry, in particular its discreteness. The existence of a connection
operator, which is constructed from derivatives and therefore seems to presuppose a smooth
underlying manifold, would constitute an awkward result for a discrete quantum geometry.
In this sense, the non-separability may be an advantage as it seems to be able to capture
the discreteness of the quantum geometry.
Such a line of argument, however, appears to be circular: Ashtekar and collaborators
make it sound as if when seeking a Hilbert space representation, one should hope to find a
representation set in a non-separable Hilbert space which does not permit the construction
of operators constitutive, or at least indicative, of a smooth spacetime geometry. But this
already presupposes that the fundamental quantum geometry will turn out to be discrete,
which, as argued in Chapter 5, was a result of the loop quantization process, not a preordained
desideratum. In formulating the quantum theory of gravity, i.e. in constructing a physical
Hilbert space which carries a representation of an algebra of observables, we have thus not
yet arrived at the conclusion that quantum geometry is, in fact, discrete. This will only be
determined once the formulation of the quantum theory is complete, and, hopefully, shown
to be empirically adequate. To be sure, nothing in this paragraph goes against the possibility
that the physical Hilbert space of LQG may turn out to be non-separable.
Regardless of whether one finds a separable or a non-separable Hilbert space more de-
sirable, it is important to find out whether the Hilbert space of LQG in fact is or is not
separable. Given the lack of a physical Hilbert space in LQG, one can investigate whether
the kinematical Hilbert space is separable or not. After all, the kinematical Hilbert space
contains those quantum states which are thought to “evolve” in “time” and thus has some
parallels to the Hilbert space of a QFT. Alas, the kinematical Hilbert space K of LQG is
not separable. Without rehearsing the details for why this is so—they can be found e.g. in
Fairbairn and Rovelli (2004)—let me briefly describe the intuitive reason. If the spin network
states contain nodes with a sufficiently high valence, i.e. with a sufficiently high number of
links joining at the node, the nodes are additionally labelled by certain continuous param-
eters, called moduli (Rovelli and Smolin 1995b, p. 5749). These moduli do not appear to
play any significant physical role in the theory such as weighing in relevantly in the spectra
of operators representing partial observables. However, their emergence implies that the
discreteness of kinematical quantum states is somehow spoilt. But more importantly, they
render K non-separable. Fairbairn and Rovelli (2004) explore the possibility of circumvent-
ing the emergence of these physically irrelevant but harmful moduli. This can be achieved
by extending the spatial diffeomorphism group Diff(Σ) such as to allow physical fields with
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isolated points of non-differentiability. Fairbairn and Rovelli claim that such a modification
in the gauge invariance group does not affect the physical predictions or consequences of
the theory. What the modification of the gauge group changes, however, is the class of
knot states formed by graphs invariant under the gauge group. Importantly, the equivalence
classes of the spin network states are now countable and K therefore separable.
The Fairbairn-Rovelli procedure to cure K from a threatening non-separability has a
precursor in the antidote given to nonseparable Hilbert spaces in QFT. The latter may for
instance arise if one decomposes a free scalar field into an infinite number of harmonic oscilla-
tors, quantizes each degree of freedom individually to receive a separable Hilbert space, and
then builds the (infinite) tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of the individual oscillators.
The resulting Hilbert will be non-separable as its basis can be given by infinite sequences
|n1, n2, n3, ...〉, where ni ∈ N0, and these sequences are not countable. Vladimir Fock pro-
posed to overcome the problem by selecting a subspace of the non-separable Hilbert space:
rather than an infinite tensor product, one only considers sequences with an arbitrary, but
finite number of non-vanishing ni’s. These sequences can be used as a basis and they span a
space, called Fock space and denoted F , given by the (infinite) direct sum of (finite) tensor
products of the Hilbert spaces codifying a single oscillator. Because the tensor products
involved in the construction of this space are finite, F is separable.
Even if it turns out that the Fairbairn-Rovelli manoeuvre is ultimately not legitimate, it
would not be implied that the physical Hilbert space of LQG is non-separable. Since K is
only the kinematical Hilbert space, it must be projected onto the kernel of the Hamiltonian
constraint operator in order to produce the physical Hilbert space and may become separable
as a result of this projection. As long as the explicit construction of the physical Hilbert
space has not been successfully achieved, however, this question must remain open. One
may nevertheless speculate about what would happen if it turned out that both physical
Hilbert spaces, the one of quantum geometrodynamics as well as the one of LQG, are non-
separable. In this case, as stated above, whether or not Callender and Huggett’s criterion is
satisfied will depend on whether or not the bases of the two Hilbert spaces have the same
cardinality. If they do, they will trivially be unitarily equivalent and if they do not, then
they will trivially be unitarily inequivalent.
But be all of this as it may, the Callender-Huggett stance is still problematic for a more
basic reason: it appears to presuppose that quantum geometrodynamics regards spacetime
as fundamental while the approaches based on loop variables do not. It gives the metric
codification of the geometry precedence over the connection codification in that it implicitly
assumes only the first one to capture the geometrical essence of spacetime. At least at the
classical level, both metric and connection description seem adequate and fully capture the
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geometrical structure of spacetime. Regardless of whether one decides to use the metric
or the connection codification of the classical geometry, the spacetime will dissolve into a
quantum foam as the Planck regime is approached. Many (kinematical) quantum states, such
as those near the initial singularity as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, do not have a classical
description which is approximately valid. At least as far as the kinematical states of LQG
are concerned, the smooth manifold structure is replaced by a discrete geometry captured by
abstract labelled graphs. As the kinematical Hilbert space of quantum geometrodynamics
has not been found, one can only speculate how the quantum counterparts of the three-
metrics look like. If the quantum three-metrics would turn out to be essentially unmodified
by quantization, this would come as a huge surprise. But unless this unlikely event is
certain to occur, we should assume that the smooth manifold character of the three-spaces
also disappears in the quantization process. If that were not the case, of course, there
would indeed be a relevant sense in which quantum geometrodynamics, unlike LQG, assume
spacetime to be fundamental.
As argued above, Callender and Huggett’s criterion should thus be augmented by requir-
ing that a unitary transformation connecting the bases of the two Hilbert spaces of quantum
geometrodynamics and of LQG should also preserve some set of characteristic algebraic rela-
tions such as the canonical commutation relations or the Weyl algebra. The criterion could
then be something like this: assuming that one has a Hilbert space representation of a set
of algebraic relations characteristic of LQG, then if there exists a connection operator for
this representation or other operators similarly constitutive of spacetime, then the smooth
spacetime structure of classical GTR can still be considered as fundamental, whereas if such
operators do not exist, the fundamental geometry is discrete.9 In the second case, but not in
the first, the loop representation should come out as unitarily inequivalent to a geometrody-
namical representation. Commitment to one construal over the other would correspondingly
entail whether or not one must consider spacetime as fundamental. If that is the criterion,
however, it seems to me as if the debate is not whether spacetime is fundamental or not,
but whether it will turn out, at the fundamental level, to be smooth or discrete. As far as I
am concerned, this demotes the issue to one which should not be decided by philosophical
predilection, but by the complete and consistent quantum theory once we have it. The two
accounts of quantum geometrodynamics and LQG are still far from this goal.
The more pressing issue on both accounts is whether, and how, the classical spacetime
structure re-emerges from the quantum regime in some classical limit and what this would
mean. Any QTG must be capable of reproducing classical GTR in the appropriate limit. At
9The polymer particle representation constructed by Ashtekar, Fairhurst, and Willis (2003b) clearly falls
into the second category.
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this point, one could also ask whether it would likewise be a condition of adequacy whether
QFT emerges in some limit from QG. At least in a semi-classical limit, one would expect that
the matter fields which feed into the right-hand-side of the semi-classical Einstein equations
governed by the appropriate quantum-field-theoretic dynamics would re-emerge too. But
since LQG is normally interpreted to exclusively deal with vacuum solutions, it is entirely
unclear how, if at all, QFT could emerge in the semi-classical limit.
We are left with the second of the three issues listed at the beginning of this section,
i.e. the dissolution of the classical continuous spacetimes into combinatorial structures of
labelled graphs. In order to appraise the disappearance—and the re-emergence—of space-
time, quantum states of spin networks must be associated with classical spacetimes. These
two levels are linked by two procedures: quantization starts out from the classical level and
results in a corresponding quantum theory, and taking the classical limit leading from a
quantum theory to its classical approximation. In some sense, quantization provides the
“context of discovery” of QG in that it leads the physicist’s hands in guiding her from
known low-energy physics to unknown Planck-scale physics. It offers the obvious direction
for searching, and hopefully arriving at, a QTG. As discussed in Chapter 2, however, it is
systematically speaking the false direction. The quantum theory of higher energies captures
the fundamental reality, whereas the classical theory serves merely as a low-energy effective
theory, as an “approximation to the truth.” Therefore, if quantization helped in the context
of discovery, its inverse direction proffers the relevant “context of justification.” It ascends
(or descends if you prefer) from the fundamental quantum reality to theories closer to direct
experience. The inverse operation, taking the classical limit, should have as its effect the
re-emergence of the continuous spacetime with its pseudo-Riemannian manifold.
9.2 RE-EMERGENCE OF SPACETIME
9.2.1 General considerations
So for LQG, pace Dreyer (2006), spacetime is not a fundamental concept, but one which
is expected to arise in an appropriate classical limit.10 An analysis of the relation between
the fundamental objects (the spin networks) and their classical counterparts thus becomes
pertinent. It seems as if a necessary condition for maintaining that spacetime is fundamental
were to establish a bijective mapping between the set of classically admitted spacetimes
10And, again pace Dreyer (2006), spacetime is not fundamental in string theory neither, at least not in its
non-perturbative expression (Horowitz 2005).
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and the quantum states in the physical Hilbert space of the QTG. In this case, one could
argue that although spacetime may not be wearing its usual classical dress, it remains the
same entity even in its quantum gown, and this entity exhibits both quantum and classical
features depending on the energy scale one is studying. Due to the lack of a complete
theory of QG, and the resultant absence of a physical Hilbert space, the criterion must for
present purposes be revamped as demanding that there be a one-to-one onto correspondence
between the three-spaces of the classical phase space and the spin network states. The
criterion thus recast, however, cannot claim to be necessary with the same authority as did
the original version, for a critical mind could always reply that even if the three-dimensional
or kinematical states do not entertain a bijective mapping between them, this would by
no means imply that the same must hold for the full physical states, depending on how
the dynamics are encoded in the theory. Of course, if the QTG had a physical Hilbert
space whose states could be brought into a bijection with the states of the state space of
the corresponding classical theory, we would be seriously surprised. Consider the n-body
problem: while the phase space of states of an n-particle system in a physical space of m
dimensions is topologically R2mn and therefore finite-dimensional in classical mechanics, the
corresponding quantum space of states is the infinite-dimensional Hilbert space L2(Rmn),
the space of square-integrable functions on Rmn.
Finding the semi-classical and the classical limits of LQG has so far resisted substantive
understanding. Relating the quantum geometry of spin network states to smooth classical
geometries requires a few steps, as is sketched by Rovelli (2004, Sec. 6.7.1). Discrete weave
states |S〉 that approximate a given metric, as seen in equations (9.4) and (9.5), play an
important role in this connection. But the quantum-classical correspondence is very much the
subject of ongoing research. Suffice it to say at this point that the correspondence will likely
relate many spin network states to a single classical metric, not unlike in thermodynamics
where macrostates can in general be realized by different microstates, as would be expected.
Furthermore, many quantum states will not correspond to classical states at all, and only
rather special quantum states can be related to classical states. LQG thus seems to entail
that space(time) is not fundamental, but emerges somehow from the discrete Planck-scale
structure. In order to render the relationship between quantum states of LQG and classical
states of the gravitational field intelligible, the meanings of “somehow” and “emergence”
in the preceding sentence need to be clarified. The remainder of this chapter attempts to
sketch a possible answer to the following questions: How does (classical) spacetime emerge
from the structures at the fundamental level? And is there a systematic way to reduce
the notorious vagueness involved in “emergence,” at least in this context? Will any of the
prevalent notions of emergence or supervenience in the literature help in this endeavour?
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Emergence is of course a prominent subject in the philosophy of science literature, par-
ticularly in the context of considering inter-theoretic relationships. Under no circumstances
shall I try to add to this literature on the level of general discussions of reduction and emer-
gence. Silberstein (2002), who offers a useful review of emergence in philosophy of science,
displays how emergence is typically understood as the denial of reductionist claims. Accord-
ing to him, an emergentist is someone who defends the view that there is no robust sense
in which our scientific theories about the macroscopic world can be reduced to or identi-
fied with more fundamental theories of the world.11 Emergentism is thus understood as the
denial of inter-theoretic reduction.12 In contrast to this characterization, I wish to remain
non-committal in this debate, at least to the extent to which the subsequent remarks still
permit the suspension of judgment. Thus, our use of terminology will be different, as will be
explicated below. If the classical theory, or an aspect thereof, emerges from the more funda-
mental quantum level, this does not imply that the classical theory cannot in an important
sense be reduced to the quantum theory. Having said this, however, it will turn out that
some features of the classical theory are idiosyncratic to this level and cannot in a narrow
sense be reduced to the quantum theory. Whether or not these non-fully-reducible aspects of
the classical theory have the same claim to reality as do the features of the quantum theory,
must be the topic for another occasion.
As I have a rather specific context in mind, I will orient my terminology predominantly
toward the extant literature in this narrower context. The only philosophical literature perti-
nent to emergence in the context of QG consists, as far as I know, of Butterfield and Isham’s
contributions (Butterfield and Isham 1999, 2001). They propose to regard quantization and
emergence as two distinct, somewhat inverse, and independent strategies for solving the
problem of QG. Of course, there can exist pairs of theories such that the classical spacetime
structure of one emerges from the other without the second being a quantized version of the
first. Moreover, the quantization of a classical theory might not guarantee the re-emergence
of the classical structure from the resulting quantum theory, due to interpretational issues
(Butterfield and Isham 2001, p. 80). Apart from the lack of a well-understood classical limit
of LQG, I shall neglect these wider meanings of emergence and use it to designate the result
of the inverse process of quantization. I find this limitation justified since I am only dealing
with the relation between LQG and classical GTR.
The main labour is to try to determine, in the absence of a classical limit, the sense
in which classical spacetime could or could not emerge from the quantum structure. One
11I do not distinguish, as Silberstein does, between the ontological and the epistemological brand of
emergentism. The version used here is essentially his epistemological variety.
12Similarly, but inequivalently, emergentism can be seen as the denial of supervenience, a possibility
explicitly allowed by Howard (2007).
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sense in which emergence cannot be applied in this context bears a temporal connotation,
i.e. in the sense of something becoming manifest over a finite period of time or coming into
existence through some sort of evolution. This temporal connotation of emergence is present
in both, everyday language as well as the philosophical literature.13 Quite regardless of the
absence of time, which was discussed in Section 4.3, emergence here signifies a systematic
relation between theories or between entities postulated by them rather than a process in
some time.
Given the richness and diversity of the literature on reductive relations between theories,
Butterfield and Isham (1999) conclude that this should be taken to sustain the conclusion
that there may not be a single concept of reduction to fit all instances considered, not even
if the analysis is confined to physics.14 Since the primary goal of the present chapter is to
illuminate the relation between GTR and LQG, and not to contribute to this vast literature
in general philosophy of science, this richness will be mined for concepts of reduction that
most appropriately describe this relation. My analysis should not be restricted to existing
categories in the philosophical discourse, but nevertheless tie in with extant concepts of
reduction which have been considered in physics.
As explicated above, due to fact that the full physical Hilbert space is not known yet, I will
limit the subsequent remarks to the kinematical Hilbert space and how classical three-spaces
could be considered as emerging from this quantum structure. This strategy has the huge
advantage that, unlike Butterfield and Isham, I can avoid the problem of time altogether,
which makes the task considerably simpler. On the other hand, however, a confinement to
considerations at the kinematical level also bears the considerable risk that not all conclusions
reached at that level translate into the final form of the theory. Concretely, this means
that the path sketched below suggesting how to return from quantum states living in the
kinematical Hilbert space to the classical three-states may be an entirely different one when
one attempts to understand how the full four-dimensional classical spacetime re-emerges
from the physical quantum states.
Butterfield and Isham (1999) distinguish three ways in which theories (or their concepts,
entities, laws, or models) can stand in a reductive relation to one another: definitional exten-
sion, supervenience, and emergence. The first typically assumes a syntactic understanding
of theories, i.e. it understands a theory as a deductively closed set of propositions. Applying
Butterfield and Isham’s definition of it to the case at hand, one could say that GTR is a
definitional extension of LQG iff it is possible to add to LQG definitions of all non-logical
13E.g. in Pepper (1926).
14No attempt shall be made to substantially consider the wider literature on the topic. Cf. Spector (1978)
for an analysis of various proposals for reduction as an inter-theoretic relation, with a particular eye on the
physical sciences.
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symbols of GTR such that every theorem of GTR can be proven in LQG thus augmented.
The concept of definitional extension is attractive because it gives us a clear understanding
of how two theories, one of which is a definitional extension of the other, relate to another.
Thus, definitional extension goes a long way to explain why the predecessor theory was as
successful as it was and why it breaks down where in fact it does. However, we do not
expect the relation between GTR and LQG to be as clear-cut as it is between Newtonian
mechanics and special relativity, where the concept of definitional extension admits a rather
straightforward application. In order to determine whether or not GTR is a definitional
extension of LQG, one needed to know how to recover the classical limit. Unless there is at
least some progress in the recovery of the classical limit of LQG, the concept of definitional
extension cannot be usefully applied to the case at stake. One would expect, to be sure,
that relating LQG to GTR will involve approximations such that propositions of GTR only
hold approximately in LQG, and only under certain conditions. More specifically, one first
extends the definitions of LQG such as to make it conceptually sufficiently potent to be able
to prove all theorems of an intermediate theory, from which GTR can, in a well-understood
way, be recovered as an approximation. This process of approximation could for instance
consist of taking specific limits of certain parameters of the intermediate theory, and perhaps
in a particular order, or it could involve the negligence of some quantities or states in order
to recover the theory to be approximated from a subset of the phase space of the approxi-
mating theory. But all of this goes beyond the concept of definitional extension and shall be
discussed below when I will discuss approximation as a form of emergence.
The second relation considered by Butterfield and Isham is supervenience. Per defini-
tionem, GTR supervenes on LQG iff all its predicates supervene on the predicates of LQG,
with respect to a fixed set A of objects on which both predicates of GTR and of LQG are
defined. The set of predicates of GTR is said to supervene on the set of predicates in LQG,
given a set of objects A, iff any two objects in A that differ in what is predicated of them
in GTR must also differ in what is predicated of them in LQG. The fact that supervenience
requires a stable set A of objects underlying both theories, i.e. an identical ontology on which
the ideologies of both theories are defined, renders it rather useless in the present case. In
a very rough way, the ontology of both theories of course contains the gravitational field.
But the finer structure of the ontologies of both theories do not resemble each other: in
LQG, one might perhaps find loops, or spin networks, or more generally the inhabitants
of the physical Hilbert space in its ontology, while in GTR, no such objects can be found.
Hence, supervenience, at least as defined above, does not offer any help in understanding the
relation between GTR and LQG. Of course, the requirement that the set A must underlie
both theories can be relaxed: one could instead demand that the set A of objects on which
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the sets of properties P1 and P2 of the two theories are defined must be closed under com-
positional operations such as mereological sums or the formation of sets. The sets P1 and
P2 would then be defined with respect to some base individuals, forming subsets A1 and A2
of A. Typically, these predications would induce some properties on the non-basic composite
objects. Conceivably, this relaxation might be sufficient to overcome the disjointness of the
sets A1 and A2.
So GTR can neither be understood as a definitional extension of LQG, nor should it
be seen as supervenient on LQG. However, it turns out to emerge from LQG if one admits
a sufficiently liberal notion of emergence. And this is exactly what Butterfield and Isham
do: they introduce emergence in somewhat broader—and vaguer—terms than the previous
two notions. For them, a theory T1 is often said to emerge from another theory T2 iff
there exists either a limiting or an approximating procedure to relate the two theories. A
limiting procedure is taking the mathematical limit of some physically relevant parameters,
in general in a particular order, of the underlying theory in order to arrive at the emergent
theory. I do not see an interesting manner in which GTR could be regained from LQG
by means of subduing the latter to something as simple as a limiting process, at least not
without approximation. The reason for this will be made explicit in the next paragraph.
An approximating procedure, as Butterfield and Isham imply, designates the process of either
neglecting some physical magnitudes, and justifying such neglect, or selecting a proper subset
of states in the state space of the approximating theory, and justifying such selection, or both,
in order to arrive at a theory whose values of physical quantities remain sufficiently close to
those of the theory to be approximated. Landsman (2006) argues that the classical world
only emerge from the quantum theory if some quantum states and some observables of the
quantum theory are neglected, and some limiting procedure is executed. According to his
view, to be discussed below, relating the classical with the quantum world thus takes both,
the limiting as well as the approximating procedure.
Rovelli (2004, Sec. 6.7.1) delivers an account of how limiting procedures alone are in-
capable of establishing the missing link. He relates how loop quantum gravitists have not
even suspected that quantum space might turn out to have a discrete structure during the
period from the discovery of the loop representation of GTR around 1988 to the derivation
of the spectra of the area and volume operators in 1995. He reminisces how during this
period researchers believed that the classical, macroscopic geometry could be gained by tak-
ing the limit of a vanishing lattice constant of the lattice of loops. This limiting procedure
was taken to run analogously to letting the lattice constant of a lattice field theory go to
zero and thus define a conventional QFT. With this model in mind, something remarkable
happened when people tried to construct so-called weave states which are characterized as
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approximating a classical metric: when the quantum states were defined as the limit one
gains when the spatial loop density grows to infinity, i.e. when the loop size is assumed to
go to zero, it turned out that the approximation did not become increasingly accurate as
the limit was approached. This can be taken as a clear indication that taking this limit
was physically inappropriate. What was observed instead was that eigenvalues of the area
and volume operators increased. This, of course, meant that the areas and volumes of the
spatial regions under consideration also increased. In other words, the physical density of
the loops did not increase when the “lattice constant” was decreased. The physical density
of loops, it turned out, remains unaffected by how large the lattice constant is chosen, it is
simply given by a dimensional constant of the theory itself. This dimensional constant is
precisely Planck’s constant. This result, as discussed in Chapter 5, is interpreted to mean
that there is a minimal physical scale. Or, in Rovelli’s words, “more loops give more size,
not a better approximation to a given [classical] geometry.” (ibid.) The loops, it turns out,
have an intrinsic physical size.
According to the traditional understanding of emergence, as described in e.g. Silberstein
(2002), the classical metrics cannot simply be reduced to the underlying quantum structure,
for the latter carries properties which the former do not. And the case here seems more
serious as when attempted to regain Newtonian mechanics from special relativity by taking
the limit c → ∞. Although it can be argued, and I believe justly so, that although taking
this limit is mathematically well-controlled, one transgresses, strictly speaking, the confines
of special relativity, which explicitly assumes that the speed of light was finite. While this
was delicate enough, in the present case, one can even take the limit of letting the lattice
constant go to zero, but the physical loop density is not affected by taking this limit at
all! Taking this limit, then, does not change the structure from discrete quantum states to
smooth manifolds. It just does not change anything in the physics. As some of the features of
the classical geometry such as smoothness cannot be reduced to or identified with properties
of the quantum states of the more fundamental theory, GTR in toto does not reduce to LQG.
According to the traditional understanding, this would imply that the classical spacetime
“emerges” from the quantum theory. But the way I have fixed the terminology, following
Butterfield and Isham (1999), we will have to be able to establish either a limiting or an
approximating procedure, or a combination of the two, in order to relate the two theories
before we can say that one emerges from the other. These remarks go to show that a limiting
procedure, at least if used in isolation, will just not do the trick.
Considering approximation then, a series of theories the last of which will mimic classical
spacetimes via approximations needs to be constructed. First of all, let us be clear what the
“approximandum,” the classical theory to be approximated, should be. In LQG as discussed
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so far, a funny distinction has been made, viz. the one between gravity and matter. For a
general relativist, these are two distinct concepts with very different roles; essentially, gravity
is the left-hand side of the Einstein equations, while matter constitutes the right-hand side.
In the quantization that led to LQG, no matter was assumed to be present: LQG results
from a vacuum quantization of GTR. So states in the physical Hilbert space of LQG as
sketched here should lead to semi-classical states which yield emergent classical spacetimes
that are vacuum solutions of the Einstein equations. This leaves us with the problem of how
to include matter in the picture—a controversial issue which I have tried to avoid. Some
claim that as long as the construction of a Fock-space in LQG has not been completed, we
do not know how to weave matter into the spin network states, while others simply add
additional representations to the nodes of the spin networks in order to represent matter,
and yet others protest that all of this is entirely unnecessary as matter is implicitly included
ab initio.15 Be this as it may, for LQG-cum-matter, the classical limit to be achieved by
approximation would be GTR coupled to all known matter. Indeed, such a theory, if we had
it, might qualify as a theory offering a full unification. But the current version of LQG does
not include matter and should therefore lead to vacuum spacetimes in the classical limit.
The approximandum suffers from another limitation, also mentioned several times in the
course of this thesis: rather than full GTR, we should expect to obtain Hamiltonian GTR,
and therefore only spacetime models of topology Σ × R with constraints forming a Dirac
algebra (4.24)-(4.28). It may be argued that these departures from GTR are not essential
in the sense that the core of what is believed to be physically relevant models has been
maintained in switching from traditional GTR to Hamiltonian GTR as outlined in Chapter
4. But more importantly, how is this approximation to be concretely implemented? The
answer to this question is wide open. Some remarks toward possible answers will be given
in Subsection 9.2.2. Before then, however, let me briefly consider an important pertinent
article by Landsman (2006).
Landsman (2006) discusses three major manners in which classical physics is typically
held to relate to quantum physics: (i) by a limiting procedure involving the limit ~→ 0 for a
finite system, (ii) by a limiting procedure involving the limit N →∞ of a large system of N
degrees of freedom while ~ is held constant, and (iii) either by decoherence or by a consistent
histories approach. Landsman defends the point of view that while none of these manners is
individually sufficient to understand how classicality emerges from the quantum world, they
jointly suggest that it results from ignoring certain states and certain observables from the
quantum theory. Ultimately, he contends, the classical world does not exist.
The origin of the idea that taking the mathematical limit ~→ 0 will return the classical
15Winston Fairbairn, personal communication, 29 June 2004.
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world from the quantum realm, Landsman convincingly suspects, can be found in Einstein
(1905), who discusses Planck’s radiation law capturing the spectral energy density function
u of a radiating black body at temperature ϑ, which was given in Planck (1901, eq. 12) as
u =
8pihν3
c3
1
ehν/kϑ − 1 (9.1)
in SMI-units (cf. Appendix A.1), where h is what later became known as “Planck’s constant,”
ν is the frequency, c the velocity of light, and k another new constant introduced by Planck
and now known as “Boltzmann’s constant.” As Einstein (1905, §2) has found, taking the
limit hν/kϑ → 0 returns the classical equipartition law. To be precise, Einstein takes the
limit ϑ/ν → ∞ of large wave lengths, which is mathematically equivalent if h and k are
held constant. Physically, this makes more sense as h and k are of course assumed to be
constants. There is an important conceptual difference: by taking the limit ϑ/ν → ∞ one
does not leave the realm of quantum physics but only studies what quantum mechanics will
predict for large wave lengths; by taking the limit ~ → 0 (or h → 0), however, one changes
the theory itself and studies how the theory would be changed in the modified regime. In
the former case, one seeks to find out how quasi-classical states behave in quantum theory,
while in the latter case, one tries to relate quantum mechanics to a corresponding classical
theory.
Landsman argues, and I have no ambition to challenge his argument, that the limit ~→ 0
by itself does not suffice to fully account for the classical world with its classical denizens
behaving classically if a quantum theory, any quantum theory, is used as a systematically
correct vantage point. Landsman also admits, however, that the many mathematically
suggestive results when taking this limit should not be ignored and certainly go some way
towards explicating how the classical world emerges. According to Landsman, a similar
argument can be made for a limiting procedure involving the limit N → ∞ of arbitrarily
large systems. Considering this limit, one realizes that strictly classical behaviour will only
emerge in the case of an infinitely large system, which of course is an idealization. Although
the size of systems for which classical behaviour can be observed is “much smaller” than in
this idealization, the fact that there exist large systems with well-behaved classical behaviour
suggests that the limit offers a valid way of getting a grasp on the relation classical-quantum
world. Mathematically, it turns out (Landsman 2006, Sec. 6) that taking the limit N →∞ is
a special case of taking the limit ~→ 0. This can be interpreted to mean that the idealization
of assuming a system to be infinite is a case of a diminishing quantum of action in a finite
system. So the first two ways in which the classical relates to the quantum involved the
limits ~→ 0 and N →∞.
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Taking limits like this, however, is confined to studying arising classical behaviour in
particular states with respect to a given observable. If the observables show an incorrect
limiting behaviour, or if one starts out from superposition states, then no classical physics
can be gained from the underlying quantum physics. This incites a grave worry: why should
it be that the macroscopic world never happens to be in superposition states? Or, in other
words, what principled reasons do we have for excluding from consideration a vast class of
quantum states and of observables when we wish to understand how classicality emerges?
If the fact that it is exactly those states and observables which are capable of reproducing
classical physics in the appropriate limits that we have used in our analysis is taken as a
justification of our having done so, the smell of a post factum reasoning becomes forbidding.
It is exactly the ambition of the third group of techniques to regain classicality to offer such
principled justifications of the necessary omissions while avoiding any post factum reasoning.
As discussed in Landsman (2006), this third group most prominently includes, but may not
be limited to, decoherence and consistent histories.
The main idea of the program of decoherence—I shamelessly ignore the consistent histo-
ries approach—is that the generically assumed presence of interference in quantum states is
suppressed by the system’s interaction with the “environment,” such as occurs in a measure-
ment process.16 In other words, while a quantum state is generally a superposition state,
the interaction with the environment, which is assumed to be macroscopic, destroys this su-
perposition very rapidly. The interaction with a macroscopic environment thus disentangles
entanglement. In order to make these statements more principled and rigorous, a theory of
decoherence is required. This theory will have to specify what is meant by “macroscopic
environment,” under what circumstances the interaction between environment and system
leads to a suppression of interference, and how this suppression is supposed to work in detail.
Without going into the details here, I state that if a theory of decoherence makes good on
these requirements, then we are equipped with a principled way to justify the elimination
of certain quantum states and certain observables in the quest to recover classicality from a
quantum theory. I will return to the question of whether decoherence might help with the
issue of emergence of classical spacetime from LQG towards the end of Section 9.2.2.
The main contention of Landsman (2006) claims that understanding the emergence of
the classical world, which strictly speaking does not exist, from the quantum realm is an
intricate business and will require a combination of the techniques described: the neglect
of some observables, and justifying such neglect, and selecting some subset of states in the
quantum state space, and justifying such selection, as well as limiting processes which relate
the values of some parameters of the quantum theory to those of a corresponding classical
16For introductory reviews into decoherence, see Bacciagaluppi (2005) and Zeh (1996).
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theory. Relating the quantum to the classical world will typically require two steps. The
first step can be thought of as preparing the quantum system for the transition, as it occurs
still within the boundaries of the quantum world, while the second step effectively performs
the transition from a particular vantage point in the quantum realm to the classical world.
Thus, the first step will essentially consist of neglecting some observables and of selecting
some states, i.e. of an approximating procedure as described by Butterfield and Isham (1999).
The second step is then the limiting procedure which brings the values of some quantum
parameters into those of the classical ones. In the literature, the first step is often said to
result in semi-classical states via a semi-classical limit, while the classical limit constitutes
terminologically the second step.
9.2.2 Remarks towards a concrete implementation
Turning now to see to what extent, if at all, such a scheme has been or could be implemented
in the case at hand, let me first remind the reader that all approaches to find the semi-
classical and classical limits of LQG are confined to use the kinematical Hilbert space K
as its vantage point. The classical states corresponding to the kinematical spin network
states of the quantum theory will thus be three-metrics on three-manifolds. Obviously,
this cannot be the end of the story as ultimately, we want to understand how fully four-
dimensional classical spacetimes emerge from the physical states of the quantum theory. But
this does by no means imply that the endeavour of studying how classicality emerges from
the kinematical Hilbert space is fruitless; quite the contrary: in the light of the difficulties in
constructing a Hamiltonian constraint operator, an important test for any candidate is that
it must reproduce, in a principled way, the classical Hamiltonian constraint function in some
appropriate limit. Unless this test is fulfilled, it seems impossible for the physical states,
which are defined to be those kinematical states which live in the kernel of the Hamiltonian
constraint operator, to correctly relate to the corresponding classical states. Getting a grasp
on what it means to draw the classical limit of the background-independent QFT as it stands
now is therefore of decisive importance for at least two reasons. First, it is an eminent, and
perhaps indispensable, help in the construction of the physical Hilbert space itself. The
Hamiltonian constraint operator is not only not polynomial in the basic variables A and E,
but it is not even an analytic function of them. This is never the case in familiar QFTs, and
new techniques will be needed. Second, only once a consistent quantum theory is completed
and it has been established that it possesses the correct classical limit, can the canonical
quantization programme be considered fulfilled. To be sure, possessing the correct classical
limit is not a sufficient condition for qualifying as the QTG, but is merely necessary as one
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would expect there to be many consistent quantum theories with one particular classical
limit. Which quantum theory will eventually turn out to be the best can only determined
empirically. At this point, however, it would be considered a huge success if one consistent
and complete quantum theory with the correct classing limiting behaviour could formulated.
The rough idea of constructing semi-classical states from the kinematical Hilbert space
K is to find those kinematical states which correspond to almost flat three-metrics, i.e. to
three-geometries where the quantum fluctuations are believed to be negligibly small. Two
major approaches to construct semi-classical theories dominate the extant literature, the
so-called weave state approach and the ansatz using coherent states. One major approach to
semi-classical QG from LQG leads via coherent states and has been pioneered by Thiemann
and Winkler (Sahlmann et al. 2001; Thiemann 2001a; Thiemann and Winkler 2001a,b,c).
The main difficulty for this ansatz is that the powerful coherent state machinery devel-
oped for the usual perturbative Fock spaces of QFT on a given background spacetime is no
longer available for the non-perturbative kinematical Hilbert space of LQG.17 Other propos-
als include Varandarajan’s “photon Fock states” and generalizations thereof (Ashtekar and
Lewandowski 2001; Varadarajan 2000), and the Ashtekar group’s shadow states (Ashtekar
et al. 2003b). Most of the remainder of this chapter shall be dedicated, however, to the most
prominent approach of constructing semi-classical states, the so-called “weave states.”
The idea of a weave state originally introduced in Ashtekar, Rovelli, and Smolin (1992),18
revolves around selecting spin network states that are eigenstates of the geometrical operator
for the volume of a region R with eigenvalues which approximate the corresponding classical
values for the volume of R as determined by the classical gravitational field. Simultaneously,
these selected spin network states are eigenstates of the geometrical area operator for a sur-
face S. More technically, consider a macroscopic three-dimensional region R of spacetime
with the two-dimensional surface S and the three-dimensional gravitational field eia(~x) de-
fined for all ~x ∈ R. This gravitational field defines a metric field qab(~x) = eia(~x)ejb(~x)ηij(~x)
for which it is possible to construct a spin network state |S〉 such that |S〉 approximates the
metric qab for sufficiently large scales ∆ `Pl in a yet to be rigorously specified sense.19 Clas-
17For details, see Thiemann (2001b, Sec. II.3). The coherent states approach is discussed in Section II.3.2,
the weave states in II.3.1 and the photon Fock states in II.3.3.
18For an intuitive introduction, see Rovelli (2004, Sec. 6.7.1). The picture is that of the gravitational field
like a (quantum cloud of) fabric(s) of weaves which appears to be smooth if seen from far but displays a
discrete structure if examined more closely. Hence weave states.
19The “upper case” spin network states |S〉 live in K?, the pre-kinematical Hilbert space, i.e. the Hilbert
space containing all spin network states which solve the Gauss constraints, but not necessarily the spatial
diffeomorphism constraints. Thus, the spin network states in K? are not represented by abstract graphs, as
are those in the full kinematical Hilbert space K, but as embedded graphs on a background manifold. This
choice is just conveniently following the established standard in the literature on weave states; we will see
below that this poses no problem as everything can be directly carried over to the spatially diffeomorphically
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sically, the area of a two-dimensional surface S ⊂M and the volume of a three-dimensional
region R ⊂ M with respect to a fiducial gravitational field 0eia are given by (Rovelli 2004,
Sec. 2.1.4)
A[0e,S] =
∫
|d2S|, (9.2)
V[0e,R] =
∫
|d3R|, (9.3)
where the relevant measures for the integrals are determined by 0eia. This fiducial metric is
typically, but not necessarily, chosen to be flat. The requirement that the spin network state
|S〉 must approximate the classical geometry for sufficiently large scales is made precise by
demanding that |S〉 be a simultaneous eigenstate of the area operator Â and the volume
operator V̂ as introduced in Section 5.2 with eigenvalues equal to the classical values as
given by (9.2) and (9.3), respectively, up to small corrections of the order of `Pl/∆:
Â(S)|S〉 = (A[0e,S] +O(`2Pl/∆2)) |S〉, (9.4)
V̂(R)|S〉 = (V[0e,R] +O(`3Pl/∆3)) |S〉. (9.5)
If a spin network state |S〉 satisfies these requirements, then it is called a weave state. In fact,
the length scale ∆, which is large compared to the Planck length `Pl, characterizes the weave
states, which are for this reason sometimes denoted |∆〉 in the literature. At scales much
smaller than ∆, the quantum features of spacetime would become relevant, while at scales
of order ∆ or larger, the weave states exhibit a close approximation to the corresponding
classical geometry in the sense that it determines the same areas and volumes as the classical
metric qab. In this sense, the weave states are semi-classical approximations.
Please permit two remarks. First, it should be noted that the correspondence between
weave states and classical spacetimes is many-to-one. In other words, equations (9.4) and
(9.5) do not determine the state |S〉 uniquely from a given three-metric qab. The reason for
this is that these equations only put constraints on values averaged over all of S and R,
respectively, and we have assumed ex constructione that these regions are large compared
to the Planck scale. Of course, there are many spin network states with these averaged
properties, but only one classical metric which exactly corresponds to these averages values.
The situation can be thought of as somewhat analogous to thermodynamics, where a physical
system with many microscopic degrees of freedom has many different microscopic states with
the same averaged, macroscopic properties such as temperature.
invariant level.
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Second, the weave states as introduced above have merely been defined at the pre-
kinematic level, i.e. they are not formulated in terms invariant under spatial diffeomor-
phisms.20 The reason for this choice lies mostly in that this is the canonical choice in the
literature, but also because in this way, the weave states can be directly related to three-
metrics, rather than equivalence classes of three-metrics. This, however, does not constitute
a problem whatsoever, as the characterization of weave states can carried over into the con-
text of diffeomorphically invariant s-knot states |s〉, i.e. spin network states in K, as follows.
If we introduce a map Pdiff : K? → K which projects states in K? related by a spatial diffeo-
morphism unto the same element of K, then the state K 3 |s〉 = Pdiff|S〉 is a weave state of
the classical three-geometry [qab], i.e. the equivalence class of three-metrics qab under spatial
diffeomorphisms, just in case |S〉 is a weave state of the classical three-metric qab as defined
above.
There arises a serious difficulty in constructing the semi-classical regime. As Minkowski
spacetime is a tremendously accurate approximation for most of our actual spacetime, one
expects that the quantum theory entertains a state, call it |0M〉, capable of mimicking
Minkowski spacetime in large scales. At a fixed time given a fiducial time parameter,
“Minkowski space” is captured by a flat three-metric ηab = δab. It is not the case, how-
ever, that |0M〉 is a weave state of ηab, for the following reason. In classical Hamiltonian
GTR, the three-metric qab is build entirely from momentum variables, i.e. from densitized
triads. Because weave states are typically rather concentrated around eigenvalues close to
the fiducial metric, it may be the case that operators built from configuration variables will
show highly delocalized behaviour with respect to these weave states. Thus, |0M〉 cannot be
an eigenstate of the gravitational field, which is constructed from the triad variables, for such
an eigenstate would have maximal spread in operators built from connection variables. |0M〉
must be “peaked” around weave states corresponding to the fiducial metric, with a mean
value exactly corresponding to the fiducial metric, and with minimal spreads with respect
to both basic operators Âia(~x) and Ê
a
i (~x). It can be, and has been (Corichi and Reyes 2001),
shown that it is possible to construct weave states which are peaked in both the connection
and the spin network basis.
It thus seems that the notion of approximation as outlined by Butterfield and Isham
might bear fruits in schematizing the semi-classical approaches involving weave states. At
least when these are taken to be simultaneous eigenstates of the area and volume opera-
tors, as they are in (9.4) and (9.5), some physical quantities must be neglected, viz. all
those operators constructed from connection operators, as the “geometrical” eigenstates are
maximally spread in these operators, and the kinematical states must be carefully selected
20Cf. also footnote 19.
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to only include those which are peaked around the geometrical values determined by the
fiducial metric. It is at least questionable, however, whether the neglect of connection-based
operators can be justified. If it cannot, then only semi-classical states which are peaked in
both the connection and the triad basis, and are peaked in such a manner as to approximate
classical states, should be considered. In this case, we would still only have a selection of
states, but perhaps no operators which must be ignored. Once we have completed this stage,
and we have found semi-classical states which approximate classical states, then a limiting
procedure can be executed to see classicality fully emerge. Such a limiting procedure will
involve taking the limit `Pl/∆→ 0, which will make the small corrections in (9.4) and (9.5)
disappear. This limit can be performed by either have ∆ go to infinity, or `Pl go to zero (or
both). The first choice corresponds to letting the size of the spatial region R grow beyond all
limits, and thus resemble the limit N → ∞ as discussed in Section 9.2.1, which considered
how classicality can generally emerge from ordinary quantum mechanics. The second choice,
letting the Planck size go to zero, corresponds then to the case ~ → 0 from Section 9.2.1.
With the second choice, but arguably not the first, we leave the realm of the quantum theory
and arrive at a strictly classical description of the spatial geometry.
Generically, of course, kinematical states do not satisfy (9.4) and (9.5). How can the
selection of kinematical states with such fine-tuned properties then be justified? Unless the
scheme relating (kinematical) LQG to classical (Hamiltonian) GTR offers such a justification,
it is hard to see how such a scheme could answer one of the key questions: why does classical
GTR work as well as it does and why does it break down where in fact it does? In attempts
to relate ordinary QM to its classical counterpart, as discussed above, more often than
not reference is made to decoherence through the quantum systems’s interaction with its
environment. Would perhaps decoherence offer a justification for the selection of very special
kinematical states? Could it be the case that the kinematical quantum state is somehow,
in a principled way, forced into a weave state when it interacts with its environment? It
seems dubious, at the very least, that in the present context decoherence can play the role it
does for the traditional problem of emergence of classicality because here the spin network
states are supposed to be the quantum account of space—and all of it. Introducing an
environment with which these spin network states can interact seems to imply that there
must be something outside of quantum space.
Does it really? Not if we conceive of areas and volumes as local properties of the quantum
gravitational field, just as these geometrical properties were local in GTR. As was explicated
in Chapter 5, given a region R of quantum space, e.g. a chunk of space in our laboratory,
each node of the spin network state represents a grain of such a space as it contributes
to the eigenvalue of the volume operator. Similarly, each link from a node within R to a
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node outside of R, i.e. each link which intersects the boundary S of R, contributes to the
eigenvalue of the area operator. If we had measurement devices at our disposal with Planck-
scale accuracy, we could measure the volume and the surface area of a region of space. Such
a measurement would essentially amount to counting the nodes within a region as well as
counting the links which leave the region. The area and volume operators correspond to
partial observables in the sense of Rovelli (2002d).21 If, however, the region R considered
does not encompass all of space, but only a delimited piece of it, then finding an environment
for such a region is straightforward.22 This re-opens the door for invoking decoherence as
a potential justification of the selection of kinematical states related to classical geometry.
Thus, it could be the case that if we perform an area or volume measurement on surface S
or region R, respectively, then the measurement interaction forces the quantum state of the
corresponding piece of space into a weave state. The price of admitting decoherence back
in, however, is exorbitant: the infamous measurement problem rears its ugly head again.
Recently, the notion of decoherence has been generalized such as to also cover cases
in which the system that decoheres does not depend for its decoherence on an interaction
with its environment.23 In fact, a sort of “self-induced” decoherence seems to allow closed
systems to entirely decohere on their own. Without going into the details of the proposal, it
is clear that if it works, then it will be attractive for quantum cosmological settings, and spin
network states seem to be perfect candidates to decohere in a self-induced manner without
having to rely on an environment. With a notion of self-induced decoherence, it might even
be possible to avoid the measurement problem, at least for this particular step.
Many details still have to be filled in, but the emerging picture is sufficiently clear.
Perhaps disappointingly, perhaps reassuringly, the way in which classical GTR emerges from
LQG according to this most promising semi-classical approach does not fundamentally differ
from how classical mechanics is most promisingly thought to emerge from ordinary QM. At
least not if the move to use decoherence by arguing that although we are dealing here with a
quantum theory of space, it is possible to have an external observer. In other words, unlike
in traditional QM, a case must be made that the application of the traditional measurement
concept is appropriate at all, at least for scenarios not depending on self-induced decoherence.
This will only be the case if we can successfully argue that a medium-sized region of spacetime
can be measured “from the outside.” But the above considerations show, the situation as to
how classicality emerges will be essentially the same as it is for traditional QM.
21See Rovelli (2004, Sec. 6.7) for a detailed discussion of the physical interpretation of the spin network
states.
22This is again the “medium-sized” region of spacetime which was already submitted to measurement in
Section 5.3.3.
23Cf. Castagnino and Lombardi (2005), Castagnino et al. (2006)
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10.0 ALL’S WELL THAT ENDS WELL OR LOVE’S LABOUR’S LOST?
While theoretical and mathematical physicists working in fundamental physics usually have
a clear preference for one of the disjuncts in the title over the other, I hope to have shown
that loop quantum gravity and the entire programme of canonical quantization of classical
general relativity enjoy, and suffer from, both. On the one hand, as I have most pronouncedly
argued in the context of the codification of the full spacetime diffeomorphism invariance in
the Hamiltonian formalism and the problem of constructing the physical Hilbert space of
the quantum theory, the loop approach has still foundational chores to do. In all likeli-
hood, these two issues will turn out to be deeply interwoven. Physicists still face the task
of finding the precise expression of the Hamiltonian operator and of completing the theory
by concretely constructing a physical Hilbert space with an inner product. Likewise, they
face the challenge of establishing that the theory has the correct semi-classical and clas-
sical limits. Furthermore, the relation between the covariant extension of the theory and
its covariant core is not yet well understood. Philosophers, on the other hand, should be
encouraged to investigate the more interpretative questions at both the classical as well as
the quantum level and address issues such as the nature of the observables of the classical
and the quantum theories, whether, and if so, to what extent, relationism is supported by
loop quantum gravity, can the concept of determinism be suitably generalized to quantum
spacetime, and can decoherence play an important role in understanding the emergence of
classical spacetime. There are still many issues wide open and the success of the entire
approach will stand or fall with the successful resolution of these difficulties.
On the other hand, loop quantum gravity and classical Hamiltonian general relativity
have greatly contributed to the clarification and advancement of our understanding of the
fundamental nature of spacetime, and in particular, to the interpretation of classical general
relativity. They have forced us to clarify the issue of symmetries, and in particular of
spacetime diffeomorphism invariance, and of their role as gauge symmetries of the theory.
Also, they have given us at least a abstract scheme for determining observables and for
extracting the physical content of a theory. Many techniques developed to deal with loop
quantum gravity have also enriched quantum field theory, some of whose concepts have been
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generalized to apply to background independent theories as well. And finally, on a somewhat
different note, the relation between the underlying, still incomplete, quantum theory and the
classical theory emerging from it have let me onto paths less trodden and to positions more
speculative than those encountered in the quantization process. Without failure, all of these
studies have encountered a wealth of important foundational issues and thus instill the desire
to continue them.
There is no doubt that the conclusive philosophical appraisal of loop quantum gravity
must await the completion of the theory. Although this may be disappointing news to
anyone who demands final and immovable answers to foundational questions, and although
an investigation into the foundations of loop quantum gravity is met by a pervasive open-
endedness, which may be frustrating at times, the canonical approach is sufficiently rich and
sufficiently solidified to offer a rewarding harvest for any foundational enquiry, as I hope
to have illustrated. This promise of abundance stands in a stark contrast to the surprising
paucity of discussion of canonical quantum gravity in the philosophical literature. With a
few notable exceptions in the technical philosophy of physics literature, quantum gravity has
largely been met by the philosophical community with neglect or disinterest. But this is an
opportune moment for philosophers to develop an interest in quantum gravity: with loop
quantum gravity a serious contender among theories of quantum spacetime has arisen, with
its practitioners willing collaborators of philosophers, and the theory has sufficiently matured
while it is still under construction and thus hospitable to more speculative endeavours.
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APPENDIX A
NOTATION AND CONVENTIONS
A.1 GENERAL REMARKS
I try to follow, not necessarily with complete success, the notational and terminological
conventions of Rovelli (2004, pp. xviii-xxiii). With a few exceptions as indicated, natural
units (~ = c = 1) are used and the Einstein summation convention is assumed.
A.2 INDEX NOTATION
The now standard abstract index notation is used, as e.g. in Wald (1984), without following
Wald in his particular choices. The index notation here follows the most common conventions
in the field, as does Rovelli (2004). These conventions are:
• Greek letters from the middle of the alphabet, µ, ν, ..., represent four-dimensional space-
time tangent indices. They are part of the notation for the tensorial object itself and
do not indicate its components. If an equation only holds with respect to a particular
basis and must thus be understood as an equation holding only between or among tensor
components, an indication will be made in the text.
• Upper-case Latin letters from the middle of the alphabet, I, J, ..., designate four-dimen-
sional internal or Lorentz tangent indices. In the context of STR, no distinction between
Lorentz or spacetime tangent indices is made.
• Lower-case Latin indices represent three-dimensional indices; the beginning of the alpha-
bet, a, b, ..., is used for tensorial indices, the middle of the alphabet, i, j, ..., for internal
ones.
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A.3 FURTHER NOTATIONS AND CONVENTIONS
• The Minkowski metric will be written as ηIJ or ηµν , with signature [−,+,+,+]. This
metric is used to raise and lower four-dimensional Lorentz indices I, J, .... The metric of
R3 is δij, the Kronecker delta. This metric is used to raise and lower three-dimensional
internal indices i, j, ....
• IJKL, or µνρσ, and ijk, or abc, are the totally antisymmetric objects with 0123 = 1 and
123 = 1 in four or three dimensions, respectively.
A.4 ACRONYMS
GTR General Theory of Relativity
LQC Loop Quantum Cosmology
LQG Loop Quantum Gravity
QED Quantum Electrodynamics
QFT Quantum Field Theory
QG Quantum Gravity
QTG Quantum Theory of Gravity (any theory combining QT and GR)
QM Quantum Mechanics (“classical” theory around 1930)
QT Quantum Theory (any quantum theory, or all)
STR Special Theory of Relativity
ST (Super-)String Theory (any string theory, or all)
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APPENDIX B
CHALLENGING THE SPACETIME STRUCTURALIST
“Structuralism” or “structural realism,” which I shall use synonymously, can be, and has
been, interpreted in a number of inequivalent ways. Its core thesis, however, is some vari-
ation or other of the idea that whatever scientific theories reveal of the external world is
structural knowledge of this world. Structural realism has been developed as a response to
the pessimistic meta-induction according to which it is incautious, at least, to commit oneself
to any particular scientific theory, given the fact that so far, in any given domain of enquiry,
all but one theories have been superseded by their successor theories. Structural realism
reduces the realist commitment in that it takes on a realist attitude toward those aspects
of a theory which are preserved through the course of a scientific revolution. It defends a
non-vacuous position in that it positively maintains that whatever is preserved through the
course of revolutions is exactly the “structure” embedded in a theory. It is therefore toward
this structure that we should make our realist commitment.
This characterization, of course, remains empty unless some precision of the term “struc-
ture” is offered. Paraphrasing Esfeld (2004), the following definition can be assumed:
Definition 9 (Structure). A structure S is a pair 〈O,R〉 which consists of a non-empty set
of relations R (“ideology”) as well as a non-empty set of relata O (“ontology”), the domain
of S.
In this definition, I have already made the choice of not considering some varieties of
structuralisms according to which there are only relations, without underlying or accompa-
nying relata. At least the rhetoric of some British structuralists suggests that they defend
this extreme, and in my opinion untenable, position. Given the unintelligibility of this posi-
tion, I suspect that such an attribution is plainly false and the position really defended by
these British structuralists differs from the one painted by their rhetoric. But let me press
on.
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The structuralism discussed in this section, as indicated by Definition 9, will assume
that both the relations and the relata are ex aequo necessary constituents of the structural
knowledge the structuralist hopes to attain.1 The structuralist position defended by Esfeld
(2004) amounts to an endorsement of the following definition:
Definition 10 (Structural Realism). The “structural” aspects of a scientific theory, to-
ward which we should entertain a realist attitude, relevantly capture the structure of the
external world. The fundamental scientific theories thus reveal the structure of the external
world, where structure is used in the sense of Definition 9. The objects x ∈ O, i.e. the things
which exemplify the relations R ∈ R, do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relational
ones.
So what is really there according to the structural realist is a network of relations among
objects which do not possess any intrinsic properties but are purely defined by their “place”
in S. How these structural aspects are identified in a given theory is, of course, a highly
non-trivial matter and will largely depend on one’s interpretation of the theory at stake.
For present purposes, I shall assume that these structural aspects of the theory have been
successfully identified.
Let me attempt to capture the idea of structuralism more formally. What the structural
realist characterized by Definition 10 demands is that the world is fundamentally described
by a structure S with objects which exemplify the intra-structural relational properties, but
no other properties. Any other properties would introduce a unwanted reference to something
beyond the purely structural. These intra-structural relational properties are exactly those
which are invariant under automorphisms of S.2 Thus, the set R, which figures in the
definition of a structure, and consequently in the definition of structural realism, contains
only automorphically invariant relational properties.
It can be shown that structural realism characterized as in Definition 10 and applied
to the present context suffers from serious difficulties in accommodating highly symmetric
spacetimes. For these particular spacetime solutions with a high degree of symmetry, a dev-
astating argument in full analogy to the one run by Kera¨nen (2001) against structuralism
in the philosophy of mathematics can be given. To this end, consider the highly symmetric
cosmological standard model in classical GTR, to Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker
1This also implies that the subsequent discussion will not follow Stachel (2006) in assuming that either
the objects or the relations should be primary, where the disjunction is exclusive. For present purposes,
it is presumed that an attractive version of structuralism can be presented without insisting either on
privileging relations over relata or on eliminating objects altogether. I am not alone: Esfeld (2004) shares
this presumption.
2An automorphism f is a map from a domain A onto itself which preserves the structure of A (i.e. is an
isomorphism of a set onto itself). A property is invariant under an automorphism when any element a ∈ A
has the property iff its image f(a) has it.
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(FLRW) spacetimes, discussed in Appendix C. These cosmological models realize the cos-
mological principle, according to which no position is space is privileged in any way, if this
principle is interpreted as requiring spatial homogeneity, as it usually is. Spatial homogene-
ity demands that the universe be the “same in every location.” This idea can be formalized
by
∀p, q ∈ Σ ⊂M,∀F ∈ P (Fp↔ Fq), (B.1)
where P is the set of admissible physical properties with respect to which points in Σ must
be the “same” and Σ is a folio of manifold M when foliated by the cosmological time as
foliation parameter. Proposition (B.1) is valid for any spacelike folio of such a foliation of a
FLRW-spacetime. The spacetime structuralist of the persuasion as captured by Definition
10 reformulates the spatial homogeneity of cosmological models as
∀x, y, z ∈ Σ = O,∀R ∈ R (Rxz ↔ Ryz). (B.2)
The individuality of the objects in O must be ascertained by an identity criterion with whose
help objects can be distinguished. If we had such a criterion, we could count how many
objects are contained in the structure which best describes the world. The most prominent
such criterion is Leibniz’s Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, or a modernized version
thereof. The core idea of this family of principles is to utilize distinction between objects in
terms of the properties they exemplify as a criterion to individuate them. In more formal
words,
∀F ∈ P (Fx↔ Fy)→ x = y. (B.3)
Varieties of this Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) typically differ in what is
taken to be in P (French 2006): (i) ∀F ranges over all possible properties, (ii) ∀F ranges over
all possible properties except spatio-temporal ones, and (iii) ∀F ranges only over intrinsic
properties. The properties here at stake, even in the weakest version (i), are all so-called
qualitative properties. A property is called qualitative just in case its exemplification does
not depend upon the existence of any particular individual. Haecceistic properties, i.e. prop-
erties based on a particular object’s being that particular individual, or its “thisness,” are
thus excluded. Furthermore, disjunctive properties such as “being featherless or being biped”
are to be excluded, as well as perhaps properties with otherwise “pathological” behaviour.
Intrinsic are all and only those qualitative properties whose exemplification is independent
of the existence of other contingent objects. Intrinsic properties can thus be attributed in-
dependently of accompaniment or loneliness. All non-intrinsic properties are either extrinsic
if they are monadic, or else relational.
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The strongest version of PII, viz. PII(iii), claims that no two individuals can possess the
same intrinsic properties. This principle is clearly violated in classical physics, where distinct
particles may be regarded as indistinguishable as far as intrinsic properties are concerned.
Black (1952) has proposed a counterexample against such a strong version of PII by placing
two indistinguishable spheres in an otherwise empty universe. Assuming that we placed two
individual spheres into the vacuum universe, Black’s example not only violates PII(iii), but
also PII(ii). Does it also violate PII(i)? Not as long as the universe into which the spheres
are put is interpreted as a fixed background. In this case, the set of properties attributed to
the two spheres are not entirely identical: at least properties based on their spatio-temporal
location will not coincide.3 So at least the weakest form of PII is usually taken to be valid
in classical physics, where spatio-temporal trajectories of rigid bodies do not overlap.
The structural realist must re-interpret PII to adapt it to her purpose. The only accept-
able version of PII for her, clearly, holds that ∀F ranges over R. So for the structural realist,
(B.3) thus becomes
∀z ∈ O,∀R ∈ R (Rxz ↔ Ryz)→ x = y, (B.4)
where the outermost universal quantifiers of x and y have been omitted for clarity’s sake, just
as in (B.3). Now the analogue of Kera¨nen’s argument (Kera¨nen 2001) can be derived easily:
for spatially homogeneous spacetimes, we get from (B.1) and (B.4) by modus ponens that
x = y. But since x and y have been arbitrary elements in Σ = O, all points of Σ coincide
and there is only one point in Σ. In other words, the universe consists of one point only!
Since the group of automorphisms of Σ are the isometries of Σ, and the group of isometries
of Σ is transitive, i.e. any point in Σ can be moved into any other point in Σ, all points in
Σ must share the same properties.4 But if all points in Σ share the same automorphically
invariant properties, they can only constitute one individual.
The structural realist cannot distinguish between the elements of O. But if the objects
in O cannot be distinguished, they must be identified according to (B.4). However, when
every other object that there might have been must be identified with one particular object,
then we say that there is only one object. In other words,
∃!x [x ∈ O]⇐⇒def ∃x [x ∈ O ∧ ∀y (y ∈ O→ x = y)] .
Can the spacetime structural realist hope to have a comeback after this reductio of her
position? Yes, and there are at least five defensible strategies to meet this challenge:
1. dismiss Definition 10 and redefine structural realism;
3This point assumes that the topology of the space into which the spheres are placed is R3. One could
re-interpret the situation as one sphere which is put into a non-Euclidean space.
4Cf. footnote 1 in Appendix C.
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2. deny the relevance of homogeneous cosmological models (and similarly symmetric space-
times);
3. reject PII(i) even for classical physics and urge its replacement with another criterion of
individuation;
4. claim that PII(i) is inapplicable to the case at hand because no criterion of individuation
is needed at all; and
5. claim that PII(i) is inapplicable to the case at hand because bare points in Σ as such
need not be individuated.
The first strategy can easily be chosen, but for each novel characterization, one will have
to ascertain that it does not run afoul of the Kera¨nen move. It transcends the limits of
the present investigation to offer an analysis which is sufficiently comprehensive to permit
generic conclusions about whether structural realism per se must face this challenge. I
suspect, however, that most versions of structural realism which deserve this name will be
subject to a similar counter-argument. Let me briefly consider the other four exit-strategies.
The second path, which denies the relevance of these highly symmetric spacetimes on
which the challenge relies, will most promisingly do so by invoking a measure-theoretic
consideration. The symmetric spacetimes of the type FLRW, this defence will run, are
arguably of measure zero in the space of solutions of the classical field equations. Since
the Einstein equations have not been solved in their full generality and since this space is
therefore not explicitly known, this line of argument incurs a promissory note recording the
debt of producing this space including a natural measure defined on it. Even if we accept
this promissory note for the time being, the contention that the disturbing conclusion will
only arise in almost no possible worlds is not implied. The structural realist will still have
to establish that the displeasingly symmetric spacetimes are in fact of measure zero. But let
us grant this, and let us even grant that the defence translates into the quantum case, i.e.
that highly symmetric solutions are also of measure zero in the physical Hilbert space of full
LQG. Even then would this defence be rather inelegant, as it is simply not the case that e.g.
the FLRW models are irrelevant. This train of thought, however, opens up the possibility of
running it in the “return” direction. But the inverted argument belongs to the third class
of defence strategies.
The third strategy rejects PII(i) as a valid criterion of individuation and seeks to supplant
it. The first answer in this vein builds on an inversion of the objection aired in the previous
paragraph and denies that PII(i) is necessarily true. It insists that its truth is contingent and
if its application in the context of fundamental physics leads to absurd results, it should be
given up as a criterion of individuation and be replaced by a more sensible alternative. Thus,
the above argument shows that PII(i) implies a disturbing and obviously false conclusion for
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some highly symmetric spacetimes. This fact can be taken as evidence that the principle
must be rejected as a criterion of individuation in those possible worlds in which it thus fails.
This is exactly what it means for the principle to be only contingent: while it is true in almost
all possible worlds, it is false in some possible worlds, which happen to be of measure zero.
To find out whether the principle is true in the actual world is thus a matter of empiricy. As
we arguably live in a spatially inhomogeneous universe, it will likely turn out as true. This
escape, however, must explain why a metaphysical principle of individuation should not be
universally valid no matter what. Why should it be acceptable to entertain different such
criteria even within a single physical theory?
Saunders (2003) offers another variant of the third strategy to counter the challenger.
He proposes to find, or construct, a symmetric, but irreflexive relation S ∈ R such as to
render the objects “weakly discernible” and hence save them from being identified.5 The
attraction of this approach is that this irreflexivity can ground the object’s individuality
without recourse to some sort of primitive thisness. However, it faces at least two other
difficulties. First, it may not be so trivial to find such a relation defined on a homogeneous
spacelike hypersurface Σ without disturbing its homogeneity, if homogeneity is understood as
defined in (B.1). Second, it appears as if in order to appeal to such relations, an individuation
of objects must already be presupposed: how can I know that there are at least two objects
such that an irreflexive relation can be exemplified on the elements of Σ? I do not see how
this suspicion of circularity can be dispelled.
Of course there remains at least a third possibility for enacting an exit-strategy of type
three. Esfeld (2004, p. 603) explicitly leaves open the possibility that the objects have non-
qualitative properties such as primitive thisness. These haecceities seem to deliver a last
resort if everything else has failed. If the individuation of objects is based on them, they
become ineliminable members of the set of properties that the structural realist must admit.
But haecceities are non-relational properties, and certainly not automorphically invariant.
Therefore, haecceities cannot be an attractive option for the structural realist. Most philoso-
phers, with the notable exception of Oliver Pooley, would consider a haecceistic account of
individuation as having a strong family resemblance with typical forms of substantivalism,
and therefore as opposed to the spirit of structural realism understood here as a kind of
relationism. More importantly, perhaps, unobservable haecceities re-open the “gap between
metaphysics and epistemology” that many structural realists such as Esfeld are so anxious
to close.
Esfeld (2004) himself endorses an escape along the fourth line of defence, i.e. denying
5A relation R defined on a set O is irreflexive just in case no element of O is thus related to itself:
∀x ∈ O(¬Rxx).
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that any criterion of individuation is needed at all, when he states that “[t]here is no need
for the [objects] of which [relational] properties can be predicated to be distinct individuals.”
(p. 611) He reaffirms his this attitude two pages later when he writes that “[t]he argument
of this paper accepts that relations require things that stand in the relations (although
these things do not have to be individuals, and they need not have intrinsic properties).”
(p. 613) Insisting that objects which stand in relations need not be individuals seems highly
counterintuitive: should there not be a fact of the matter whether two “places” x and y
in a structure S are identical or not? In other words, should the statement x = y not
have a definite truth value? Although intuitions may deceive, and they often do at the
level of fundamental physics, it nevertheless seems as if the advocate of the no-criterion-of-
identity-is-needed position owes an account of why such a criterion is not needed and why
our intuitions must be overturned in this case.
In a brief reaction to my challenge, Esfeld and Lam (2006, Sec. 1) criticized what they take
to be my metaphysical position as motivating my questionable demand that objects must
carry intrinsic properties as only such properties can ground the individuality of the relata.
This metaphysical position, which they seem to attribute to me, assumes that the objects
enjoy a metaphysically prior position over the relations. I respond with an emphatic “no.” I
insist that even for structural realists a` la Definition 10, i.e. for someone who puts relata and
relations on an equal footing, identity criteria will be required to individuate both objects
and relations. In general, no intrinsic properties are required at all in order to individuate
objects. Thus, I also maintain that individuating objects and relations is in general possible
within the structural realist programme, but runs into trouble in highly symmetric cases.6
The highly symmetric cases may only go to show that we have not correctly identified the
structure S, as I try to sketch in the description of the sixth strategy.
The final reply to the challenge seems to most promising route to me: claim that PII(i)
does not apply to the case at hand since the points of the bare manifold Σ as such need
not be individuated. This is a much milder form of response four because it does not deny
that a criterion of individuation is required for the places of a fundamental structure but
still claims that the points in Σ need not be individuated. This strategy is also minimally
radical: structural realism as typically understood, and as characterized by Definition 10, can
be maintained, while the individuation need not be governed by haecceities. As it maintains
6I have not discussed the individuation of properties. It seems obvious to me, however, that this will be
equally necessary for a structure S to be intelligible. But it might seem less problematic if relata are only
related by one relation. For a structural realist, however, this would resurrect a similar worry as the one
exposed by the challenge: will it still be possible in general to individuate objects in the ontology with the
help of only one relation? The answer is yes, although in order to be able to individuate objects, symmetric
structures must be excluded.
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that the objects in O of a structure S must be individuated, and since the manifold points
in Σ cannot be individuals as shown by the challenge, it must consequently deny that the
manifold points in Σ can play the role of the relata in S. Therefore, manifold points should
not be interpreted as places in the fundamental structure describing reality according to
GTR. In other words, Σ 6= O. Arguably, this resolution of the challenge posed to structural
realism in this section receives independent support from the hole argument discussed in
Section 3.2. Of course, this sketch of a proposed resolution is entirely programmatic. In
particular, it will have to be fleshed out how one can identify the individuals which take the
place of the relata in the structure at hand. But this is the topic for another occasion.
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APPENDIX C
CLASSICAL COSMOLOGY:
FRIEDMANN-LEMAıˆTRE-ROBERTSON-WALKER SPACETIMES
This appendix gives a quick summary of the most important points on the cosmological stan-
dard model in GTR, the so-called Friedmann-Lemaˆıtre-Robertson-Walker (FLRW) space-
times. In the main body of the text, it is assumed that the reader is familiar with this mate-
rial, for which I claim no originality whatsoever. Those unfamiliar with FLRW spacetimes,
or those in need of a reminder should consult this appendix before moving on to Chapter
6. Reader interested in studying the FLRW models in depth, should consult the pertinent
literature, most notably Hawking and Ellis (1973, Sec. 5.3), Weinberg (1972, Sec. 14.2 and
Ch. 15), and Wald (1984, Ch. 5) and references therein or Cheng (2005, Chs. 7, 8) for a more
recent account and up-to-date references.
Modern cosmology uses the so-called Copernican or cosmological principle, according to
which no position in space—including ours—is privileged in any way. It is generally inter-
preted to mean that the universe must exhibit spatial homogeneity, at least approximately
so. Spatial homogeneity is mathematically encoded in the action of a group of isometries
on M with spacelike hypersurfaces as the group’s surfaces of transitivity.1 Any point on
any spacelike hypersurface is thus equivalent to any other point on the same hypersurface.
Appendix B exploits this homogeneity to challenge the spacetime structural realist.
Spatial homogeneity is only expected to obtain at sufficiently large scales. Unfortunately,
testing spatial homogeneity seems impossible, for we have access to only a tiny portion of the
entire universe. What we can observe, however, are isotropies and anisotropies. Observations
have so far corroborated that the universe is approximately spherically symmetric about
our location. Anisotropies in the cosmic background radiation, for example, have been
1The surface of transitivity of a group G acting on the manifold M is the set Ω ⊂ M of all points such
that the group action G×Ω −→ Ω possesses only a single group orbit, i.e. for every pair of elements x, y ∈ Ω,
there exists a group element g ∈ G such that gx = y.
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observationally confined to be small. Hence, exact spherically symmetric models of GTR are
good approximations to the large-scale structure of spacetime—at least in the region that we
can observe. Because of the spherical symmetry about our location, the Copernican principle
would have it that the universe is spherically symmetric about every point in spacetime. The
close relationship between isotropy and homogeneity of space has been made explicit by a
theorem due to Walker (1944):
Theorem 2 (Walker). If a spacetime (M, gµν) exhibits exact spherical symmetry about each
of the points p ∈ M, then it is spatially homogeneous and admits a six-parameter group of
isometries whose surfaces of transitivity are spacelike hypersurfaces Σ of constant curvature.
Spacetimes (M, gµν) with exact spherical symmetry about every point are exactly the
FLRW spacetimes mentioned above. Theorem 2 establishes that there exists a preferred
foliation of a FLRW spacetime. This foliation into spacelike hypersurfaces of constant three-
dimensional curvature is determined by the isometry group and can be labelled by a time
coordinate t. A time t thus privileged is called a cosmological time. In conveniently chosen
coordinates t, r, θ, φ, where t ∈ R+, r ∈ R+, θ ∈ [0, pi], φ ∈ [0, 2pi], FLRW spacetimes are
given by the metric
ds2 = −dt2 + a20a2(t)
[
dr2
1− kr2 + r
2dθ2 + r2 sin2 θdφ2
]
, (C.1)
where a(t) is a yet to be determined positive, dimensionless function of the cosmological
time, a0 is the “present size of the universe,” and k is a constant which can assume the
values −1, 0 and +1 in appropriately chosen units for r. This constant captures the sign of
the spatial curvature. The spatial geometry of the spacelike hypersurfaces Σ privileged by
the isometry group is given by the part of (C.1) in square brackets, which is independent
of t. When k = 0 or −1, the hypersurfaces Σ are diffeomorphic to R3 (“open”) and r runs
from 0 to ∞. For k = 1, the Σ are diffeomorphic to a three-sphere S3, in which case Σ is
compact or “closed” and r runs from 0 to 2pi. Cosmological time is diffeomorphic to R and
assumes values in the open interval ]a, b[ ⊆ R.
The three-dimensional curvature scalar of spacetimes with metric (C.1) is given by
3R =
k
a20a
2(t)
, (C.2)
i.e. the curvature of the three-spaces is inversely proportional to a2(t). For k = −1 (the
hyperbolic case) and for k = 0 (the Euclidean case), the Σs are infinite, while for k = 1
(the spherical case), they are unbounded, but finite, with circumference 3U = 2pia0a(t) and
proper volume 3V = 2pi2a30a
3(t). In the latter case, the Σs can be regarded as spheres of
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radii a0a(t) in E4, in which case a(t) is the size of the universe in terms of the present size
of the universe, i.e. in terms of the radius of the spherical three-space at some fiducial time.
For the hyperbolic and Euclidean geometries, this direct interpretation of a(t) fails. As it
nevertheless scales the three-spaces, a(t) is called the (dimensionless) scale factor in all three
cases.
As a result of the symmetry of (C.1), the energy-momentum tensor takes the form (Hawk-
ing and Ellis 1973, p. 70)
Tµν = (ρ+ p)VµVν + p gµν , (C.3)
which is the form of a perfect fluid with density ρ(t) and pressure p(t) which only depend on
time, but must be the same anywhere in a given Σ because of the Copernican principle. The
flow lines of the fluid assume constant values of r, θ and φ. The unit vectors Vµ are tangents
to these flow lines. This means that the coordinate system which yielded the simple form in
which (C.1) is cast is a co-moving frame. The factor a0a(t) thus scales the separation of flow
lines, i.e. the separation between neighbouring galaxies. From the conservation of energy
and momentum ∇µTµν = 0 (where “∇” designates the covariant derivative) and (C.3), one
obtains
ρ˙ = −3(ρ+ p) a˙
a
. (C.4)
Together with an equation of state p = p(ρ), (C.4) can be used to determine the density ρ
as a function of the scale factor a. For instance, for a radiation-dominated universe, we have
p = ρ/3 (“radiation”) which, when inserted into (C.4), leads to ρ ∝ a−4. For a universe
dominated by non-relativistic matter, the pressure is negligible (p  ρ, “dust”) and (C.4)
is solved by ρ ∝ a−3. Thus, all physical parameters have been reduced to a single one, the
scale factor, which captures the remaining dynamical degree of freedom.
In order to find the dynamical evolution of the remaining degree of freedom, the Einstein
field equations must be used. The cosmological principle, via the FLRW metric (C.1), fixes
the left hand side of the equations. But it also constrains the right hand side: the simplest
choice of Tµν satisfying the requirement of isotropy and homogeneity is the perfect fluid
(C.3). The Einstein equations thus relate the geometric parameters of the scale factor a(t)
and of the curvature signature k to those describing the cosmic fluid, i.e. to the density ρ(t)
and the pressure p(t). As mentioned above, the state equation p = p(ρ) and (C.4) reduce
the three unknown functions to a single one—a(t)—which is determined by the Einstein
equations. The symmetry requirements of the cosmological principle (and of diffeomorphism
invariance) reduce the independent components of the Einstein equations from ten to two
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(Wald 1984, Sec. 5.2). They are given by
a˙2
a2
=
8Gpi
3
ρ− k
a20a
2
+
Λ
3
, (C.5)
a¨
a
= −4Gpi
3
(ρ+ 3p) +
Λ
3
, (C.6)
and are called the first and second Friedmann equation, respectively. The three equations
(C.4), (C.5), and (C.6) are not functionally independent: the two Friedmann equations (C.5)
and (C.6) are related to (C.4) via the Bianchi identities ∇µ(Rµν − 12Rgµν) = 0. Because
(C.4) affords such a straightforward interpretation as statement of energy conservation and
is mathematically simple, it is often used in conjunction with (C.5).2 These equations in two
variables a and ρ are of first order, and thus govern one single degree of freedom.
Even without specifying an equation of state, some statements about the FLRW models
can be made. First, provided that Λ = 0 and that (ρ+ 3p) is positive, which is not entirely
unreasonable to assume, by (C.6), the scale factor a(t) decelerates. The universe, according
to these models, can only be static in case Λ = 4piG(ρ + 3p). This may or may not be the
case. Because it is reasonable to assume that ρ > 0 and p ≥ 0, the rate of expansion can
only be increasing if Λ > 0.3 Barring the possibility of quintessence or other strange forms
of matter, and insisting—perhaps erroneously—that Λ < 4piG(ρ+3p), the rate of expansion
of the universe is slowing down. Furthermore, since a is per definitionem presently greater
than zero and because the presently observed red shift of distant galaxies suggests a˙/a > 0,
it must be the case that there was a time t in the finite past such that a(t) = 0. Let us
calibrate the origin of the t-coordinate such that a(0) = 0.
Thus, assuming Λ < 4piG(ρ + 3p) > 0, interpreting the observed red shift as evidence
for a˙/a > 0, demanding exact isotropy about every point of the cosmological model and
excluding strange forms of matter, general relativity makes the astounding prediction that
there was a time in the finite past when the distance between all points of space was zero
and thus all flow lines coincided in this point. Since the flow lines are interpreted as idealized
world lines of galaxies, this means that going back in time toward this point of coincidence,
the galaxies must have been closer and closer. Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that
(C.4) implies that the density ρ must increase as the scale factor decreases (and conversely),
and in fact must increase without bound as a → 0. Equation (C.2) shows that the same
holds for the curvature scalar 3R of the three-spaces if k 6= 0. In fact, the Einstein equations
2E.g. Cheng (2005, p. 137f) uses (C.5) and (C.6) to derive (C.4), while Hawking and Ellis (1973, p. 137)
explain that whenever a˙ 6= 0, (C.5) can be can be derived as a first integral of (C.4) and (C.6).
3Or if there exists a strange form of matter, the so-called “quintessence” (Earman 2001). Cf. Section 12
of this reference for a review of the evidence for Λ 6= 0 up to 2001.
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show that because ρ → ∞ for a → 0, there must be some scalar which diverges for a → 0.
The four-dimensional scalar curvature, which is given by
4R = − 6
a2
(
aa¨+ a˙2 +
k
a20
)
, (C.7)
grows beyond any bound as a = 0 is approached from above. This singular behaviour of 3R
and 4R is what I refer to in Chapter 6 as a kinematic singularity. In contrast to the analogous
situation in Newtonian spacetime, where galaxies also converge in one point and where thus
all particles intersect in this point and the density equally diverges, spacetime itself becomes
singular in the relativistic model as all distances between “points in space” vanish. No
physical laws could be well-defined there. The point of convergence is therefore excluded
from the spacetime and the cosmological time t assumes only strictly positive values.
One physical law which breaks down at a = 0 is the Friedmann equation (C.5), as no
regular solution a = a(t) can pass through a = 0. This means that the (backward) evolution
of the universe is ground to a halt at the “big bang.” In this sense, the FLRW models with
the specified parameters are also dynamically singular. The dynamically singular character
of these models can also be expressed by pointing out that they are geodesically incomplete
at the “initial” singularity, because geodesics can be interpreted as representing admissible
trajectories of matter or radiation.
Initially, many physicists believed that the initial singularity could be avoided when
the strictly isotropic FLRW models would be replaced with more realistic models including
anisotropies in the distribution of matter and energy. This hope was based on the idea that
these local irregularities in the density distribution would grow when traced back in time
and could thus prevent the singularity by causing the universe to “bounce,” i.e. to grow
larger again after (or really: before) a minimal size was attained. Those who championed
this idea must have felt a heartbreaking disappointment when Penrose and Hawking proved
their singularity theorems, establishing that the initial singularity occurs generically in a
wide class of physically realistic models.
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APPENDIX D
COMMUTATOR OF THE INVERSE SCALE FACTOR AND
HAMILTONIAN CONSTRAINTS OPERATORS
In this appendix, I shall compute the commutation relation of the inverse scale factor operator
and the Hamiltonian constraint operator applied to an eigenstate |µ〉 of the volume operator,
as used in Section 8.1. The calculation of
 ̂(sgn(p)√|p|
)
, Ĉgrav
 |µ〉
is straightforward, given equations (7.9) and (7.11). We get (in Planck units)
̂(
sgn(p)√|p|
)
Ĉgrav|µ〉 = 32√
piβ5
(
Vµ+
√
3/4 + Vµ−√3/4
)
·[(√
|µ+
√
3 + 1| −
√
|µ+
√
3− 1|
)
|µ+
√
3〉
−2
(√
|µ+ 1| −
√
|µ− 1|
)
|µ〉
+
(√
|µ−
√
3 + 1| −
√
|µ−
√
3− 1|
)
|µ−
√
3〉
]
,
and
Ĉgrav
̂(
sgn(p)√|p|
)
|µ〉 = 32√
piβ5
(
Vµ+
√
3/4 + Vµ−√3/4
)
·(√
|µ+ 1| −
√
|µ− 1|
)(
|µ+
√
3〉 − 2|µ〉+ |µ−
√
3〉
)
.
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Obviously, the coefficients for the |µ+√3〉- and the |µ−√3〉-terms differ in the two equations.
Combining them yields ̂(sgn(p)√|p|
)
, Ĉgrav
 |µ〉 = 32√
piβ5
(
Vµ+
√
3/4 + Vµ−√3/4
)
· (D.1)
[(√
|µ+
√
3 + 1| −
√
|µ+
√
3− 1| −
√
|µ+ 1|+
√
|µ− 1|
)
|µ+
√
3〉
+
(√
|µ−
√
3 + 1| −
√
|µ−
√
3− 1| −
√
|µ+ 1|+
√
|µ− 1|
)
|µ−
√
3〉
]
,
which does not, in general, vanish. The inverse scale factor operator does therefore not
represent a Dirac observable.
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